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ABSTRACT  
This is exploratory research that has examined the efficacy of agricultural marketing 
cooperatives in the UK as a mechanism to redress power imbalances when faced with highly 
consolidated downstream markets. This issue would appear to be of particular significance in 
the light of the continued UK government emphasis on the cooperative action as a means of 
supporting farm gate prices following the deregulation of European Markets. This research 
draws upon, and examines the possible linkages between two key bodies of literature, Power 
Dependency Theory and literature based on the issue of common property and the free-rider 
problem and presents, through the exploratory framework, the idea that cooperative success is 
contingent upon an iterative relationship between leverage and cohesion (Emerson, 1962: Olson, 
1965). This understanding is used to examine the three diverse marketing cooperatives, and 
findings from which suggest that cooperatives in current market structures are unable to 
improve their leverage position over the longer term. The research also suggests that there is not 
necessarily an iterative relationship between cohesiveness and improved leverage. What is 
apparent is that Cooperatives endure because they offer other types of benefits to farmers and 
currently play an important role is sustaining a failing farming sector.  
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CHAPTER 1 
AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE ISSUES OF COOPERATIVES 
 
1.0 Introduction  
It is generally agreed that the UK agricultural sector is going through a period of crisis. Despite 
price increases in the 1990s, total income from the farming sector declined from £7bn in 1970 to 
£2.7bn in 2006 (DEFRA, 2007b). There has recently been something of a recovery, as in 2010 
total farming income increased to £4.38billion (DEFRA, 2010). It has become evident though 
that farm gate prices in certain sectors are still very low by historical standards, and in certain 
sectors, such as the pig and dairy sectors, are below the costs of production (BPEX, 2008; 
DairyCo, 2008) 
Whilst the literature points to a number of explanations of the source of this crisis, there is 
reasonable agreement that its cause can be primarily attributed to the combined effect of the 
move towards market liberalisation, following the GATT Agreement on Agriculture, and 
downstream market concentration.  
The UK government, under different political hues, has felt compelled to respond to this crisis. 
Since 1996 there has been a number of rural development programmes, which have included 
various initiatives designed to promote rural economies. These have included initiatives 
designed to help farmers develop competitive businesses through innovation or diversification, 
2 
as well as initiatives designed to safeguard the “rural” landscape, for example, the 
environmental stewardship schemes.    
A prominent underpinning dimension of much of the government’s response has been the 
promotion of cooperation and farming cooperatives. Cooperative formats vary quite 
considerably on a number of dimensions, including share ownership, decision rights and 
membership rules, but up until recently those established in the UK have had more in common 
with Traditional cooperative principles than with the more recent formats that have emerged in 
the US and Europe. 
Traditional cooperatives are defined by four key principles: all shares should be owned by 
members, each member has one vote, all earnings are distributed to members and no parties 
should be excluded from membership; the so called, user-owner, user-controlled, user-benefit, 
and open membership principles (Barton, 1989).  Their function is to deliver improved farm 
gate prices to their members. 
In encouraging cooperative action, the government hopes that a less fragmented UK farming 
sector will become more sustainable and successful. The logic behind this policy is that 
cooperatives will offer farmers a countervailing force against horizontal or vertical competition. 
However, despite the heavy focus of the government on cooperative action, the question 
emerges as to whether this aspect of the government policy response can successfully address 
problems faced by the sector.  
3 
In examining the literature on cooperatives and cooperative action, it is apparent that there are 
two distinct themes which stand out regarding the success of co-operatives. Firstly, in the 
context of UK government policy, the success of cooperatives is dependent upon their ability to 
provide the membership with increased leverage.  The first literature theme draws from Power 
Dependency Theory (Emerson, 1962). Emerson suggests that cooperation of this kind will only 
be an effective counterweight when two conditions are met; that the cooperative a) is able to 
achieve scarcity relative to that of the exchange partner, b) is able to improve the exchange 
partner’s motivational investment. The second and more substantive strand of the literature 
focuses upon the issue of cohesion, which has both influenced and drawn upon the work of 
Olson, 1965). Where the concept of cohesion reflects the coherence of cooperative member 
objectives, Olson has argued that where benefits are attained, freeriding can become rampant, 
causing the institution to decline and disintegrate. Of course the two literatures are not unrelated. 
That is to say that a) a lack of organisational cohesion may undermine the ability of cooperatives 
to deliver a negotiated counterweight and b) conversely the failure of the cooperative to act as a 
counterweight may lead to a loss of organisational integrity. 
In this thesis, the author will examine the extent to which UK farming cooperatives are in fact 
increasing leverage and maintaining cohesion and the intuitive expectation that greater leverage 
will assist cohesion and cohesion will assist great leverage. If, across the sector, agricultural 
cooperatives are able to achieve both leverage and cohesion then it is likely that the UK 
government will deliver the desired-for alleviation of the crisis in the sector. If they can’t, the 
efficacy of the government’s policy will be in doubt.  
 
4 
The author pursues this research aim via the mechanism of an exploratory study based on 
qualitative data. Data was collected from three cooperatives, in different commodity areas, 
which have predominantly the characteristics of traditional cooperatives. The research findings 
suggest that there does indeed appear to be an iterative relationship between leverage and 
cohesion and cooperatives are unable to improve leverage when faced with a highly competitive 
buyers’ market. Their ability to generate leverage and thus coherence is further undermined by 
the offensive strategies of competitors in a highly contested market.  
 
The thesis proceeds in the following manner. This introductory chapter starts by describing the 
crisis in agriculture in more detail and the measures implemented by the UK government, before 
going on to introduce the discourse of factors affecting the success of cooperatives.  Chapters 2 
and 3 examine the theoretical constructs that underpin the thesis. In chapter 2 the exploratory 
theoretical framework based on Emerson is outlined. This is followed in Chapter 3 by 
examination of the insights gathered from Olson on the free rider problem. Chapter 4 brings the 
two sides of the problem together into a single exploratory framework. These are followed by 
chapter 5, the methodology, and chapters 6- 9, the case studies. Chapters 10 and 11 respectively 
discuss the research and its limitations and recommendations for future research, followed by 
the concluding chapter, chapter 12. 
 
1.1 The UK farming sector  
In the UK, over recent years, farmers have seen a sharp decline in farm gate prices (Van 
Bekkum, 2001). These have fallen, in some cases, by 50% of their mid-1990s levels, (DEFRA, 
5 
2000). At difficult times, a number of factors are seen to have contributed, including 
overproduction and the collapse in commodity prices, the high value of the £ sterling, the 
collapse of the Russian and Asian markets, the excessive returns of retailers and wholesalers, the 
impact of animal welfare standards, the inelasticity of the demand for food, and the lack of 
market orientation of farmers (Anderson et al., 2001; Anderson, 2004; Vorley, 2003; Aksoy et 
al., 2005; Regmi, 2005; DEFRA, 2007b). Two further ‘culprits’ are seen to be particularly 
prominent contributors to the current crisis: trade liberalisation and the continued consolidation 
of the buyers’ market. The next four sub-sections discuss the above in more detail. 
1.1.1 The decline in agriculture – evidence of economic problems  
Despite the increases in prices during the early 1990s, there has been evidence of a continual 
decline in farm incomes. In the UK, total income from farms declined from £7bn, in 1970 to 
£2.7bn in 2006 (Oglethorpe, 2005; DEFRA, 2007b; OECD, 2008). In 2005/06 a quarter of 
farmers had net incomes of less than zero, and half had an income of less than £10,000 
(DEFRA, 2005; 2006b).  Average income per farmer in 2007 was around £13,540 and whilst 
this was up from £12,500 in 2006, a function particularly of the consolidation of the farming 
sector, it had declined from £20,558 in 1996.  Some of the highest average incomes were found 
in cereal production, with an average income to farmers of £27,900. However, increases in costs 
of production, due to rising fuel prices, have resulted in even slimmer profit margins and these 
have been particularly marked in cattle and sheep farms in Less Favoured Areas (LFA) (Vorley, 
2003; DEFRA, 2006b).   
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These trends, along with the high price of land and low succession rates have resulted in the 
steady decline in the farming population. Currently around 1.2% of the population are involved 
in farming, but the number of farms had declined from some 500,000 farms in the UK as a 
whole to around 311,000, including horticultural holdings, by 2005 (Vidal, 2003; DEFRA, 
2007b). On average, the decline in numbers of farms across OECD countries has been 1.5% per 
year (Vidal, 2003). 
Farm income levels and the number of farmers leaving the sector have been attributed to the 
decline and stagnation of UK commodity prices (DEFRA, 2007b). In 1996-1998 the average 
price for cereals was £137.50 per tonne but by 2003 this had declined to £110.70 per tonne. 
Similar price declines were evident across other commodities. Milk declined from an all-time 
high of over 24p per litre in 1995-1996, following the disbandment of the Milk Marketing Board 
in 1994, to 17.05 pence in 2002, creating as a consequence a decline in livestock prices over the 
same period (http:statistics.defra.gov.uk/esg/ publications/amr/datum, 2008). Alongside the 
decline in UK farm gate prices, the cost of production, mainly on account of increases in fuel 
and fertiliser prices, has shown a steady increase over the same period (DEFRA, 2007). 
As discussed above, any number of reasons has been proposed as factors affecting farm incomes 
and farm gate prices. Yet, two of the most frequently highlighted are the liberalisation of trade 
and over-supply (Anderson et al., 2001; Anderson, 2004; Vorley, 2003; Aksoy et al., 2005) and 
the interconnected increased concentration of market power amongst trans-national corporations 
(Anderson et al., 2000; Anderson, 2004; Lang, 2005). 
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1.1.2 Causes of problems – market concentration downstream  
A handful of integrated store groups control most of the UK market. Food sales through major 
retailers increased from 22% in the 1950s1, to 44% in 1971, to current figures where the top 4 
retailers account for more than 75% of the UK market, of which of the top retailer,  Tesco, holds 
over 30%  (Wrigley, 1987;  Morelli,1999; Clark, 2000; IGD, 2005; IGD, 2009).  
Increased concentration within the retail sector is paralleled in other European countries and the 
United States as well as being an emerging trend at a global level. Published food sales figures 
indicate that the percentage share of food sales for retailers is dominated by supermarkets, even 
in African states (Regmi et al., 2005).  
These levels of concentration in the UK can be linked to events of over half a century ago. One 
such was the abandonment of the resale price maintenance system in 1964. The effect of the 
removal of RPM, because it prohibited price fixing by the manufacturers, was to redistribute the 
balance of power between manufacturers and retailers (Morelli, 1998; 2004).  However, 
concerns were expressed as early as the 1970s (Bolton Committee, 1977) about the impact of 
deregulation on smaller retailers and the growing concentration within this sector (Clarke, 
2000). As well as the RPM change, increased consumer mobility through car ownership and an 
increase in the numbers of working women added momentum to the changes in market 
structure, bringing about a significant shift in the power balance between manufacturers and 
retailers (Dawson and Kirby, 1979; Hollingsworth, 2004). 
                                                                
1  Retailers with more than 10 outlets  
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Increased purchasing power, as retailers continued to consolidate, resulted in the continued 
erosion of manufacturers’ profits, with average margins for manufacturers declining from 12% 
in1960 to around 8% in 1986 (Strak et al., 1995). None the less, it was the development of own 
brands by the multiple retailers that brought about a fundamental transformation, that is, a 
reversal of the power balance between the manufacturers and their customers.  At first, 
consumers perceived own brands to be a cheaper option, but retailers have since overcome this 
negative perception (Burt, 2000; IGD, 2003).  
In their position of market dominance, retailers have effectively become gatekeepers to the 
consumer, controlling shelf space as well as consumer perceptions of quality and acceptable 
product standards (Cooper, 2003; Dobson et al., 2003). This has enabled the retail sector to 
place increasing pressure on manufacturers to absorb additional costs such as slotting fees2, shelf 
ready packing, factory gate pricing and audit costs (Sullivan, 1997). Retailers have attempted to 
further reduce costs through the centralisation of distribution systems and the development of 
category management, which is a type of sourcing strategy whereby retailers are looking for 
fewer, larger, more efficient and innovative suppliers. Both measures have resulted in the 
decline of alternative markets for the farming sector (Hughes, 1996; Fearne and Hughes, 2000; 
White, 2000; Hingley, 2001). 
                                                                
2 Fixed fees paid to retailers by manufacturers for stocking a new product on a trial basis 
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The shift in power positions between the retail and manufacturing sectors and changes in the 
market channel structure have placed the farming community in a weak position and made it 
increasingly dependent on the multiple retail sector. 
The impact of UK retail practices on farmers and manufacturing sectors has not escaped the 
notice of the government and the media. A number of investigations have been conducted by the 
UK Competition Commission, in 2000, 2003, and 2007, but have repeatedly found that retailers 
are not exploiting their position of power but using it to provide benefits to the consumer 
(MMC, 1981; MMC, 1985; MMC, 1999; Burt et al., 2003; Cooper, 2003; Dobson et al., 2003; 
Hollingsworth, 2004). Furthermore, it has been found that there are “no systemic problems” 
with the economic viability of suppliers (Emerging Thinking report, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
UK government introduced the New Enterprise Act in 2002 and the Retailer Code of Practice, as 
a framework to empower the Office of Fair Trading to have an annual review of practice to 
ensure retailer conformance. The introduction of these measures would seem to reflect acute 
fears of monopsonistic behaviour within the sector. 
  
Whilst admittedly there has as yet been little official evidence that suppliers to the retail sector 
have had to accept lower prices than from alternative buyers, comparisons of gross margins 
would appear to suggest that this is so (Cox et al., 2005; 2007). Furthermore, reports take little 
account of the practices of retailers who place pressure on suppliers to absorb the costs of due 
diligence, delivery and marketing (Competition Commission, 2007), although it is 
acknowledged that supermarkets “bully” their suppliers (DEFRA, 2007a). 
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1.1.3. Causes of problems – liberalisation of trade 
A second factor that has significantly affected the nature of farm gate prices is the de-regulation 
of European markets. As the result of the Uruguay GATT/ WTO Round and the Agriculture 
Agreement 1986-94, pressure was placed on many industrialised countries to reconsider their 
agricultural and trade policy.  The EU countries were also required to introduce measures in 
order to relax tariffs and quotas and reduce the agricultural prices, under article 39 of the Treaty 
of Rome as part of the European Common agricultural policy “CAP”. The Common 
Agricultural Policy was originally devised with the key objective to increase productivity levels 
and living conditions, through the stabilisation of market conditions in the mid-20th century.  
The measures imposed were based on a system of target pricing for crops grown within the EU, 
and threshold pricing for goods imported into the Union countries. They were achieved through 
the direct injection of funds into the market by way of intermediaries. For a sector 
predominantly determined by price signals, target pricing tended to enhance any market 
distortions and resulted in many cases in significant over production. Although European 
farmers were ostensibly protected from the effects of price depression, over supply within the 
EU was seen to have the impact of depressing world prices.  
The continued depression of world prices, which in part arose out of the EU price mechanism, 
resulted by the mid-1980s in increased pressure from members of the WTO to include 
agricultural produce in the General Tariff and Trade discussions.  The WTO first brought 
agriculture to the agenda in 1986, because of calls for radical changes in the protectionist 
11 
policies operated by many of the developed countries (Tangerman, 2003) 
Http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm3_e.htm. 
The aim of the Agricultural Agreement of 1994 was to reform trade in the sector and make 
policies more market orientated. The negotiations had focused on three pillars or main areas: 
market access, including tariffs, quotas and other trade restrictions confronting imports; 
domestic support, in the form of subsidies and other support programmes, including those that 
guaranteed farm gate prices and income; and export subsidies. These were all methods designed 
to make exports artificially competitive.  
The 1994 agreement was designed to allow governments to continue to support their rural 
economies, but with reduced trade distortions. The rationale was that subsidies and border 
barriers have had the effect of artificially supporting prices in developed countries, causing 
world over-production. This, in turn, it was argued, led to declining world prices, although a 
counter argument suggested that these assumptions were based on an inadequate understanding 
of the farmer’s response to low prices (Aksoy et al., 2005). Indeed, it was noted by a number of 
bodies in Europe that the removal of price interventions and subsidies would have a negative 
impact on farm gate prices to the benefit of buyers (Hendrichsmeyer and Witzke, 2000; Keyser 
and Merbis, 2000; Van Bekkum, 2001). 
As part of the 1994 agreement, import tariffs for developed countries were to be reduced by 6% 
per annum, 36% over six years, with an average reduction of import tariffs for developing 
countries of 15% over the same period.  Further domestic measures having a direct effect on 
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production and trade were agreed and the total aggregate measures of support within developed 
countries were expected to be reduced by 20%. Measures that did not stimulate production were 
introduced, the so-called green box measures, that included research and other support 
measures, as well as payments direct to farmers that did not promote production. 
 
The response from many of the developed countries was immediate, with many of the domestic 
support mechanisms being converted to green box measures. The EU commission was already 
under considerable pressure from members to act, due to the considerable cost to both 
governments and consumers of the Common Agricultural Policy (Allen et al., 1987; Gardner, 
1996; Swinbank et al., 1999; OECD, 2001).  
The MacSharry reforms of 1992 led in part to the successful conclusion of the WTO talks 
(Daugbierg, 2003; Tangerman, 2003). The CAP reforms had laid the foundation for a radical 
change. They highlighted the need to shift the emphasis away from the promotion of efficiency 
in production by switching from price support mechanisms to direct payments to farmers and 
the introduction of measures to reduce production of milk quotas (see, for example, CEC, 1988; 
Harvey, 1997; Hubbard and Ritson, 1997; Ritson, 1998; Winter, 2002).   
By 1995, under the Maastricht Treaty, the EU put forward further measures to decouple 
payments from production, the so-called Pillar 1. This came into place in 2003 in the UK in the 
form of the Single Farm Payment (Frontier Economics, 2003) and shifted policy emphasis 
towards the development of a more competitive farming industry, something promoted under 
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Pillar 2 of the Maastricht Treaty. Here, there was greater emphasis not on the support of 
agriculture but on the development of an integrated rural economy (Lowe et al., 2002).  
Evidence for the success of the Uruguay Round is patchy. However, there has been a general 
agreement that trade liberalisation in agriculture has generated more global transactions, with 
greater volumes of products flowing between countries (Tangerman, 2003). The World Bank 
has investigated these trends and discovered that whilst certain countries have been unable to 
gain increased access to global markets, the gap between world price and domestic price has 
narrowed, with average border gaps decreasing from 63% to 31% by 2002. 
1.1.4 Discussion  
It might be suggested that whilst trade liberalisation was primarily driven by the need to reduce 
overproduction in the west and reduce world economic imbalances, the key beneficiaries of the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) are the major agri-businesses and the retailers. Evidence 
suggests that trade liberalisation has offered import and export opportunities for larger players, 
offering increased markets for certain high value commodities, such as meat, and fruit and 
vegetables in developing countries.  Yet, the proportion of the retail value retained by the 
farmers is minimal. In the case of Kenyan exports this has been estimated at around 14% of the 
retail value (Vorley, 2003). By comparison, increased competition from overseas has placed UK 
farmers under pressure. Indeed, the impact of trade liberalisation appears to have been 
predominantly to increase production and force down world prices (Tulipe and Michaels, 2004), 
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opening UK farmers up to global competition and pressures on prices due to the buying power 
of trans-national corporations within the food sector (Allenson et al., 1996). 
1.2. UK Policy Responses 
The response to the crisis focused on the development of initiatives to encourage farmers to 
measure success not only on profitability but on their ability to predict and deliver customer, 
economic and environmental wellbeing (DEFRA, 2006a). The 2003 reforms of the CAP have 
further enhanced early initiatives to remove interim support mechanisms, export refunds and to 
place reliance on measures to improve the business orientation of farmers. The second phase of 
reform, agreed in June 2003, was aimed at further strengthening rural development by 
transferring more funds from the first pillar to the second pillar, as agreed under the Maastricht 
treaty. 
1.2.1 Business / Market orientation 
Interim steps in the adjustment of European policy were evident in the emergence of ‘green box 
measures’ within the European Union. These shifted payment from entry barriers, toward direct 
payments, in headage payments for cattle, acreage payments for arable land and production 
volume controls in terms of set-aside and milk quotas, as recommended under the MacSharry 
Reform. By 1999, the European Union had established the next phase of redefining policy in 
order to meet the guidelines set down under the AoA. Under Agenda 2000, (Agenda 2000, 
1999) member states were required to set down a 7 year plan 2000-2006 and, within the 
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guidelines, to set down the mechanisms for the development of a sustainable rural economy 
(DEFRA/MAFF, 2000). Such development programmes not only advocated the decoupling of 
compensation payments from production but supported measures to enhance environmental  
management and the socio-economic development of rural areas, under council regulations 
1260/1999 and 1257/1999 (Lowe et al., 2002;  DEFRA, 2006c). 
A further milestone followed the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in 2002, when the 
government commissioned Don Curry to examine the nature of the food industry and provide 
recommendations for the future of the industry. More recently, following the 2003 CAP 
reforms, the Rural Development Programmes for 2007 -2013 again highlighted the need for 
farmers to become increasingly focused on market opportunities and operate according to 
market pressures. These policy documents similarly reflected the nature of the WTO’s objective 
of free markets for agricultural commodities, with the view to eliminating over production and 
trade distortion. 
The rural Development programmes were designed to address the issues of inefficiencies within 
farming methods, supply chains, business practices and exchange relationships and encourage 
farmers to become more market and business orientated (DEFRA, 2006c). Policy documents 
show that the primary objective of the government was to encourage farmers to adapt business 
practices in order to ensure sustainable agricultural incomes. 
The three key ways forward that have been identified are the development of alternative market 
opportunities for farmers, the improvement of farm and supply chain efficiency through closer 
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co-ordination and collaboration within the supply chain, and the development of added value 
and differentiated products (DEFRA 2006a; DEFRA, 2006c; DEFRA, 2007a). The value of 
cooperative activity to address the problems has been a recurrent and dominant theme. Measures 
designed to generate collaboration between producers are being progressively initiated, with 
increased integration within the supply chain (DEFRA, 2005a; DEFRA, 2006c)   
1.2.2 Changes to commercial relationships 
Under the Rural Development Programmes of 2006 (England, Wales, N Ireland, and Scotland) 
and the more recent Rural Development Programme for England (RDPE), two possible 
solutions are proposed to farmers (DEFRA, 2006c3): the development of new markets and 
managing existing relationships more effectively.  This means that the government suggests that 
farmers should either look to improving the functionality of the products they offer to existing 
buyers through delivering greater efficiency in the supply chain or added value products, or they 
should switch to alternative buyers. 
1.2.2.1 Direct to market / New customers - the development of new markets 
Measures to develop new commercial relationships within the supply chain, either through 
adding value to products or through accessing new markets, are based on a perception that 
businesses, in particular farmers, should to respond to what consumers care about and want. A 
number of initiatives are in place that aim to reconnect farmers with the market. Bodies such as 
                                                                
3 The Rural Development programmes focus on 4 key areas ( axes) Axis 1 – which promotes profitable, innovative, competitive businesses, 
Axis 2- which promotes agri-environmental measures, Axis 3- which promotes rural diversification and capacity building and Axis 4- which 
promotes tourism and the Leader programme. 
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the Regional Development Agencies, set up in 2002, were given the remit to work with Food for 
Britain and the International Agri Technology Centre (IATC). They are supported by local 
authorities and a range of NGO organisations such as the East Anglia Food Link and Sustain, as 
well as private consultancy firms.  
These initiatives are concerned with the exploitation of new markets in the UK and overseas, in 
order to develop new sources of income for farmers.  Amongst them are the initiatives that deal 
directly with the consumer, such as farmers’ markets, box schemes and farm shops, local food 
networks. There are also public procurement initiatives under the Public Sector Food 
Procurement Initiative that have facilitated, in partnership with local authorities, the 
development of local food hubs and networks. Inherently, much of this policy is underpinned by 
the development of collaborative vehicles to facilitate training, benchmarking and market 
access. The formation of discussion groups and business clubs, in particular under rural 
gateway projects run by Business Link, has been designed largely to help farmers find ways of 
accessing new markets or develop new rural enterprises through diversification strategies.  
1.2.2.2 Changing relationships with existing customers  
1.2.2.2.1 Value creation  
The importance of greater integration between members of the supply chain is central to UK 
rural development policy. The Red Meat Industry Forum has operated as a trail blazer for four 
business programmes that include: Farm Business Improvement, Probe, Value Chain Analysis 
and Master Classes. The emphasis on efficiencies gained particular momentum on the 
publication of the Curry Report (2002), in which it was maintained that the development of a 
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competitive farming industry is contingent upon the recognition of the mutual dependency of all 
parties within the supply chain.  The Curry Report placed considerable emphasis on the 
establishment of a Food Chain Centre, to be administered by the Institute of Grocery 
Distribution, with the remit of mapping and measuring the supply chain, and eliminating 
unnecessary costs, and the objectives of identifying and disseminating best practice. The 
objectives were to be achieved through teamwork and collaboration throughout the supply 
chain. In consequence, a variety of business clubs have been formed by Levy groups, Regional 
Development Agencies, and independent consultants. 
1.2.2.2.2 The distribution of value 
It has also been suggested that farmers would benefit were they able to improve farm gate prices 
either by reducing the number of alternative suppliers and/or by differentiating their product 
within the market place.  Within the context of this policy, cooperatives are seen to be the key 
mechanism through which farmers may both instigate the reduction of alternative suppliers and 
implement a strategy of product differentiation. In effect, given the fragmented nature of the 
farming industry, cooperatives are seen to be key to the development of brands in the farming 
sector, by cutting the cost of new product development, marketing and risk to the individual 
farmer.  Since the rural white paper of 1999, the underpinning message is that collaborative and 
cooperative action can enable the successful development of farm businesses. This message was 
reiterated in a succession of government reports, including the 2002 Curry report, in which it 
was suggested that the best way for small farm business to attain the benefits of a large 
enterprise was to collaborate with others (DEFRA, 2001; 2002; 2005; 2006c).   
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1. 2. 3. Delivery of changes to commercial relationships  
To summarise, the implementation of UK policy in the sector has been based on the premise 
that the revitalisation and growth of market orientation within the farming industry is contingent 
upon a package of voluntary regulatory and market based initiatives, to be delivered through 
three key mechanisms:  
1. Subsidies, pump-priming, and support funds that provide short term aid to protect 
incomes and through longer term support and through investment programmes to 
stimulate the development of market led initiatives 
2. Education and information dissemination that provide a mechanism to facilitate the 
development of expertise in addressing issues of production and markets. 
3. Collaboration and cooperation within the supply chain that provide support and funds for 
the development of collaborative relationships. 
1.2.3.1 Subsidy and short term income protection and modulation  
One key subsidy that serves as a mechanism to smooth the transition of farmers from payments 
schemes to market led initiatives is the Single Farm Payment. The SFP, with the limited coupled 
elements, was designed to ensure that there is a secure income flow to farmers whilst they are 
adjusting to the rural policy framework. 
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Introduced in the UK in 2005, the full grant of Single Farm Payments and other direct payments 
would only be paid if the farmers adhered to the statutory requirements of the legislation. These 
set down linked standards of environmental and food safety, animal and plant health and animal 
welfare management, and a requirement to keep all farmland in good agricultural and 
environmental conditions, a system known as cross-compliance. Non-compliance with the 
regulation would result in the forfeit of funds.   
The European states were, however, given the option as to how payments should be determined.  
Member states were able to devise a payment system based either on historical payments 
received by each farmer or on the actual area land farmed. Despite considerable discussions 
within the industry, particularly with respect to the impact on hill farms, it was determined in the 
UK that the SFP criteria should be based on historical data, from the period of 2001-2002. This 
meant that direct payments to farmers were based on previous calculations of area payments in 
arable on the headage payments for sheep and beef cattle and on milk quotas in dairy.  This 
seriously disadvantaged other livestock farmers, such as pig and poultry farmers and 
horticultural producers, who had not previously received European direct funds. 
In order to balance out the impact of currency fluctuations, British farmers could also make the 
choice of being paid in Euros or £ Sterling, an aspect which has worked to their favour given 
recent declines of the £ against the € up until 2011 (DEFRA, 2002).   
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1.2.3.1.1 Modulation  
A further reform of the CAP was agreed in June 2003, that aimed to further strengthen rural 
development by transferring more funds from the first pillar to the second pillar of agricultural 
policy   (European Commission: http://europa.eu.int/comm  DEFRA: http://www.defra.gov.uk), 
thus shifting the emphasis of EU policy from the support of agricultural activities to integrated 
rural development.  Following on from the earlier reforms, the objective was to strengthen rural 
development policy with more EU money. New measures were introduced to promote the 
environment, quality and animal welfare and to help farmers to meet EU production standards, 
starting in 2005. This entailed the retention of a proportion of direct payments, a system known 
as modulation, in which proportionally bigger farms delivered a larger share of the funds 
designed to finance the new rural development policy.  
 
In the light of the enlargement of the EU, this constituted a mechanism for financial discipline to 
ensure that the farm budget, fixed until 2013, is not overshot. Britain was one of the first EU 
countries to implement modulation in accordance with the objectives of the EU. Since 2005, all 
European countries have been required to retain funds, at a rate of 4% of subsidy payments in 
2006 and 5% in 2007. The funds raised are paid back to Brussels and redistributed to members 
and it is agreed that no member should receive less than 80% of the funds collected.  
In March 2007, the UK secured the right to continue to levy an additional national rate in order 
to deliver the four measures or Axes promoted under the English Rural Development 
programme 2007-2013. As indicated earlier in this chapter, these were measures, entitled Axis 
1,2,3,4, were designed, respectively, to promote more profitable, innovative, competitive 
businesses, environmental stewardship, rural diversification, and capacity building and tourism. 
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Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland have negotiated similar rights to the increase of the rates 
levied from modulation.  
 In England, 80% of the additional funds have been utilised to fund the Environmental 
stewardship schemes, a further 10% used to fund Axis 1, and the remainder delivered under 
Axis 3.  Additional voluntary levies remain in the hands of the UK government and have, under 
Axis 1, been employed to facilitate member investments in the pump priming of added value, 
bench marking and diversification initiatives.  
 
1.2.3.1.2 Funding initiatives – shifting away from Project based funding streams  
Under the English Rural Development Programme 2000-2006 there were a number of diverse 
funding streams available. These included the processing and marketing grants and the rural 
enterprise grants, as well as initiatives for vocational training, energy crops, country 
stewardship, and organic farming schemes.  Reports show that these initiatives supported 
transition of agricultural businesses into the market economy, with some 380 new products been 
brought to market through: the support of Processing Marketing Grants and by the setting up of 
over 3,000 Rural Enterprise Scheme Projects.  
From 2007, such initiatives under the new rural development programme have safeguarded 
14,500 jobs, and over 1,200 farm diversification projects. The numerous project based schemes 
have been simplified into 3 key streams or axes, Axis 1, sustainable food and farming, Axis 2, 
national resources, and Axis 3 for sustainable rural development.  
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Axis 1 and Axis 3 funds are available for improvements in marketing, development of added 
value products, new processing plants, farm diversification, and the development of 
collaborative initiatives. Processing and marketing grants, administered by DEFRA, retain their 
remit under the label of agricultural development schemes. Other funds, for the development of 
agricultural businesses other than environmental and forestry schemes, are administered by the 
Regional Development Agencies (RDA). Under the 2007–2013 measures, the core themes of 
Axis 1 are the provision of vocational training programmes, the development of advisory 
services, the setting up of farm management relief and advisory services, adding value to 
agricultural products, and the collaborative development of new products. Of these applications 
the three largest budgets have gone to farm modernisation, adding value, and development of 
cooperative initiatives. 
Funds that were originally available under the Rural Enterprise Scheme are now available under 
Axis 3. These include measures designed to promote capacity building and the raising of 
economic activity in rural areas. In addition to the funds delivered for the purpose of 
development and training via regional development agencies and DEFRA, additional support is 
delivered through what are known as the Curry Bodies (DEFRA, 2006c). These include the 
Food Chain Centre, the English Farming and Food Partnership, the Red Meat Industry Forum 
and the Cereal Industry Forum, established as recommended by the Curry Report and funded 
through the DTI and DEFRA. The purpose of these bodies is to generate business improvement, 
cooperation and information flow in the food supply chain.  
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1.2.3.2 Education about relationship development  
Besides grants focused on training within the RDPE, the key focus of what have been described 
as the Curry Bodies (DEFRA, 2006c) is the dissemination of best practice. The Curry Bodies 
include the Food Chain Centre, the English Farming and Food Partnership, the Red Meat 
Industry Forum, and the Cereal Industry Forum. Each has developed a series of benchmarking 
exercises in order to disseminate best practice. Established as a result of the recommendations of 
the Curry Report and funded through the DTI and DEFRA, the purpose is to generate business 
improvement and information flow in the food supply chain.  
The work is project based and there have been 5/6 grants made available. The organisation is 
run through a steering group, chaired by the Institute of Grocery Distribution (IGD). The 
initiative drew from previous developments that were designed to tackle issues of benchmarking 
skills and pricing transparency and the relationships between the farmers, and processors or 
retailers. These bodies operate by establishing partnerships with the levy boards and partnership 
boards in order to establish an industry forum. The four main forums cover red meat, home 
grown cereals, the dairy industry, and fresh produce. 
Similarly, the English Food and Farming Partnership, the collaborative board recommended by 
the Curry report, is designed to promote good practice within the farming sector. It endeavours 
to achieve this through the growth of market focused, farmer controlled businesses, amongst 
which we find cooperatives, joint ventures and strategic alliances between farmers and other 
initiatives, in order to develop co-operation and partnership activities not only between farmers 
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but also between farmers and the food chain. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT) will look at the 
extension of cooperatives in the same way as any other business (DEFRA, 2002). 
 
The organisation is independent but works in an inclusive manner at all levels of the industry. 
Target participants include non-food growers, managers, farmers, food processing businesses, 
importers and exporters, food wholesalers and retailers, support businesses, influence groups 
and public bodies.  
1.2.3.3 The emphasis on cooperatives 
As indicated earlier, teamwork and cooperative action has become an important vehicle in the 
delivery of funds and other forms of government and non-government support. Activities 
designed to address issues of waste, cost and efficiency within supply chains are examined both 
through business groups, as established by a variety of parties, and by greater vertical co-
operation between parties throughout the supply chain.  
Horizontal networks in the form of business networks have been set up by a variety of parties 
including Business Link, the RDA and the Levy groups. Examples include the British Pig 
Executive forum and the benchmarking initiatives run through the Food Chain Centre. At one 
level they are a mechanism to examine and disseminate best practice but they also encourage 
farmers to work towards a more formal cooperative arrangement.  
Evidence suggests (DEFRA, 2007a) that formal collaborative arrangements are more likely to 
occur when farmers enter into a cooperative activity with the specific commitment to make 
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financial investment, and less likely to emerge from continued association through business 
clubs. The English Farming and Food Partnerships (EFFP), as recommended by the Curry 
Report, were specifically designed to encourage and facilitate the development of cooperatives 
or farmer controlled businesses in the manner of the former. They have  teams of advisors in 8 
regions of England who work directly with the farm based businesses of small farmer groups 
and individual farmers wanting to collaborate.  Much of their work is centred on developing 
market focused business solutions for farming and food businesses.  In order to support these 
initiatives, they offer a range of services including market analysis and feasibility studies.  
The EFFP is promoting a variety of forms of cooperation that include traditional cooperatives 
focused on supply and marketing, non- traditional cooperatives that draw upon external 
investors and strategic alliances, in the form of farmer and producer marketing groups and 
buying groups, machinery rings and joint ventures. Each cooperative group demonstrates a 
variety of competitive strategies, including cost leadership through the development of 
collective grain drying facilities, and niche branded products, as in Peak Choice Meat. This 
strand of the policy response, the strand of most relevance to the thesis, is now explored in more 
detail. 
1.3 Cooperatives 
One of the key themes underpinning policy-making as a response to the crisis has been towards 
the development of countervailing co-operatives supplying commodities and added value 
products into the main stream supply chain. Despite the patchy performance of cooperatives 
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historically in the UK, the UK government believes that co-operatives offer a fragmented 
farming sector an alternative to subsidies and direct intervention and a means of facilitating 
investment.  
 
The lack of a strong tradition of cooperatives within UK farming communities, which was in 
part due to the existence of the marketing boards, has been considered to be a drawback in the 
establishment of a sustainable farming sector.  Yet, despite this unpromising background, recent 
evaluations have shown indications that more farmers are becoming involved in formal 
collaborative initiatives.  
 
Figures indicate that 30-40% of farmers in England belong to a co-operative or farmer 
controlled businesses. These include 47% in the dairy sector, 40% in general cropping and 34% 
in cereals, although only 5-17% in livestock (DEFRA, 2007a). With at least 109,000 members, 
which represent around 40% of all farmers, farm supply cooperatives are the most frequent form 
of cooperative. Yet minimal evidence has been provided as to whether the establishment of 
formal collaborative measures has been successful, and if not, why not, despite the fact that the 
UK government’s emphasis on cooperatives makes it an important area of study. This thesis 
seeks to go some way towards filling this gap. 
 
1.3.1. Defining cooperatives   
Cooperatives can be seen to hold a duality of identity, as both a collective of independent 
businesses as well as a virtually integrated firm. The hybrid nature of cooperatives, in that they 
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display governance structures which are both bilateral and unilateral, results in particular issues 
for the business format that are distinct from those that pertain to other forms of governance 
structures – an issue that is at the heart of this dissertation.  
 
There are two types of co-ops, with variations within those types. First, there are 
Entrepreneurial cooperatives, distinguished by their offer of tradable shares with a secondary 
value and individual rights of equity which are available to either members or to external 
stakeholders. Entrepreneurial cooperatives vary principally with regard to two aspects: the 
nature of membership and the participation of external stakeholders in the cooperative. Second, 
there are traditional co-ops, distinguished by the restrictions placed on access to external 
funding as specified under cooperative rules (Cornforth, 1989). 
 
At the start of the research, whilst agricultural cooperatives across mainland Europe and the US 
had already evolved into Entrepreneurial cooperatives, cooperatives in the UK had more in 
common with traditional cooperatives than many of their European cousins.  It was for this 
reason that traditional cooperatives became the focus of this study. 
 
Traditional cooperatives are defined in terms of the original ten principles established by the 
Rochdale Pioneers (LeVay, 1983; Birchall, 1997; Evans et al., 2005) and may vary only 
according the participants. That is to say, a cooperative may be a worker cooperative, a requisite 
cooperative or a marketing cooperative.  
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Traditional cooperatives are distinguishable from other business forms in that the enterprise is 
owned collectively by its members and there is no individual ownership of equity. All shares are 
owned by members but hold no tradable or appreciable value. There are no restrictions to 
membership, that is, there is open membership and membership is free.  Each member has one 
vote, not linked to the significance of their contribution to the cooperative, and directors are 
elected by the members.  All excess earnings are distributed to members according to use, 
patronage or monetary investment (Barton, 1989, p1).4  
 
The essential elements are that members of marketing cooperatives are not only suppliers to, but 
also owners of the cooperative. This dimension places pressure on the cohesiveness of the 
governance form, as will be explored later on.   
 
1.3.2 Definitions of Success 
 
Cooperatives are central to government policy.  It is presumed that they will play a major role in 
the protection of farm prices and margins and thus counteract the impact of a more liberalised 
market on UK farmers. The argument made by the government and others, including Emerson, 
is that a coalition of farmers has the ability to counterbalance downstream dominance and so 
improve farm gate prices. This means that success is a function of the delivery of improved farm 
gate prices and margins to the UK farming sector. This is distinctive from non-cooperative 
                                                                
4 It can also be noted that the original ten principles of cooperatives as identified by the Rochdale Pioneers also included principles of member 
education, no credit transactions, and working to the common good. 
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firms, which simply measure success in terms of a financial measure such as above normal 
profits or return on investment.  
 
 A further distinction between non-cooperative and cooperative organisation, is that the 
cooperative is noted to be a comparatively fragile form of governance and at risk of failure as a 
consequence of internal and external free riding. All farm businesses must gain from the 
coalition, otherwise there is a risk that the members will defect and the cooperative will become 
unstable. This suggests that the cooperative’s success is also based on its ability to provide 
sustained, improved farm gate prices and profitability for farmers who are members. 
 
1.3.3 Explanations of success and failure 
It is the contention of the author that there are a number of attributes of the cooperative and its 
market that affect its success. As defined in 1.3.2, in order to be successful, a cooperative must 
provide a countervailing power mechanism (Mauget et al., 1996; Arcas et al., 2003; Beverland, 
2005; Edwards et al., 2005; Beverland, 2006) and it must also achieve a degree of longevity, 
something that can be impeded by the presence of internal and external freeriding.  
Dealing first with countervailing power, in the absence of a body of cooperative-specific 
literature, Emerson offers us an instructive theory: Power Dependency Theory. His thesis 
suggests that power is a function of the relative dependency of one party in terms of the other. 
This means that simply forming a coalition or cooperative may not be sufficient to 
31 
counterbalance the power attributes of the other party; it may increase their dependency on the 
coalition of farmers but not to a level that outweighs the dependency of the coalition.  
Each party has two key means of resisting the power of the other party. A dependent party could 
either decrease their dependence on the more powerful opponent by decreasing the opponent’s 
power or by increasing their own power. PDT suggests that cooperatives can improve the 
financial position of farmers by increasing motivational investment, for example through the 
development of branded products, or by reducing the number of alternative sources of supply 
for downstream customers. As a result, Emerson offers insights into the leverage created 
through collective action.   
However, although it provides insight into countervailing power, it is evident that Power 
Dependency Theory fails to examine the extent to which group dynamics impinge upon the 
efficacy of collective action as a means of redressing power imbalances. The literature on 
collective action (Olson, 1965) and farmer cooperatives corrects this and suggests that collective 
action is inherently unstable because the calculative rationality of individuals runs counter to the 
collective good.  Olson argues strongly of the dangers to collective action of the free rider 
problem. He believes that if parties cannot be excluded from obtaining the benefit from 
collective action, irrespective of their level of investment, there is little incentive to contribute to 
the collective action.  If all were to act in this manner then collective action would not take place 
and no-one would benefit. The problem lies in power of self-interest over the collective.  Whilst 
recognising the work on agricultural marketing cooperatives (Cook, 1995; Nilsson 1999; Van 
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Bekkum, 2001), this thesis draws principally on the Olson principles in examination of the free 
rider problem. 
The principle of freeriding hinges upon twin axioms of self-interest and calculative rationality 
and that the most rational option is to benefit from the common or public goods whilst letting 
others pay (Reisman, 1990; Olson, 1965/1971). Cooperatives are particularly vulnerable to free 
riding. This is because benefits are non-excludable and there is no appreciable value to 
investments made by members into the collective whole. In addition, there are no perceivable 
consequences to the individual if they choose to shirk the costs of cohesion (Cook, 1995; Olson, 
1965)  
More successful cooperatives are seen to be those that ensure against free riding through the 
means of sanctions and incentives to ensure conformance of individuals to coalition goals 
(Hariyoga, 2004, Sandler, 1992).  These measures are seen to be effective if they can reduce the 
disparity of interests between members and managers and foil attempts to free ride (Cook, 1995; 
Harkelius, 1999; Harvey and Sykuta, 2006).Where this fails, it is perceived to threaten the 
cohesiveness of the cooperative and loyal parties, within the cooperative, risk incurring 
increased costs.  
Cooperatives may also have difficulty in responding rapidly to changes in market conditions 
(Turner, 1990; Cook, 1994; Cook, 1995; Hendrikse et al., 2001; Hariyoga, 2004). Democratic 
decision making, particularly where there is diversity of interest (Hendrikse et al., 2001), is 
laborious and inflexible and requires more time and effort to reach decisions than in alternative 
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governance structures. Furthermore, the reliance of traditional cooperatives on members’ funds 
and loans for the sources of investment exacerbates the problem. This is of particular 
importance where the cooperative is attempting to diversify into multiproduct cooperatives, 
where there are higher demands for additional investment (Hariyoga, 2004).  
This suggests, therefore, that the success of cooperatives is a two part interconnected problem. It 
is argued that, based on the existing literature, cooperatives cannot improve their leverage 
position where they are prone to free riding and lack cohesion. But there is a more fundamental 
problem in that without ensuring leverage and thus delivering financial benefits to farmers, 
cooperatives will be prone to freeriding and a loss of cohesion, ultimately reducing the longevity 
of the cooperative. This can be seen diagrammatically in figure 1.1. 
Figure 1.1 – the interconnectivity between causes of success  
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1.3.4 .History of cooperatives in the UK 
Paradoxically, whilst it was one of the earliest countries to set up formal cooperatives, in the 
19th century, the UK’s agricultural cooperative movement has had a weaker and  more 
chequered history than its counterparts in  mainland Europe and the USA.  This fact has led to a 
greater interest by academics in the factors that have inhibited the development of cooperative 
action rather than those that influence cooperative success (Foxall, 1982; Rayner et al., 1987). 
Several reasons are advanced for the lack of farmer involvement in cooperative action. In the 
early development of cooperatives in the 1900s the slow development of cooperatives within the 
UK was attributed to the resistance of Landlords ( Rayner et al., 1987) More recently the slow 
development of cooperatives has been attributed to the limited effective direct or indirect 
support from government bodies as well as  limited access to financial resources, dissention 
from the National Farmers Union, and later on the establishment of Agricultural Marketing 
Boards (Morley, 1975; Foxall, 1982; Rayner et al., 1987). 
This does not mean that there has been no cooperative action in the UK.  From the mid-
nineteenth century, a number of cooperatives were established to support agricultural sectors. 
The first cooperatives to be established in the UK were requisite cooperatives, but by 1890 there 
were over 30 cooperatives, which were designed to support the marketing of agricultural 
commodities.  By 1920, there were 381 cooperatives that collectively held around one third of 
the market share and handled products from a third of all UK farmers.  The number of 
cooperatives declined by 40%  in the period up to the 1930s, a consequence of a series  of 
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mergers between cooperatives and the consolidation of the sector  in addition to some  loss of 
membership5 (Rayner et al., 1987). 
However, numbers of both cooperatives and cooperative membership continued to decline over 
the following 3 decades, with a notable low in the early 1960s. By the mid-1960s cooperative 
numbers were 60% lower than in 1920. This position has subsequently been reversed and 
cooperatives have a notable presence in the market, and represent some 40% of farmers across 
agricultural sectors (Rayner et al., 1987). 
It is also evident that UK governments have attempted to put in place measures to promote 
cooperation, of which there has been a succession, including the launch of the Agricultural 
Organisation Society in 1900 by Sir Horace Plunkett and the introduction of the Development 
and Road Improvement Funds Act of 1909, which supplied grants to support cooperative action.  
Membership numbers in 1920 were encouraging and by 1919 most counties in England and 
Wales had a farmers’ society, but there is little research into the factors which contributed to the 
subsequent decline in members in the 1920s.   By the late 1920s the UK Government  had 
responded to the  apparent failure of agricultural cooperatives, with the introduction of  the 
Agricultural Marketing Acts of 1931 and 1933 , which heralded the producer controlled 
statutory monopolies known as marketing boards (Morley, 1975; Rayner et al., 1987). 
                                                                
5 Member numbers only declined by 21% 
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Four marketing boards were initially set up to support the Milk, Bacon, Hop and Potato sectors. 
Initially they bought and supplied about 20% of the total value of the gross agricultural output of 
GB (Bauer, 1948). Other boards such as the Meat, the Egg, and Bacon marketing boards were 
established after the Second World War. Most of the boards, with the exception of the Bacon 
Board, survived until the mid-1990s.  The presence of the marketing boards within many of the 
commodity markets removed the perceived necessity for cooperative action (Rayner et al., 
1987). This position was accentuated by the introduction of, in post war years, measures that 
directly subsidised the activities of individual farmers, obviating any need for both collaboration 
and studies of factors that would lead to its success. Government subsidies safeguarded the farm 
gate price and offered grants for improvements to farming practices (Bower, 1985). The 
individualist approach of farmers was further enhanced on the entry of the UK to the EEC.  
Where research has taken place it has been largely descriptive (Morley, 1975; Murray, 1983; 
Rayner et al., 1987). 
Research into cooperatives has taken place but has primarily examined the issue of success in 
workers’, consumer, and requisite cooperatives (Foxall, 1978; Cornforth 1988, Perotin, 2004; 
Birchall, 2003). Even where consideration has been made of the state run cooperatives, also 
known as marketing boards, there has been limited consideration of success and even here this 
has been either descriptive or focused upon consideration of free riding (Empson, 1998; Frank, 
2001). 
Lessons can be learned from the European and USA experience, but what is apparent is that 
there is a dearth of research on the ability of the cooperative to redress power imbalances, other 
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than from the perspective of the problems of cohesion and cooperative longevity. This issue will 
be explored in more depth in Chapter 2. 
1.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has raised the question as to whether cooperative activity can effectively address 
the problems faced by the farming section in the UK. Cooperative action has been a keystone in 
the UK Government’s policy response to the impact of changes to global policy and the UK 
downstream market structure on the viability of the UK farming sector. The policies recognise 
that a fragmented farming sector and highly concentrated downstream markets has created vast 
disparities in negotiating power between farmers and their retail customers. They also recognise 
that fragmentation makes it more difficult to identify market opportunities and alternative 
markets and have thus placed particular emphasis on the value of co-operation and 
collaboration, both horizontal and vertical, to redress these issues. 
Yet, whilst membership of cooperatives has increased since the establishment of the EFFP, there 
is little evidence as to the value of cooperatives as a means of halting the decline of the UK 
agricultural sector. There is literature on the implications of governance structure on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of decision making and the availability of investment funds. 
However, given the thinness of the literature on the specific issue of traditional co-ops in the UK 
agricultural sector and increased leverage, this thesis fills an important gap.  
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  CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW –DETERMINING THE SUCCESS OF 
COOPERATIVES AS A BALANCING MECHANISM 
2.0 Introduction  
The first chapter outlined the UK and European agricultural policy framework and the emphasis 
placed by the UK government on cooperatives as a mechanism to generate countervailing power 
when faced with the changes to global agricultural trade policy and increased consolidation 
within the downstream market players. Following the Uruguay agreement, farm incomes have 
suffered from the joint impact of the removal of intervention and support mechanisms and the 
increased power of the downstream markets as result of consolidation of the retail sector. The 
EU and UK policy makers have responded by seeking alternative mechanisms based on market 
dynamics to develop a sustainable farming sector. At the start of chapter 1, despite the limited 
development of cooperatives in the UK historically, the UK government appears to have pinned 
high hopes on cooperative action as a vehicle to enable a highly fragmented farming sector to 
improve its leverage. 
Chapter 1 has further indicated that the purpose of this research was to explore the likely 
effectiveness of cooperatives and to this end this thesis has suggested that any exploration of 
effectiveness was a two part puzzle. In the first instance the ability of cooperatives to be 
successful is dependent on whether they have the ability to provide members with leverage 
when faced with current downstream power structures. Secondly, the effectiveness of 
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cooperatives also depended on the ability of the cooperative to maintain cohesion and integrity, 
which was linked to their ability to manage the free riding problem. Finally, it has been 
suggested that these two themes might be linked. This is to say that the ability of cooperatives to 
deliver benefits to members may undermine their integrity/cohesion, and conversely the failure 
of cooperatives to maintain cohesion may inhibit the delivery of benefits.  
The purpose of this second chapter is to explore the first part of this argument in some depth. 
This chapter does this with reference to Power Dependency Theory as originally developed by 
Emerson. Emerson argues that the ability of an actor or organisation to generate benefits is 
linked to the structural power relative to the exchange parties. This in turn is a function of two 
factors, the first of which relates to the choices or options facing the exchange partner. The idea 
is that the greater the range of choices enjoyed by a party, the stronger the party’s relative 
power. The second factor is what Emerson called motivational investment or status giving. This 
means that where exchange relationships become more important to the other party, there is a 
greater likelihood that favourable terms can be agreed. Where organisations lack both these 
attributes, Emerson examines the options or strategies open to them. Critically, this includes the 
option of coalition formation which in the context of this research equates to the formation of 
cooperatives. 
The chapter organises the material in four broad sections. Section 1 examines existing literature 
on agricultural cooperatives and points to a research gap in terms of the value of cooperatives as 
a balancing mechanism. Section 2 introduces the subject of exchange upon which theories of 
power and dependency construct their analysis. Section 3 deals with the broad tenets of the 
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theory itself. Section 4 applies the broad principles of power and dependency theories to the 
business environment context. The chapter concludes by pointing out the limitations of Power 
Dependency Theory and indicates that whilst the theory is useful, it is incomplete because it fails 
to deal with the internal group dynamics and how they undermine the collective ability to deal 
with vertical inequalities.  
2.1 Insights into existing literature on the effectiveness of cooperatives in the generation of 
financial benefits  
It becomes apparent that the major concerns of existing literature focus on the cooperative 
governance structure and the implications of the problem of collective cohesiveness for the 
nature and effectiveness of decisions. The key issue is whether the cooperative can adapt to 
market changes given the internal dynamics of the collective entity, and, as such, draws heavily 
upon concepts of common and public goods (Olson, 1965). Few have questioned whether 
consolidation or the development of added value products actually has the potential to improve 
the leverage position of farmers (Staatz, 1987; Goodhue et al., 2011; Russo et al., 2011).  
The literature recognises that the success of the cooperative is dependent upon its ability to 
expand the market share (Guillouzo, 2003), thereby generating higher returns to farmers 
(Hanson, 1996). Evidence suggests that they often fail after a few years (Cook, 1995; Hanson, 
1996; Hind, 1997; Hardesty et al., 2004). This has been attributed to their inability to control the 
aggregate supply when faced with the opportunistic behaviour of non-cooperative firms whose 
pricing strategies are deliberately designed to undermine the cooperative (Cook, 1995).  
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Open membership in cooperatives has been said to be a contributory factor in the ability of the 
cooperative to close the market (Staatz, 1987; Boland et al., 1999). Even if cooperatives succeed 
in attaining monopolistic position, they are often unable to impose constraints on the volume of 
the product for sale, which inhibits their control over price. Where the cooperative is able to 
have control, the volume delivered by members, higher prices attract new members, with the 
accompanying increase in volume and decline in farmgate prices (Hansmann, 1996). In 
situations where prices are low, members will defect to alternative buyers, thereby undermining 
the market power of the cooperative. Others have suggested that even in closed member 
cooperatives, where the numbers of members permitted are restricted, farmers have a strong 
incentive to expand production beyond the level that will ensure monopsonistic rents (Youde 
and Helmberger, 1966), even though the evidence suggests that closed membership policies are 
a more conducive means of attaining market power (Youde and Helmberger, 1966; Van 
Bekkum, 2001). 
With the increased contestation within the food commodity sector at a global level (Vorley, 
2003), the ability of cooperatives to increase farm gate prices is seen to depend on their 
development of international strategies, niche markets and/or, added value products 
(Kyriakopoulos, 2000; Nilsson, 2001; Van Bekkum, 2001; Bijman, 2010; Cavicchi, 2010). 
Some have questioned the impact of such strategies on farm incomes, given the power relations 
in the food sector (Cotterill, 2001; Bijman, 2002; Hariyoga, 2004; Hanf et al., 2011). However, 
despite the strong sense that cooperatives have failed to deliver leverage, there is little research 
and very few reported incidents of cooperatives who supply to highly concentrated markets, to 
substantiate this position (Van Bekkum, 2001).  
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Power Dependency Theory argues that coalitions are a key mechanism to adjust power 
imbalances. However, the concept has not until now been used to examine the cooperative 
problem. PDT suggests that cooperatives can potentially improve the financial position of 
farmers by increasing motivational investment and/or reducing the number of alternative 
sources of supply. In exchange relationships, Power dependency theories suggest that coalitions 
offer an opportunity to redress power imbalances (Emerson, 1976). Interestingly, whilst the 
Emerson framework underpins much of the power literature that examines exchange 
relationships between “firms”, it has not been explored in the context of cooperatives. 
The present project attempts to address this research gap.  It is an issue of growing concern in a 
situation where farmers are faced with an increasingly contested food commodity sector 
(Vorley, 2003).  The next sections of this chapter will, in the first instance, examine the market 
conditions where suppliers are able to leverage prices, before examining Power Dependency 
Theory, a theory that underpins much of the literature on competitive advantage (Emerson, 
1976).  
  
43 
2.2 The basis of Business in Exchange  
According to theories of economics and in particular neoclassical economics, trading or 
exchange is at the heart of business activities. The terms under which people are able to buy and 
sell ultimately plays an important part in determining their profitability. Neoclassical and 
classical economists believe that within efficient markets economic profits will return to zero. 
This means that they presume that all sellers are price takers, and explanations of relative 
business success are largely constrained to relative levels of efficiency.  This position is at odds 
with the literature on business strategy that suggests that competitive advantage is central to 
business survival. Competitive advantage is seen to be dependent on the ability of a firm 
(cooperative or non-cooperative) to lever a greater proportion of the total economic value 
through the effective management of resource attributes whilst recognising those of its exchange 
partners (Galbraith, 1952; Porter, 1980; Peteraf et al., 2003). The literature on competitive 
advantage suggests that a firm can enhance its competitive position by inhibiting competitors, 
thereby increasing the dependency of the exchange party on the transaction. Where the 
dependency of their exchange party is increased, the firm is able to increase their share of the 
consumer price.  
This dimension of competitive advantage and the distribution of surplus can be clearly modelled 
through Power and Dependency Theory (Emerson, 1976), a theoretical framework that 
underpins much of the existing literature on business strategy. The next sections will examine in 
more detail the conventional economic theory of perfect markets, prior to examining the 
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limitations of such theories in understanding imperfect, highly concentrated markets, and will 
examine alternative ways of exploring the distribution of economic surplus.   
2.2.1 Cooperative and competitive surplus value 
In order to demonstrate the effect of market imperfections on the distribution of prices in an 
exchange relationship, this section returns to the basic principles.   Many economists believe 
that the interests of buyers and sellers both coincide and are in conflict (Hirschleifer et al., 
1998). The coincidence of interest in exchanges is derived from the fact that both parties need or 
desire to participate in the exchange process and thus require the resource offered by the other 
party (Blau, 1986). This is because parties are mutually dependent in that the process of 
exchange enables increased opportunities for consumption/acquisition (Taussig, 1911; Weber, 
1947; Kuhn, 1963; Hirshleifer et al., 1998; Acemoglu, 2003).  
It is thus important to note that the exchange process requires a coincidence of will to exchange 
and indeed if both parties do not share an effective preference,  a degree of capacity to exchange 
objects, plus the will to exchange, then no exchange will take place (Kuhn, 1963). It is 
considered that the coincidence of will and conflict of interest within exchange is a key concept 
in economic studies of market imperfection.  
Studies of markets indicate that the determination of price is contingent upon the relative utility 
and scarcity of the product of exchange for each party, and is a function of the availability of 
alternative sources of supply or demand, and the relative importance of the exchange (Marshall, 
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1923; Walras, 1954; Stigler, 1953; Tirole, 1988; Hirshleifer et al., 1998; Cox et al., 2002).  The 
presence of alternative sources of supply and demand and different utilities will have an impact 
on how value, and indeed risk, are distributed in the exchange relationship and determine which 
party will attain the greater gain.  In taking this position, the thesis is in effect distinctive from 
both the Marxian perspective, where interests in exchange relationships are seen to be 
diametrically opposed, and at the other extreme, concepts of socio-embeddedness where it is 
held that all transactions take place in a social context (Granovetter, 1985), a concept which 
reflects that of social bonds found in a much earlier examination of exchange (Mauss, 1922).  
2.2.2 Conventions in Business exchange 
In any given situation of scarcity, resources have to be allocated and it is the allocation of 
resources between competing demands that gives rise to a utility function and thus the 
distribution of value between the buyer and seller. In order to determine how value or what is 
often known as economic surplus is distributed, it is important to recognise the relative value of 
the exchange to the two parties. In the concept of perfect markets, an ideal market, in which 
many buyers are motivated to maximise utility and many sellers selling homogenous products 
are also motivated by self-interest and operating from a position of perfect/complete 
information, neither party are able directly to influence the market price. However, the 
homogeneity of products means that buyers can freely move between suppliers as each supplier 
attempts to improve their market share.  
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In these conditions, neoclassical economists hold that price is ultimately determined by the costs 
of providing the product and the marginal cost of production.  In the long term, a firm must 
recover its costs and will not take less for its products than it costs to produce. Hence, it will not 
accept less than the additional cost of producing an extra unit of production. That is the 
Marginal Cost of Production = the Marginal Return (MC=MR).   
If any firm, cooperative or non-cooperative, attempts to improve returns above the marginal cost 
of production, in these conditions they will be easily substituted by the buyer. This means that 
ultimately the balance of surplus/gain will be in the hands of the buyer. Any improvements in 
the cost of production will result in corresponding increases in buyer/consumer surplus. As an 
aside, the marketing cooperative is faced with an additional problem, in that in order to generate 
financial benefits to its farmers it must deliver higher than average prices than its competitors.  
The interrelationship between the relative utility of buyers and sellers and its implication on 
price, distribution of economic surplus and volume can be represented by the Edgeworth Box.  
The box is made up of the conjunction of two sets of indifference curves representing the utility 
function of the two parties undertaking the exchange, which illustrates the number of units of y 
an individual is willing to exchange for X. In the case of the buyer ( A) this would be the 
amount of money Y they would be prepared to dispense for a volume of a good  X, whilst for 
the seller B, this would mean the amount of the good X that they would prepared to sell for a 
given sum Y.  
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As illustrated in Figure 2.1., in the case of individual A, higher levels of ordinal utility are 
experienced the closer the amounts of Y and X are to the point of origin Ob. Correspondingly, 
levels of utility increase for individual B in line with the proximity of the point of exchange to 
Oa (Mercuro et al., 1997; Hirschleifer et al., 1998). However, whilst the ordinal utility of B is 
greatest at Oa for a given amount of X and Y, exchange at that point is not in the interest of A.  
Gains for both parties exist at a point where both A and B are able to enhance their respective 
utilities. This occurs inside the lens, trading lens that encloses the intersection of indifference 
curves a1 –a3 and b1- b3. This is a zone containing all mutually beneficial trading possibilities 
for both parties.  It suggests that there is a range of prices between which the buyer is indifferent 
and thus will not influence demand (Marshall, 1923; Stigler, 1953; Hewitt, 1976; Kreps, 1990; 
Mas-Colell et al., 1995 p. 315; Mercuro et al., 1997; Hirschleifer et al., 1998). Yet, whilst the 
Edgeworth box demonstrates that any offer within the shaded area would be subjectively 
acceptable to exchange parties, the point where both parties could gain the greatest maximum 
joint benefit, as indicated by the line a2-b2, is known as the contract curve, and this will 
normally determine the position where exchange will take place. The length of the line a2-b2 
may be taken to represent the amount of benefit attainable through that exchange. Point F 
however is the point at which moving in any direction either towards Oa or towards Ob, 
individual B or individual A will gain a smaller share of the economic surplus. Point F is said to 
be the pareto-optimal and any move away from this point will reduce the utility of one or other 
party.  However in the context of negotiation it is in the interest of each party to move away 
from the pareto-optimal in order to improve their utility.  In perfect markets, the presence of 
alternative suppliers means that the price will shrink and A or B, as the cooperative, will be 
located close to point F. 
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Figure 2.1. : Distributive efficiency as illustrated by the contract curve   
Whilst the Edgeworth box offers a determinate explanation of the range of values in perfect 
markets, it provides little insight into how and why price is arrived at within an exchange 
relationship, and falls short in explaining imperfect markets (Emerson, 1976). Unlike perfect 
markets, imperfect markets are characterised by natural or productive scarcity and incomplete 
information on supply and demand. 
In imperfect markets the activities of the market are no longer controlled by a large number of 
players but control lies either with one powerful or a few powerful businesses (Zeuthen, 1930; 
Robinson, 1933; Chamberlin, 1933; Harvey, 1969; Hewitt, 1976). In such models of monopoly, 
the assumptions of perfect substitutes found in competitive markets are removed, thus enabling 
firms to avoid price pressures from competitors.  Monopolistic firms, whether they are 
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cooperative or not, in contrast to the perfectly competitive firm, are able to set output and price 
simultaneously and will decide on output in order to maximise the difference between total 
receipts and total variable costs. The ability to fix a level of output presents the firm with the 
option of fixing price. 
Where the explanations of economic theories falter is in the belief that monopolies, oligopolies 
and other forms of market failure are exceptional and products of extreme market rigidities 
(Tullock, 1964; Possner, 1974), a state that refers to the sluggish response of prices or to market 
excess or shortages.  They fail to acknowledge the importance of power as a mechanism to 
explain the distribution of surplus between exchange parties.  In the first instance, mainstream 
economists assume that monopolies are exceptional and unstable. Even though they are able to 
set prices over the short term, over the longer term, the existence of high prices represents a 
market signal to potential new entrants, with the net effect of driving down prices, resulting in 
profits tending towards zero. Monopolies and oligopolies are considered short lived, since 
competition serves as one of the three mitigants of economic power (Galbraith, 2007 p223).6 
Yet there would appear to be certain sectors where the conditions of sustained levels of 
concentration, such as the food retail and manufacturing sectors, run counter to classical 
constructs.  
 
A further factor that prejudices economists with regard to the significance of power in 
determining the distribution of surplus is the dominance of the maximisation of the consumer 
welfare discourse (Galbraith, 1956; Dixon et al., 1995). Despite a burgeoning interest in power 
                                                                
6The other two according to Galbraith are the state and countervailing power. 
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across disciplines including sociology (Lukes, 1974; Emerson, 1976;), philosophy (Giddens, 
2001; Foucault, 1980), and business management (Porter, 1980; Barney, 1991; Cox et al., 2002), 
the belief that market equilibrium and economic efficiency is attained when consumer surplus is 
at a maximum has blinkered economists and indeed marketing academics to the importance of 
power within exchange processes (Reicheld et al., 1990; Leverin et al., 2006).  
Neither economics nor marketing academics have provided sufficient insight as to how an 
increase in surplus is distributed in imperfect markets (Gronhaug, 1979; Cox, 2007). Whilst it is 
apparent that in the context of the Edgeworth box, were individual B to be in a monopolistic 
party, the exchange would take place at a position located on the A1-A3 curve, this presents 
little insight into the distribution of surplus and the contributory factors.   
In contrast, literature on the competitive advantage of firms, with an interest in the maximisation 
of value to the seller, has placed power and leverage at the heart of its approach. This is apparent 
within two key schools of thought.  In structure, conduct and performance analysis, Porter 
(1980) specifically describes five threats to the power of a firm, including supplier and buyer 
bargaining power. Theoretical constructs from the more recent resource-based school argue that 
power is a central component of competitive advantage and contend that the power and thus 
competitive advantage is achieved through the acquisition of and thus denial to others of key 
resources (Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993; Foss, 
2003).  
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Even though some economists acknowledge the concept of power, few recognise its value in the 
understanding of the distribution of surplus in exchange relationships (Williamson, 1995). 
Whilst dependency is considered often to be an operational necessity (Williamson, 1995), 
imbalances of power, in situations where one party achieves more from the relationship than the 
other, are perceived to be an outcome of managerial incompetence. Williamson further suggests 
that there is a lack of rigour in the evaluation of the process through which power is delivered. 
The tendency to ascribe power to those who enjoy the advantage means that the concept is not 
only elastic but is also a tautological label for differences in resources in a system of bargain and 
exchange (March, 1988; Williamson, 1995; Cox, 2007).  Williamson suggests that there is little 
doubt as to the explanatory value of power dependency theory in the allocation of surplus in 
exchange relationships, but there is an indeterminacy of cause and effect and difficulties of 
measurement and as such raises serious doubts as to its value as a theoretical framework.  
However, he fails to understand that the real value of power/dependency theory lies in the idea 
that the outcome of the exchange is contingent on the interplay of two parties within the 
relationship. Unlike the position held in other economic constructs, in power/dependency 
theories how the determination of price is arrived at cannot be reduced to the analysis of the 
actions or characteristics of one party. Williamson fails to acknowledge that power is a relative 
concept and that in order to understand the impact on exchange, the situation of consumers and 
producers and their actions, including their ability to cheat/obfuscate, need to be analysed at the 
same time.  
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This simultaneous analysis of the relative position of each exchange party leads to an 
understanding of the interplay of available resources or assets that offer the unique competitive 
advantage. It is not the resources per se, but their relevance to a particular objective and 
circumstance.  It is apparent that the relative leverage position is a function of the resource set, 
and each party’s cognisance of their own resource set. 
Economists are not alone in their failure to understand that the accumulation of certain internal 
resources of a firm offers a unique competitive position (Dierickx et al., 1989; Barney, 1991; 
Day, 1994; Okitemgil et al., 2000; Priem and Butler, 2001). Similar examples can be drawn 
from economic and political sociology. Emerson criticised early work on power on the basis of a 
failure to gain a real insight into human behaviour as their explanations tended towards equating 
greater power with personal characteristics (Rohrer, 1953; Dahl, 1957; Bacharach and Baratz, 
1959). Indeed, even where authors drew upon the inter-personal determinants of dependency 
proposed in PDT (Emerson, 1962; 1964), interpretations defaulted to personal attribute 
conceptions of power (French and Raven, 1959; Wrong, 1968; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980; 
Ramsey, 1996). This can lead to the assumption that power is simply an outcome of individual 
or structural attributes, although, for power to be present there needs to be both structure and 
deployment. Parties within an exchange relationship may have comparable or distinctly 
imbalanced power attributes, but only in the use of such attributes is there a power and 
dependency issue. This has been expressed in the following terms, “Party A can be said to be 
using power if B gives A more of y than A gives B of x” (Molm, 1981, p. 43). 
 
53 
2.2.3 Alternative models of exchange 
Whilst it becomes apparent that the major emphasis in mainstream economic literature has been 
on consumer welfare and the importance of economic zero to market efficiency, there is an 
alternative body of economic literature that examines the problem of allocation of surplus as an 
outcome of exchange.  Game Theory has been utilised to examine a range of exchange situations 
and is often deployed to predict the equilibrium condition under which an exchange will take 
place. The classic Game Theory assumes that players have full knowledge of all possible 
courses of action or choices available and it is assumed that they will act or choose in such a 
way that will optimise their payoffs in the light of their prediction about the actions of the other 
party (Von Neuman and Morganstein, 1944).   
Theories of games have been criticised, particularly those known as zero sum games, as they 
make a number of unrealistic assumptions, particularly about perfect information, cardinal 
utility and the diametric nature of interests (Harsanyi, 1977).  Further problems have been 
recognised with regard to specific problems associated with the empirical testing of Game 
theory (Colman, 1982). One of the key problems identified is that it is a fundamentally 
prescriptive model that examines what players ought to do, not what they do, and, despite claims 
that the strength of Game theory lies in its mathematical rigour, it is often believed that GT 
provides no insight into the human response to problems of interdependent choices (Wagner, 
1975), and it merely maps choices.   
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N person game theory has been utilised to examine whether the diverse stakeholders can agree 
upon a set of joint benefits, and decide upon the allocation of benefits and costs in a form that 
ensures cohesion (Staatz, 1983). It offers a way of examining the resources available to parties 
whose interests are both coincidental and in conflict (Axelrod, 1984). None the less, it provides 
an unrefined explanation for the distribution of surplus between two parties, and offers a limited 
insight about why some parties receive greater benefits from the exchange situation than others. 
The next section goes on to describe and examine the theory of Power and Dependency, which 
provides a more suitable framework for our purposes. 
2.3 What determines distribution of value in Power Dependency Theory?  
More than the previously discussed theories, Power Dependency theories present us with an 
important means to understand the allocation of surplus within a supply chain. The central idea 
in Power Dependency Theory is that the allocation of benefits depends upon the distribution of 
power between two parties that, in turn, is contingent upon the relative scarcity/availability of 
alternatives and the utility/motivational investment of the product of the exchange relationship 
(Blau, 1986, pp. 152-6). The concept of power is described as thus: 
“The power of one party is dependent upon the level of resistance of the other, and the 
dependence of actor a upon actor b is directly proportional to a’s motivational investment in the 
goals mediated by b and inversely proportional to the availability of those goals outside the a-b 
relation” (Emerson, 1962, p. 32). 
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As stated earlier, the exchange relationship may be defined in terms of the comparative degree 
of resource dependency of either party and suggests that the ability to leverage value is a 
function of the resource set (Aldrich, 1979). It is therefore important to understand the 
respective resource set of each party in order to determine the outcome of the exchange process 
(Emerson, 1962; 1964; 1976; Cox et al., 2001; 2002; Cox, 2004).  
Resource sets may thus be conceptualised as a mechanism or attributes through which a 
business can influence the perceived scarcity and utility of the product of the exchange 
relationship. In this light it is evident that resources have been conceptualised in a number of 
different ways. Some of the earlier examinations of power relations within business literature 
(Martin, 1971; El-Ansary and Stern, 1972; Robicheaux et al., 1976; Etgar, 1979; Dwyer and 
Walker, 1981; Anderson and Narus, 1984; Reve et al., 1986; Arndt, 1993), drew upon resource 
sets (sources of power); under the headings of coercive, legitimate, referent, expert, reward, and 
information, from the typology characterised by French and Raven (1959).  
Yet inherently this literature examines the “sources of power” as mechanisms to resolve the 
issue of conflict and power struggles in order to ensure effective channel performance. In 
essence, marketing channel literature suggests that power imbalances are inevitable and that 
effective coordination of markets is contingent upon the subjugation of the weaker party. This 
mechanism of submission is denoted as a cost reduction in Power Dependency Theory; Emerson 
notes that in general it is a process that involves a change in values that reduces the pains 
incurred by the weakest in meeting the demands of the more powerful (Emerson, 1962, p. 35). 
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More recent literature in business management, as illustrated in figure 2.2, has explored the 
nature of critical resources/assets deployed by firms to generate the dependence of the other 
party. These may be broadly represented as market based properties or properties intrinsic to the 
organisation.  
In the first instance, in terms of Industrial Organisation Theories, the ability of one firm to 
outperform another is linked to the structural conditions of the industry sector (Bain, 1956; 
Porter, 1980; Schumpeter, 1942). The power position and the ability of the firm to influence the 
structure of the industry are determined by its resource set (McWilliams and Smart, 1995; 
Thomas and Pollack, 1999).  The dominant parties are those who can effectively exploit the lack 
of potential competitors, inhibit new entrants and the mobility of rivals, and limit the relative 
importance of both suppliers and buyers. Such a result is achieved through the creation of 
appropriate resources such as economies of scale and through absolute cost advantages, product 
differences, property rights, technological uniqueness, informational complexity and the 
construction of switching impediments for their buyer/supplier. 
Alternatively, as also seen in figure 2.2, within resource based views, firm performance7 
depends upon the heterogeneity and immobility of internal resources (Priem et al., 2001).  The 
list of identified resources has included tangible resources such as finance, types of capital 
equipment, qualification profile of employees (Hofer et al., 1978), less tangible resources such 
                                                                
7  It is again suggested that this is pertinent to both cooperative and non-cooperative firms 
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as skills, experience, brand reputation, and networks (Wernerfelt, 1984; Hall, 1989; Williams, 
1992; Fahy et al., 1999).   
More recent examinations of power have suggested that the possession of critical assets/resource 
sets does not necessarily mean that the firm can achieve market closure. The realisation of 
closure is contingent upon the ability to utilise these resources. Effective use of these resources 
may depend on how far the manager is able to understand how resources may be deployed to the 
benefit of the firm and the value placed on the exchange by the other exchange partner (Farjoun, 
1994). As indicated previously, the determination of a power/dependency relationship is 
contingent on the deployment of resources of either party. The possession of resources doesn’t 
necessarily result in a dominant position.  
Figure 2.2 shows a range of ways in which resource sets have been classified. The main thrust 
of the arguments within this body of literature is that resource sets inhibit imitation, substitution 
or market entry through the “tacitness” or lack of information on the competences involved 
(Reed and DeFillippi, 1990). Lippman and Rumelt (1982) identified specific cognitive or 
informational resources such as uncertain inimitability, search costs, information impactedness 
(Rumelt, 1984). Others identified inimitability (Barney, 1991; Amit and Schoemaker, 1993; 
Collis and Montgomery, 1995) and transparency (Grant, 1991).  This leads back to the issue of 
conceived resources already noted, whereby the relative power position is contingent not only 
upon the understanding of the manager as to the resources available to counter act those of the 
other party, but on the ability of their exchange partner to hide, or manipulate information so to 
deceive.  
58 
This is a position held by Cox et al. (2002), whereby the determination of the power dependency 
relationship is contingent not only on the comparative level of resource sets and their relative 
scarcity and utility but on the manipulation of information as a power resource.   In order to 
provide a more robust conceptualisation of the significance of scarcity and utility of resource 
endowments in buyer and supplier exchange, Cox et al. (2002) introduced the concept of 
objective and subjective interests. Based on precepts of bounded rationality (Simon, 1972) their 
theory distinguished between what was known and the actions taken by individuals and those 
which in objective terms were available. This enabled a more rigorous evaluation of power on 
the basis of both structure and action of each party. 
The study of power from a subjective viewpoint examines those resources that either party 
deploys to secure their expressed preferences, but complies with the assumption that power does 
not exist if not enacted. However in combination with the objective view, it is possible to 
expand the analysis to take account of the extent to which the parties subjectively understand 
their own and the objective economic interests of their exchange partners, something that 
addresses the problem of tautology identified in earlier power literature (Williamson, 1995).
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Figure 2.2: Summary of key literature on the nature of key resources 
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In conclusion, the issue of resource sets has been addressed from a number of perspectives, 
each of which has shown some evidence of validity (Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991; 
McGahan and Porter, 1997; McGahan and Porter, 2003). What becomes apparent is that 
there is a need for a balanced view (Zajak, 1992) and a more holistic approach to the 
problem of assessing the power of each party in an exchange relationship (Ackoff, 1971; 
Schwenk and Dalton, 1991). Evidence from research shows that neither industry structure 
nor resource sets provide a complete explanation of profit rates across companies 
(Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt, 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997; McGahan and Porter, 
2003).  Indeed work on Systems Theory from the 1970s implies that it is the interaction 
between the two levels of analysis, the interconnectivity between firms  and the industrial 
environment in which they are located, that determine the success of each party (Achoff, 
1971; Gregory, 2001; Bauder et al., 2007). 
The discussion in chapter 4 will explore how combining the frameworks of industrial 
organisation and resource based literature can offer stronger more appropriate measures or 
determinants of power in the context of Power Dependency Theory.   
2.3.1 Emerson and Power 
The influence of power dependency literature has been considerable, providing important 
insights into a range of research areas. Marketing channel literature has explored the 
negative impact of power struggles, stressing the need for “submission” of the dependent 
party to assure effective channel performance (El-Ansary and Stern, 1972; Etgar, 1979; 
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Dwyer and Walker, 1981), whilst others have examined the implications of balancing 
mechanisms on vertical supply chains and dyadic relationships ( Cox et al., 2001; 2002). 
However, scant attention has been paid to the impact of horizontal collectives on buyer seller 
relationships and the allocative process (Philips, 1960; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Cox, 2004). 
In order to examine the nature of horizontal relationships it is appropriate to return to first 
principles. A major insight found in Power Dependency Theory, but ignored within 
marketing channel literature, is the idea that parties are inherently unhappy with power 
imbalances. Emerson believed that the instability of unbalanced relations can be traced to a 
fact that, any use of power will by definition arouse psychological conflict in the recipient 
and, when power is not actually used, parties nonetheless feel vulnerable in their excessive 
dependency. The subject involved in an unbalanced relation is perceived to be keenly aware 
that the relationship is lacking what Homans has called distributive justice (Homans, 1958).  
Emerson’s work was designed to be a generic framework, which may be applied to a range 
of social relations and could be applied to small groups as well as complex relationships 
(Emerson, 1962). However, he also acknowledges that the conception of dependence as 
based on two variables, “availability and motivational investment”, looks remarkably like 
the economic principle of supply and demand. The nature of Emerson’s insight into balances 
and imbalanced relationships may be expressed as in figure 2.3.  
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Figure 2.3: Representation of balanced and imbalanced power (Emerson, 1962) 
 
In figure 2.3 above it is notable that balanced relationships are those where Pab= Dba and 
Pba=Da. This means that the power of a over b is equal to and derived from the dependence 
of b on a. This represents equal levels of power and dependence of each party. In balanced 
power relationships, the dependence of party b is “directly proportional” to that of the 
dependence of a on b (Emerson, 1962, p. 32) demonstrating equality of utility and scarcity of 
offerings between the two parties (Blau, 1964; Wrong, 1968; French and Raven, 1969; Luke, 
1974; Bacharach and Lawler, 1980; Ramsey, 1995; 1996). 
Alternatively, where Pba = Dba > Pab=Dab, this means that the power of one individual is 
not neutralised by their dependence on the other. Therefore the theory suggests that the 
relative power/dependency of each party results in either balanced or imbalanced 
power/dependency relations. This means that the relative dependency of each party on the 
resources of the other results in one of three power dependency relationships (Emerson, 
1962; 1964; Wrong, 1968). As identified in figure 2.4 there are three key power positions. 
 
Pab= Dba 
V       V 
Pba= Dab  
 
imbalanced  
Pab= Dba 
=             = 
Pba= Dab  
 
balanced 
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These amount to an equality of power and dependency, a state known as incursive, plus two 
integral conditions, the dominance of   a over b and the dominance of  b over a.  
Pab= Dba 
V       V 
Pba= Dab  
(integral) 
 
Pab= Dba 
=             = 
Pba= Dab  
( incursive) 
  Pba= Dab 
V       V 
Pab= Dba 
(integral) 
 
Figure 2. 4: The Emerson power matrix 2.3.2 Balancing mechanisms 
Emerson’s particular contribution to the field is his thesis that imbalanced relationships are 
in the main undesirable and that there are four potential mechanisms through which 
dependent parties may redress power imbalances. In his essay, Emerson does acknowledge 
that the dependent party could submit to the power imbalance, but points to a number of 
means by which the unbalanced power relation can be redressed. In short these amount to 
redressing the imbalances by increasing motivational investment or reducing choice. As 
suggested earlier in section 2.2 etc., this amounts to increasing or decreasing supply or 
increasing or decreasing demand, as is illustrated in more detail within figure 2.5. 
  Figure 2. 5:  Balancing mechanisms in exchange relations 
 Decreasing power of A Increasing power for B 
Alternatives/ choice  
- consolidation 
1. Decrease choice – for 
independent party  
2. Develop more  choice 
for dependent party  
Motivational 
investment / status 
giving  
3. Increase motivational 
investment for 
independent party 
4. Decrease motivational 
investment for 
dependent party 
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Figure 2.5 shows that each party has two key means of resisting the power of the other party. 
A dependent party could either decrease their dependence on the more powerful opponent by 
decreasing the opponent’s power or by increasing their own power. To decrease the power of 
the other party, they could either decrease the number of alternative suppliers or improve the 
functionality of the product and increase the motivational investment. To increase their own 
power position, they could increase their number of alternatives or decrease the importance 
of the motivational investment they have in the other party. 
 In his 1964 work Emerson summarised the four options as: 
1. coalition formation – a means of decreasing the availability of alternative relations 
for the stronger parties 
2. network extension- a means of increasing the availability of alternative relations for 
weaker parties  
3. status giving- a means of  increasing the motivational investment of the stronger 
parties 
4. withdrawal- a means of reducing motivational investment on the part of the weaker 
parties 
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This means that Emerson’s particular contribution to the field is the clarity in which he 
determines the factors which instigate change to the dynamics of an exchange relationship. 
His thesis that coalition’s networks and status giving strategies were potential mechanisms to 
redress power imbalance is core to the thesis of the current research and indeed is apparent 
within the government policy. Government policy, as explored in chapter 1, places particular 
emphasis on the importance of increasing scarcity through consolidation of the supply base 
and of the value of increasing utility through the development of added value products. The 
next section will consider in the context of cooperatives the importance of these options as 
means of redressing farm incomes.  
2.3.2.1 The cooperative as a balancing mechanism 
In a sector where family farms are considered the most efficient business unit (Bijman, 
2002), cooperatives have been identified as appropriate balancing mechanisms, offering the 
potential for leverage (DEFRA, 2007). Existing cooperative literature, drawing heavily upon 
neoclassical theories, suggests that cooperatives emerge in conditions of depressed prices or 
market failures that were often induced through excessive supply (Helmberger, 1964; Sexton 
and Iskow, 1993; Cook, 1995; Nilsson, 1999).  Market imperfections can be traced to the 
imbalances associated with respective optimum efficient sizes of farms in comparison with 
both upstream and downstream parties, as well as disparately high levels of investment 
(Friedland, et al., 1981; Goodman, et al., 1987; Bijman, 2002; Bruinsma, 2003; Aksoy et al., 
2005). 
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As indicated earlier, the development of cooperatives can be seen to generate two key 
countervailing functions: of coalition formation and increases in motivational investment 
through status giving activities, both of which are anticipated by Emerson’s power 
dependency framework.   We now look at this in more detail. 
2.3.2.1.1 Consolidation – through coalition formation 
In the case of the consolidation of supply through collective effort, leverage is generated by 
the reduction of choice, increase of scarcity, to customers. As discussed in chapter 1, 
historically, the literature on cooperatives has examined two leverage positions which 
emerge from the consolidation of supply. The first leverage position reflects an 
absolute/partial monopoly and is known as countervailing power where the effectiveness of 
the cooperative is dependent on the percentage share of the supply base held by the 
cooperative. It is worth noting that “countervailing power” cooperatives are effective where 
there are both monopolies and monopsonies.34 In the second instance, the yardstick 
cooperative ( Nourse, 1945; Bonus, 1996; Szarbo, 2002 ) is of value to farmers in that its 
presence or the mere threat of entry is said to force competitors to offer reciprocal pricing ( 
Sexton and Sexton,1987) that leads to greater efficiency and the correction of market prices 
(Helmbergers, 1964). Such strategies are seen to be particularly effective where there are 
conditions of market shortages (Hendrikse and Veerman, 2001; Cook, 1995; Fulton, 1999; 
Beverland, 2006).  
 
                                                                
34 This point will be explored in more depth in section 2.3. 
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The Power Dependency Theory predicts that the balancing operation can be found in 
coalition formation, reducing the ability of the dominant party to seek gratification 
elsewhere, thereby creating a climate for the delivery of fundamental transformation and 
enabling farmers to become price makers (Hendrikse, 2004). In theory, in context of the UK 
food supply chain, the consolidation through cooperation should enable a cooperative to 
restrict supply and reverse their power position. In figure 2.6 below, it is apparent that prior 
to collective action there is a multitude of farmers supplying into but a few multiple retailers 
and processors. Through consolidation, as proposed by Emerson, there would be one party, a 
collective of farmers who would supply into a greater number of buyers and thus redress 
power imbalances.  
Figure 2.6: The impact of consolidation through coalition after Emerson
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However, the critical issue in the context of cooperatives is whether the collective condition 
generates sufficient leverage to countervail the purchasing advantage of downstream players 
to an extent that ensures greater economic returns, if not monopolistic rents.  It might be 
suggested that the larger the size of the cooperative the more effective they are (Cook, 1995). 
None the less there is an issue as to whether a sufficient supply base exists to ensure 
effective leverage. If examined in the context of the ability of the cooperative to increase the 
resource dependency of their buyers, it can be seen that this depends upon the extent to 
which they can achieve economies of scale, and their ability to inhibit the entry of 
competitors or restrict the market conditions of buyers, suppliers and competitors. Their 
ability to achieve any of these is restricted both by their governance structure and the 
structures of the markets in which they operate. Their ability to both restrict supply and 
achieve economies of scale is inhibited by their failure to control volume where they are 
obligated to accept all produce supplied by their members.  
2.3.2.1.2 Differentiation- increasing motivational investment - status giving 
The UK policy suggests that the cooperative may also generate increased value to its 
members by producing added value products, an example of the use of collective action as a 
status mechanism, by which they can increase the motivational investment of buyers. This 
may be achieved by increasing the operational importance of the product to the buyer by 
improving functionality and/or by increasing its commercial importance through augmenting 
the product’s reputational effect (Arcas et al., 2003; Edwards et al., 2005; Beverland, 2006).  
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While government policy has emphasised the importance of developing value added 
products, the ability of a cooperative so to do is conditional upon the extent to which brand 
or product specificity can increase the resource dependency of the other party.  In the light of 
current market conditions where manufacturer brands do not generate a sufficient point of 
differentiation for competitive advantage (Buttle, 1996), their value as counter levers may be 
limited, however they will nevertheless require some considerable investment to deliver. The 
issue of consideration is whether the product is inimitable and heterogeneous and whether 
the development of such products would prevent the withdrawal of the buyer.  
With the growth of retailer own brands, which have become a strong competitor against 
those of the manufacturer, the situation is even more problematic. This is particularly so 
where property rights remain firmly in the hands of the buyer and new product development 
costs and the costs of increased functionality represent significant asset specific costs to the 
cooperative. Nevertheless Emerson’s status giving concept proves us within a second 
potential rational for corporate effectiveness. 
2.4 Weaknesses of the theory  
Despite a certain level of criticism against the principle of power in business management 
and economics, the concept of power offers a valuable tool through which to examine the 
distribution of economic surplus between exchange parties.  Yet, the strength of Power 
Dependency theories lies in their ability to explain the how and the why of surplus 
distribution. 
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The Emerson theory has certain limitations when addressing the research question, in that it 
fails to address the issues identified in existing research regarding the cohesiveness of 
coalitions. The dilemma in cooperative literature is twofold. In the first instance, collective 
action requires a common interest. In the second, collective interests do not necessarily 
produce collective action. One key academic in this field, Olson, indicated that the pursuit of 
individual rationality may be counter to collective interest (Olson, 1965).  Even when there 
is complete agreement over the common goal, members may not choose to put in the effort 
in either time or investment for fear that their effort will not be reciprocated by other 
members of the collective.  
The reasons for the break down between collective interest and action may be attributed to 
the characteristics of public goods, in that they are jointly supplied, but that it is also not 
possible to exclude those who do not bear the costs of the supply from the consumption of 
the goods (Runge, 1984). Olson argues strongly about the dangers to collective action from 
the free rider problem. He believes that if parties cannot be excluded from obtaining benefit 
from collective action, irrespective of their level of investment there would be little incentive 
to contribute.  If all members failed to contribute then collective action would not take place 
and no-one would benefit. The problem lies in the conflict between self-interest over the 
collective. This position can be seen to be all the more poignant where cooperatives are 
required to make significant investments in order to compete in current markets.  
This suggests a weakness of Power Dependency Theory, in that it offers little insight into the 
fragility of the collective action in the context of power.  If an individual is to act in self-
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interest, and the other party is in full recognition of this fact, then there is considerable 
incentive for a party to undermine the position of the collective.  
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has examined the theoretical underpinnings of cooperative action with 
particular reference to Power Dependency Theory and argues that the concept of power, 
whilst unrecognised by neoclassical economists, has much to add to the understanding of the 
distribution of surplus between two parties. This is particularly the case in the context of 
monopolistic, duopolistic or oligopolistic conditions, where the distribution of surplus can be 
linked to the relative resource dependency of one party upon the other.  
There is considerable literature on cooperatives, particularly neoclassical and new institution 
economic models of the effectiveness of cooperatives as monopolies in conditions, where the 
potential for defection can undermine the monopolistic condition. However, the issue is 
whether cooperatives are an effective response to the crisis in farming. In this chapter the 
author has looked at the manner in which Emerson explains the government policy and its 
emphasis on cooperative action as a means of readjusting the balance of power within the 
supply chain. The chapter also has examined, in the context of economic literature, the 
arguments which have been put forward against the concept of power throughout its 
chequered history. In chapter 3 the author will examine the implications of internal and 
external free riding for the cooperative stability and longevity. This argument is drawn from 
Olson’s work on “common property” problem (Olson, 1965). 
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CHAPTER 3  
LITERATURE REVIEW- DETERMINING THE SUCCESS OF 
COOPERATIVES, COHESION AND THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL 
FREE-RIDER PROBLEM 
3.0 Introduction 
In the earlier chapters it has been argued, in the context of UK agricultural policy, that the 
effectiveness of cooperatives is likely to be linked to two key issues, a) the ability of 
cooperatives to act as a counterweight to the structural power of multiple retailers and b) the 
ability of cooperatives to sustain cohesiveness or integrity. Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that these two factors may be related in that the ability of the cooperative to retain 
members and cooperative cohesion will have an impact on the ability of its leverage 
position. Where cooperatives are unable to deliver leverage, cooperative cohesion may be 
threatened further. In chapter 2, the author started the examination of the theoretical 
underpinnings of cooperative action by assessing Power Dependency Theory. PDT provides 
a rationale for believing that cooperatives have the potential to improve the financial position 
of farmers by either increasing motivational investment or reducing the number of 
alternative sources of supply for buyers. However, it is evident that the Power Dependency 
Theory fails to examine the extent to which cooperative cohesiveness or lack of cohesiveness 
impinges upon the efficacy of cooperatives as a means of redressing power imbalances in 
vertical relationships. 
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The purpose of this chapter is thus to examine the issue of membership retention and 
cooperative cohesion in more detail. The chapter will specifically attempt to examine the 
idea that the decision of the cooperative member to engage with the objective of the 
cooperative is a calculatively rational decision. It is only rational for a member to continue to 
engage if the benefits delivered exceed the costs of delivery.  Government policy is expected 
to deliver benefits such as higher farm gate prices, better margins and improved supply chain 
productivity; however, these benefits can only be delivered, in traditional cooperatives, after 
members have made a significant investment. These investments (or costs) include the 
obvious asset specific investments such as investments in physical, site, human, dedicated, 
brand and time, as well as additional costs associated with the free rider problem, including 
those stemming from the monitoring, lobbying and control of members and managers, the 
implementation of sanctions and the costs imposed on other members of  shirking or 
freeriding. What makes this difficult to achieve is that benefits are non-excludable, thereby 
allowing some members to free ride, that is, that individuals will attempt to get the benefits 
without incurring the costs (Olson, 1965). Olson suggests that where many participants make 
the same calculation then the cooperative will lose effectiveness and risk decline. 
Cooperatives are thought to be at risk from internal free riding where cooperatives are larger 
and where members’ individual actions are unobserved.   
The function of this chapter is to explore the concept and implications of calculative 
rationality on the efficacy of cooperatives. The first section examines ideas put forward on 
calculative rationality, collectives and cohesion. This section includes the ideas of Olson in 
his seminal work on the logic of collective action, with reference to parallel literature. In the 
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second section, the author examines the literature on agricultural cooperatives. This draws 
upon the common property problem identified by Olson and examines the issue of how 
members can determine the costs of cohesion and how this may impact on cooperative 
cohesiveness. In the third section the author concludes and points the way to an integrated 
theoretical framework, encompassing both PDT and collective action theories, to be 
presented in chapter 4.  
3.1 Olson, Common property and Calculative rationality 
The precept that an individual is self-interested and in pursuit of individual gain is common 
to many economic theories, Yet, views on the consequences for collective action are varied. 
In classical and neoclassical economics the view is that individual action is to the collective 
good. That is, in striving to maximise his/own well-being the farmer will contribute to the 
well-being of all.   In Power Dependency Theory, based on precepts that it is the 
fundamental propensity of humans to form and join groups (Simmel, 1950), the view is 
taken that if members of a group have a common interest, it is in the interest of the 
individual to further the interests of the whole. A third perspective is put forward by Olson 
(1965), who challenged conventional wisdom. Olson argued that the most rational option is 
the pursuit of individual interest but that in the context of a common or public good35 it is 
not logical to assume that this will also be in the interest of the group (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 
1967; Hardin, 1968).Olson argues that: 
                                                                
3535 leading to utility maximisation  
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“Even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested and would 
gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their common interest, they will still not voluntarily 
act to achieve that common or group interest.” (Olson, 1965, p2) 
The reason for this viewpoint is that whilst collectives of individuals exist to further the 
interest of their members and will “perish” if they fail to do so, the non-excludability of 
public or common goods means that it is in the interest of the individual to let others pursue 
and bear the cost of the collective interest as they cannot be excluded from sharing its 
benefits (Olson, 1965, p. 15). This became known as the free-rider problem or the tragedy of 
the commons (Hardin, 1968). The failure to rescind individual interest over the collective can 
be seen to be a function of the desire to benefit from the public good without contributing to 
the cost.  
 This problem is more acute in larger cooperatives (Hariyoga, 2004; Sandler, 1992). Olson 
examines the problem in the context of perfect markets. He argues that, whilst it is in the 
interest of an industry to attain higher prices, which is a function of supply and demand, the 
delivery of higher prices is undermined by tensions between individual and collective 
interest. The common good, the higher price for industry, is undermined where individual 
firms follow their own interest of maximising production to a level where the cost of 
producing another unit equals the price of the unit. If the majority of or all firms increase 
output, the sector price would decline and each would attain a smaller profit (Olson, 1965. p 
9).  
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However, where the cooperative is made up of a large number of farm businesses, the 
perception of the individual firm is that no-one will notice if they act in self-interest and do 
not contribute to the collective good, in this case withholding output to a level which 
maximises the industry price  As a result, if sanctions or incentives are not offered to 
members of a group, then the individual interest is not to take the burden of maintaining the 
aggregate but to gain the benefit whilst others bear the costs. In such cases, they could prove 
to be even worse off than through maximising their own output (Olson, 1965; Reisman, 
1990).  
Large cooperatives, in which there is parity in the volume delivered by members, are 
particularly vulnerable to this free riding problem. However, in cooperatives in which there 
are extreme differences between the volumes supplied, amongst members the free rider 
problem is marginally attenuated. In such cooperatives the members supplying the greater 
volume are able to influence price through by, when required, refraining from maximising 
their production volume. Although they will bear a disproportionate burden of the cost of 
cohesion36, their action would theoretically increase price and thus for these members the 
financial gain they receive should be greater than the total costs of collaboration, that is, the 
cost of operating at individual suboptimal levels for the collective good (Olson, 1965;  Bland 
et al., 1999).   
                                                                
36 The cost of cohesion sometimes referred to as costs of association means in this instance – the loss of income from not maximising 
revenue through minimising unit costs 
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Where the costs of cohesion are high, the free rider problem will not necessarily mean that 
collective action will not take place. It is acknowledged that collective action, particularly in 
large cooperatives, is unlikely to be sustainable (Olson, 1965). The impact of the calculative 
rationality of the individual is contingent either upon the visibility of the action of the 
individual or the employment of control mechanisms, either coercion or selective incentives. 
In contrast, in small groups there is a greater likelihood of group consensus and group 
members are more likely to act in ways that are conducive to the common interest. This is 
because their behaviour is observable and manifest. This phenomenon is compatible with the 
axiom of self-interest, and is still indicative of individual calculative evaluation of the costs 
and benefits. In small groups, individuals, in a search for social acceptance and thus self-
approbation, will act in the interest of the common good (Olson, 1965; Riesman, 1990).   
This suggests that smaller cooperatives will be more cohesive and thus operate under lower 
costs of cohesion. The relationship would appear to be iterative in that the more coherent 
their objectives and interests, the more cohesive the cooperative membership will be. The 
more cohesive they are, the lower the costs of cohesion. The lower the costs of cohesion and 
the lower the risk of shirking costs, the greater the cohesion will be. Indeed, this has also 
been found to be the case in cooperatives, in which there has been considerable variance 
between the size of production volumes of members (Baland, 2004). 
Costs of cohesion include the costs of implementing sanctions and incentives and also 
include the costs of monitoring involved parties, as well as the costs of group norming that 
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needs to take place within a multiple interest decision making body (LeVay, 1989). Costs 
will increase in proportion to size of cooperative, as well as homogeneity of size of 
membership. The presence of heterogeneous members within a cooperative is said to reduce 
costs of monitoring, control, incentives and sanctions to the cooperative as a whole (0lson, 
1965).  
These ideas have been heavily drawn upon by much of the literature on marketing 
cooperatives. In the next section, section 3.2, literature that examines the free rider issue in 
marketing cooperatives is explored. Ideas explored in this section will form the cohesion 
problem identified in the exploratory framework in chapter 4.   
3.2 Examination of the issues in marketing cooperatives  
Much of marketing cooperative literature suggests that farmers’ perceptions of the value of 
cooperatives are dependent on the returns on investment to their farm business. Cooperatives 
will only be effective, it is said, if they deliver obvious financial benefits to each member. 
Research suggests that financial benefits are delivered when farmers receive higher than 
average returns at a low cost (Furubotn, 1972; Caves and Peterson, 1986; Boyle, 2004). 
Where the relative costs of achieving collective action are high and are perceived to rise 
above financial benefits, participants will be less incentivised to take the burden of the costs 
and will act opportunistically and often defect (Staatz, 1983; Staatz, 1989; Cook 1995, Katz 
1999, Fulton, 2000, Stoel, 2002 Cook et al., 1999). 
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 Research findings also suggest that members are averse to being required to contribute to 
the costs of investing into diversification strategies, technical developments and new product 
developments which are disproportionate to their benefit.  This can make it difficult to raise 
funds for traditional cooperatives, and hinders the adaption of cooperatives to changes in the 
business environment (Cook, 1995; Harte, 1997; Van Bekkum, 2001; Cook and Iliopoulos, 
2000; Chaddad, et al., 2002; Hendrikse et al., 2002; Bijman et al., 2003; Chaddad, 2003; 
Hariyoga, 2004; Bijman et al., 2005). In much of the research literature these problems have 
been articulated as incentive problems, that is to say, factors which undermine the desire to 
cooperate (Cook, 1995; Torgerson, 1999; Van Bekkum, 2001). Cook (1995) argues that 
these different problems increase the costs of transactions, including asset specific and 
agency costs. 
The concept of incentive problems refers to four issues facing cooperatives. Firstly, 
cooperatives face incentive problems that are linked to the heterogeneity of membership, 
which is said to result in increased costs of transactions within the cooperative; costs 
associated with lobbying and negotiating. These incentive problems have been called 
decision and influence problems (Cook and Iliopoulos, 1999; Bijman and Ruben, 2005).  
Secondly, particularly in the face of increased investment costs, the potential for loss of 
cohesion increases in the face of what are known as the horizon37 and portfolio 38problems. 
These are seen to be of particular issue where members’ shares have no secondary or 
appreciable value.  
                                                                
37 this relate to differences between the actual period of investment and the period of time in which the member would benefit, that is to say 
the period time the member will benefit is shorter than the period of the investment  
38 the appositeness of the investment to the member’s risk and business strategy  
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The third category of incentive problem is that of the control problem which relates to the 
costs of managing and controlling managers where incomplete contracts allow for 
opportunistic behaviour and where managers seek to maximise their own returns or those of 
a minority of members (Porter et al., 1987; Cook, 1995). Finally, cooperative literature has 
emphasised the costs of free riding or common property, as examined by Olson, which 
points to the problem where individuals seek to gain benefit without the costs of cohesion 
(Cook, 1995). The costs of cohesion can be represented in the following figure, figure 3.1 
and can be represented in terms of direct costs associated asset specific costs, as well as the 
indirect costs of free rider and associate costs of transaction and agency as expressed within 
the Olson framework. 
 3.2.1 New Institutional Theories, costs to members and cohesion. 
Cooperative incentive problems have been examined from a number of angles. One of the 
most prominent is from the perspective of New Institutional Theory.  New institutional 
approaches applied to cooperatives  have offered a detailed insight into the source of  costs  
incurred by the incentive problem and have conceptualised  incentive problems as a 
reflection of the  disparity between the individual members’ decision unit and that of the 
collective of a whole (Van Bekkum, 2001). Theories, such as Transaction cost economics, 
have been devised to formulate empirically meaningful optimisation problems by associating 
the utility function with the individual decision maker (Furubotn et al., 1972).  In this 
instance, the individual member will make a calculative decision on the basis of the 
perceived individual benefits of cohesion versus alternative opportunities.  Where costs of 
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cohesion for the individual are perceived to be higher than alternatives this will result in a 
reduction in cooperative cohesion as members defect. Thus attention has been paid to the 
nature of the costs.  
First, such costs can be articulated in terms of direct costs of cohesion that have a net effect 
on the financial benefits of members as in asset specific costs. Second, there are indirect 
costs, and these can be seen as costs arising out of the internal and external free rider 
problem. These are expressed in figure 3.1 and examined in more detail in later sections. 
3.2.2 Direct costs Asset specific costs and investments 
Located in the body of literature on New Institutional Approaches, asset specificity is the 
term used to denote sunk costs or investments made to support a particular transaction that 
may not be redeployed elsewhere due to their transaction-specific nature (McGuiness, 1994; 
Williamson, 1975; 1985; 1986 1996, p59). The more transaction specific investments are, 
the more businesses run the risk of being subject to opportunistic behaviour, and as we will 
learn later in more detail, and have touched upon in chapter 2, the cooperative has risks of 
opportunistic behaviour or at least self-interest from both its buyers and members.  
3.2.2.1 The nature of asset specific investment  
Asset specific investment / cost has been categorised according to the nature of the resource.  
These initially included specificity of site, skills or manpower, physical non-site specific and 
investments dedicated to the delivery of the products (Williamson, 1996). These have more 
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latterly been extended to include brand and temporal specifics (Joskow, 1988; Masten et al., 
1991). The nature of these is more fully described below:  
1. Site specificity, which refers to the tie in of specific investment in buildings 
and technical equipment to a “customer”. High levels of specificity would 
reflect significant impediments of relocation of facilities (Joskow, 1985). In 
cooperatives this could refer to storage or distribution facilities which are 
customer specific. 
2. Physical asset specificity refers to the investment in physical assets such as 
technology or research and development which are not site specific but are 
specific to the requirements of the cooperative key customers’ requirements  
(Joskow, 1985)  
3. Human asset specificity- specific skills or knowledge to cooperative and 
cooperative customers 
4. Dedicated assets- these will tend to be on or off farm investments. Which in 
the context of this study could be perceived to be investments in  processes  
dedicated to the delivery of products to key customers  
5. Brand  name investment relates to investment made that is specific to a 
product or reputation  
6. Temporal- concerns assets which have a value that will depreciate over time 
if not maintained – and could  relate to the scheduling of activities contingent 
upon customer schedules 
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Historically, cooperative members contributed to asset specific investment through such 
costs as the cost of membership, marketing costs and any on-farm investment required to 
improve farm efficiency. Any additional investment required by the cooperatives for 
replacement of physical assets would be attained through the retention of the trading surplus. 
In current market climates, where the development of added value or branded products or 
increases of efficiency are required in order to compete, a member may incur higher asset 
specific costs, particularly where the cooperative is  producing more bespoke products for 
particular markets.  In this instance, dedicated asset specific investment may be made by the 
farmer and the cooperative in order to meet the requirement for improving the functionality 
of each of their customer bases. Product specification can vary quite considerably within 
commodity groups and customers. 
3.2.2.2 The implications of asset specific investments 
In increasingly competitive markets where cooperatives invest in processing facilities, asset 
specific investments are seen to rise as a consequence of their ill-defined property rights, a 
problem which is a consequence of the lack of a secondary appreciable share value in 
traditional cooperatives (Cook, 1995). Research has pointed out that the upshot of a lack of 
secondary value to shares is that where members perceive a discrepancy between their 
contribution to the collective asset specific investments and the individual benefits gained, 
they are increasing reluctant to contribute to cooperative investment. This reluctance can be 
related back to the incentive problems of Horizon and Portfolio, in that either the period of 
time over which they benefit from the investment may be shorter than its product life, or 
their own business goals fail to be promoted by the investment, which means they are 
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required to invest in suboptimal portfolios and may also be forced to accept more or less risk 
than they would prefer (Nilsson, 1997; Cook, 1995, p.1157; Borgen, 2004; Vitaliano, 1983).  
In contested markets, this can lead to allocative problems both on and off the farm, 
particularly where cooperatives attempt to extend their market position. Where companies 
attempt to establish motivational investment there is a further risk that farmers will 
experience greater farm costs. The farmer may feel that investment in new brands or 
products is counter to his interests, but that he still incurs the costs of production39.  Even if 
farms are able to meet changes to specifications or production methods, where products are 
easily imitable and buyers are able to switch suppliers, specific investment on the farm and, 
correspondingly, the impact on individual returns may be considered too high. This event 
may still occur even where the cooperatives can attain higher than average returns. This is 
because there is a requirement, particularly in traditional cooperatives, that members should 
take on the burden of asset specific investments. These conditions can lead to loss of 
cohesion and member defection. 
3.2.3. Indirect costs –the common property problem 
However, the costs of coalition are not only direct but can also be seen to be losses to 
benefits attained from cooperative action due to the non-excludability issue (Olson, 1965).   
As noted earlier, the concept of public and common properties means that whether or not 
                                                                
39 This is reflective of the classic portfolio problem. 
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there are benefits to be generated from the cooperative, or asset specific investments and 
thus costs to members are lower than those of competitors, free rider or shirking problems 
may mean that members will seek to find other buyers or maximise their benefit from the 
common property to the long term detriment of the collective (Olson, 1965).   Even where an 
individual has not contributed to the costs of cohesion, it is impossible to exclude an 
individual from partaking of the benefits.  It is important to note that free riding can be from 
members and non-members. In each case, free riding means that a lack of investment of 
time, effort and money will mean that certain parties will attain benefits from the public 
good and the input of others, without bearing any of the costs. 
In the case of internal free riders, as suggested earlier, there are a range of types of free 
riding. Olson suggests that these can be isolated into internal free riding through over 
production, internal free riding through non alignment of on-farm activities, and internal free 
riding through non-investment in off farm developments. In the case of internal free riding 
from non-investment in off farm developments, this form of free riding is a consequence of 
the fact that either a farmer joins the cooperative after the investment has been made or has 
failed to invest as an existing member.  
A further type of free riding can be perceived to stem from the non-excludability of benefits 
to non-members. As seen earlier, one positive outcome indicated by the cooperative 
literature is that there may be net increases in prices awarded to farmers, whether members 
or non-members, as a result of the presence in the market of a marketing cooperative (Staatz, 
1987). This is because the price established by the cooperative operates as a benchmark price 
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and inhibits the opportunistic behaviour of competitors and the threat to farmers of rock 
bottom prices. Yet, whilst farmers see that cooperatives may generate higher prices, they do 
not necessarily have the incentive to use the services of the cooperative, and will switch to 
alternative non-cooperative firms if prices are even higher.  
3.2.3.1 Internal free riding  
A predominant position held within the literature is that uneven distribution of costs results 
in member dissonance which can seriously undermine the stability of the cooperative. The 
internal free riding problem can be seen to be a consequence of the uneven distribution of 
asset specific, agency and transaction costs across members.  Even if costs have been 
distributed equally among members, simply the fear that they may not be so can undermine 
the position of the cooperative. 
3.2.3.1.1 Internal free riding through over production  
Incidents of internal free riding through over production can be described as those where 
cooperative members, when attracted to the cooperative through higher prices, increase their 
volume of production to a level above the market equilibrium. As previously discussed, 
where price is higher than marginal cost of production, a farmer may find that it pays to 
increase output to the maximum. An essential assumption of this model is that each firm 
aims to maximise profits, based on the expectation that its own output decision will not have 
an effect on the decisions of its rivals.  In addition, each farmer has knowledge of the total 
volume required and the volume produced by the other members.  
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These are the same issues as those previously examined in the context of both asset specific 
and transaction costs, but in parallel are perceived by members to be a substantive potential 
indirect cost.  In such a case, the costs perceived by members were that if others were to 
maximise their output, prices would fall. In effect this represents a fear that they will bear a 
higher burden of the costs of managing the total available supply. Its presence may 
fundamentally undermine the collective coherence. 
3.2.3.1.2 Internal free riding through non-alignment of on-farm activities 
A further situation exists where farmers fail to adapt their own farm practices to meet the 
cooperative’s allocative decisions. This failure could be a consequence of conditions outside 
the farmer’s control40 , but either way, may result in the uneven distribution of asset specific 
costs across members.  In a similar situation, those who invest may experience or fear that if 
others do not do so, the returns available from establishing a differentiation strategy may be 
compromised.  
Furthermore, even if this were not to be the case, many cooperatives effectively subsidise 
prices paid to farmers across products lines (Hariyoga, 2004), that likewise may be seen as 
an additional cost to the compliant farmer. Yet, where no cross subsidisation takes place, 
farmers who are unable to align due to constraints of terrain and climate may similarly feel 
that they have to bear a disproportionate cost of alignment, because they are inhibited from 
profiting from the increased benefits received by other farmers due to circumstances that are 
                                                                
40 Such factors as location, size of farm, geology, climatic conditions and other natural factors that affect the productivity of farms. 
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simply a facet of their farm or other acts of nature. In cohesive collectives, any additional 
investment by farmers in their farm must have a corresponding investment by other farmers. 
3.2.3.1.3 Internal free riding through non-investment in off farm developments. 
In addition, as discussed earlier in section 3.4, there may be particular resistance to 
investment in cooperative development.  This occurs for a number of reasons, including the 
belief by members that any increase in cash flow they will receive that may be generated by 
the asset is of a shorter duration than the productive life of the asset. This can emerge from a 
belief that the investment has been made in a market of a short lifespan, but is more likely to 
be a consequence of the age of the farmer and length of time in which he can personally 
benefit, particularly as there is increasingly a lack of succession within farming families, a 
problem previously referred to as the horizon problem (Porter and Scully, 1987, p. 495; Van 
Bekkum, 2001). This means that there is a perception that they will bear the costs for the 
benefit of others, which can prove to be a disincentive to investment, even were they to 
believe that in the short run the benefits they would attain would exceed the costs.  
A similar issue may emerge where new members enter the cooperative. Whilst the 
investment by existing members may have generated conditions where new members were 
needed in order to meet expanding demand, existing members may resent past costs, the 
benefits of which are now reaped by new members who paid nothing to their achievement 
(Cook, 1995; Fulton, 2000).  
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Further disincentives for investment may emerge when membership expands and or where 
cooperatives allocate their resources across a range of differentiated product lines, arising 
out of the impact of increased heterogeneity on the perceived distribution costs in relation to 
the distribution of benefits.  Such feelings may present a disincentive for investment. 
Members prove to be more antagonistic to investment where they are averse to the nature of 
the risk incurred and this is further exacerbated where there are disparities in risk aversion 
between members.41 
3.2.3.2 External free riding  
It is posited that the fundamental problem with cooperatives is that found in the context of 
many public goods, in that the benefits attained are non-excludable and non-rivalled. Even 
where the cooperative effectively closes the market through relative or absolute scarcity, the 
impact on prices benefits all members and non-members alike. This has been perceived to be 
a positive dimension of cooperatives. Within cooperative literature it is posited that if 
cooperatives were to disappear in an imperfectly competitive market, the power position of 
the remaining firms would increase. Nourse suggests that the power of the cooperative is that 
it can dispel monopoly power and maintain a “vigilant role” or a “yardstick operational 
position” (Nourse, 1945), thereby raising prices for the farming sector involved.  
Yet there is little consideration given to the calculations of costs over benefits that could be 
inferred from principles of calculative rationality. It might be assumed that those who are 
                                                                
41 This was referred to earlier in chapter 2 as the Portfolio problem. 
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contributing to the costs of the cooperative might resent the effect of their contribution of 
costs on the price received by the sector as a whole.  Evidence would suggest that the simple 
presence of cooperatives in the market place, where cooperatives achieve some levels of 
scarcity, may result in the raising of prices by competitors (Gunnerson, 1999). Non-members 
would thus attain the benefits of the cooperative, without the costs. The logic of collective 
action would suggest that members would experience a level of dissonance in bearing the 
costs for others of achieving such price rises. The logic would suggest that the preferred 
action would be not to become members and thus allow others to bear the cost. If all were to 
do so then the cooperative would not be formed. Indeed, even were the cooperative to be 
formed, higher prices offered by competitors could be used to  tempt farmers away, thereby 
undermining the ability of the cooperative to close the market. 
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Figure 3. 1: Costs of tensions between individual and collective interests  
Costs of the cooperative to members – tension between individual and collective good 
Source  Costs  
Direct costs    
 
Asset specific 
investment  
 Site specific – extent to which the site can be relocated post 
contract  
 Physical – assets to meet specific stipulations by the 
cooperative  
 Human-specific skills or knowledge held by cooperative and 
cooperative members 
 Dedicated – investment on and off farm in processes 
dedicated to key customers 
 Brand – investment specific to a product or brand 
 Temporal – assets which depreciate over time if not 
maintained 
 
Indirect costs   
the common 
property and free 
rider  problem 
 
Internal – 
 over production –costs caused by a decrease in price as a 
result of excess production levels by some or all members 
 Non-alignment additional–costs experienced by compliant 
members  caused by compliant members who are not 
compliant 
 Non-investment off farm – failure or resistance to investment 
in processing, marketing and delivery systems, often due to 
problems such as horizon 
 
 External free riding – members bearing the costs of cohesion 
where the benefits are non-excludable to external parties  
 
Transaction costs   Metering/ monitoring costs –costs incurred in monitoring 
compliance 
 Lobbying –costs of negotiation, influencing opinions 
 Sanction and allocation- costs incurred in assuring 
compliance  and loss of inefficiencies, where compliance 
measures fail 
 Shirking cost –cost of compliance for compliant members not 
incurred by non- compliant members. 
Agency costs   Costs of monitoring and costs of failure to monitor managers  
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3.2.3.3 Implications of free riding 
The literature suggests that the calculation of free riding costs by members, both internal and 
external, has significant implications for the longevity of cooperatives. Even where 
cooperatives are able to generate higher returns to farmers, fears of free riding may deter the 
members from acting in the interest of the collective. This in turn increases costs of cohesion 
for members. In addition to the increased costs of on and off farm investment, which as 
discussed earlier, research suggests could result in a perception by farmers  that costs 
outweigh gains, with the corresponding negative  impact on the availability of investment for 
cooperatives (Koller, 1953; Furubotn et al., 1972), there are further cost implications for 
cooperatives which emerge from the free riding problem. These are namely the increases in 
the costs of monitoring, control, sanctions, and shirking, alternatively known as transaction 
and agency costs as explicit within New Institutional Theories. 
Transaction and agency costs associated with internal free riding will increase in line with 
heterogeneity of interest. Interests may become more heterogeneous where cooperatives are 
not only large but shift their emphasis towards diverse, multipurpose, differentiated products, 
issues of coherence and thus the costs of coalition experienced by members  become more 
significantly to the fore.  Although offensive investments strategies such as branding and 
value added processing have implications for many traditional cooperatives in terms of 
availability of funds, the choice of sources of funds, whether internal as in the retention of 
member patronage surplus and direct member investment, or external sources as in external 
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shareholders, B shares or long term loans are seen to have a disparate impact on the 
longevity of cooperatives 42  . 
This next section examines in more detail the nature of the indirect costs of cohesion with 
reference to transaction and agency costs.  In the first instance, this section will outline the 
implications of principles of common property as transaction costs as identified in 
Transaction Cost Economics, before examining asset specificity and agency costs and 
outlining the implications of common property as indirect costs incurred by cooperatives’ 
members. 
3.2.3.4 Transaction costs. 
The concept of transaction costs relates to the inherent costs of undertaking lobbying, 
monitoring and searches, negotiating and developing and enforcing policy that arise directly 
from opportunistic behaviour (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978; Ouchi, 1980; Hechter, 
1984; Barzel, 1989; Demsetz, 1988; Williamson, 1985). The transaction cost approach was 
developed in order to understand how the characteristics of a transaction affect the costs of 
handling it through markets, bureaucracies and other governance forms.  Research suggests 
that both from the individual farmer and the collective position, cooperatives can attenuate 
transactions costs of marketing (Bijman, 2002: Sexton, 1986; Hakelisus, 1999).  
 Alternatively, there is more rigorous research that examines the transaction costs of the 
decision problem from the unit of analysis of the farmer (Cook and Iliopoulos, 1999), where 
                                                                
42 The  introduction of secondary value shares and external ownership as seen in the Entrepreneurial cooperatives has, it  has been argued, 
ameliorated the free rider and thus cost of cohesion issue (Dahl and Dobson, 1976; Newman, 1983; Royer, 1983; Royer and Cobia, 1984; 
Caves and Peterson, 1986; Diaz-Hemelo et al., 2001), 
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it is suggested that the more disparate the collective the greater the costs. In cooperatives this 
is normally recognised as a function of the size of the cooperative and numbers of products 
supplied (Hind, 1997; Cook and Chaddad, 2004). This means that as cooperatives become 
larger and more multipurpose, transaction costs increase, leading to cooperative instability. 
Hechtor (1984) succinctly represents these costs in terms of lobbying, metering, sanction, 
and shirking costs. 
These costs are explained in more detail in the following list: 
a. The cost of lobbying relates to the costs of negotiating and influencing opinion and 
could be incurred in cooperatives by agents who are involved in influencing members 
and board opinion. These costs may be incurred largely by the board and members 
through networking activities.   
b. Metering costs – these are the costs incurred in monitoring the compliance of 
individuals. The source of metering costs relates to the problem of actually accessing 
the individual compliance (Hechtor, 1984).  In the context of the cooperative, the 
metering costs are incurred in monitoring the compliance of members to collective 
objectives.  These costs are experienced both in terms of direct costs of time or effort 
by agents/members involved in the metering of members and the increased burden of 
costs on members arising from the costs of the additional effort. These may include 
information transfer activities relating to best practice, and members may be party to 
initiatives such as network groups designed to promote and discuss best practice. 
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c. Sanctioning costs and allocation costs stem from the deployment of resources in 
establishing mechanisms for compliance and the costs of administration incurred in 
the process of implementing mechanisms, both incentives and penalties, as well as 
the financial costs to the collective of the bonuses or penalties. Moreover, the loss of 
allocative efficiency, were the compliance measures to fail, would result in a loss of 
benefit to all members, which in effect is an opportunity cost to compliant members. 
d. Finally, shirking costs are largely non-quantifiable but relate to costs of time, effort 
investment, which have not been incurred by non-compliant members but are 
incurred by those who have adapted farming practices to meet the collective 
objectives.  
These costs are seen to rise in proportion to the disparity of member interest and increase as 
a function of the size of the cooperative and numbers of products supplied (Cook and 
Chaddad, 2004).  This is particularly so where it is considered that there have been poor 
allocative decisions as a result of internal power balances and an inability of an individual 
member to influence the strategic and operational goals, (Hariyoga, 2004; Porter et al., 1987; 
Ferrier and Porter, 1991).  
3.2.3.5 Agency costs  
In the second instance, cooperative literature draws upon Principal Agency Theory to 
examine the problem of manager control. In this body of research, the question of the 
coherence between the management and member objectives and interests is often referred to 
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as the control or follow up problem. The agency issue is a function of the contract under 
which the cooperative members engage the manager to perform the service on their behalf.  
Agency theory suggests there are two potential sources of conflict in the Principal-Agency 
relationships and these stem from a potential non-alignment of managers’ and members’ 
objectives and levels of risk aversion. In both these instances there are costs in monitoring 
management activities, particularly those stemming from ensuring that managers act in the 
interest of the collective (Porter, et al., 1987; Sexton and Iskow, 1988; Klein et al., 1997; 
Richards et al., 1998; Hakelius, 1999; Iliopoulos and Cook, 1999; Gripsrud et al., 2000). 
Whilst the Principal/agency problem is inherent within most forms of organisation, the risk 
of agency issues in cooperatives is more significant.  In line with the principles of principal 
agent theory, where cooperatives have no external monitoring systems, such as external 
stakeholders, presumptions are that managers’ x and allocative inefficiencies will follow. 
High administrative costs may be incurred due to lack of management competence or actions 
taken by the manager which are in their own interest rather than those of the cooperative 
members. Such costs could range from high sales costs, or the opportunity costs of poor 
decisions at a corporate, business or functional level that may result in lower returns than 
alternative types of governance (Katz, 1997; Katz and Boland, 1999; Hariyoga, 2004).  
Furthermore, the dilution of ownership (Jenson and Meckling, 1976) means that costs accrue 
not simply as a result of reduction in potential residual claims but in the monitoring and 
control of the actions of managers. Explicitly such costs relate to the employment, the 
monitoring and the mechanisms designed to control management activity.  
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It is critical to note that the competence levels of cooperatives are contingent upon the 
recruitment of professional managers to which the low status and low payment packages of 
cooperatives in the business world has been traditionally a barrier. This has led to a lack of 
competent management as well as claims that managers fail to understand cooperative 
principles, (De Loach, 1962, Caves and Peterson, 1986; Lang, 1994; Cook, 1994; King et al., 
1998). As a result, less competent managers have been perceived to have a lower 
understanding of operational and strategic decision making and financial management / 
reporting. Where managers are deficient in management skills and experience of both 
operational and strategic decision making, there are potential opportunity costs of ineffectual 
decisions (Sexton, et al., 1988; Howard and Klosler, 1991; Katz et al., 1997; Kyriapoulos et 
al., 1999; Bruynis et al., 2001). 
Fears also exist that managers will experience no checks against acting in their own self- 
interest in the absence of the external control mechanism of share ownership. It is posited 
that as the cooperative expands there is increasingly less control over management actions, 
resulting in high administrative and sales costs (Hariyoga, 2004), which as discussed earlier 
is exacerbated in increasingly complex markets, where risk averse managers may be 
incentivised to sell goods and services at a price lower than that which maximises profit 
(Katz, 1997; Katz and Boland, 2000; Borgen, 2004; Hariyoga, 2004).  
On the other hand, if competent managers are attracted through attractive pay deals and 
compensation payments, they risk being seen by members as opportunistic. Even where 
competent managers are employed, the extent of their control over member activities and 
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their ability to reconfigure internal competences may seriously inhibit their ability to attain 
motivational investment. 
Such costs may be mitigated by the design of incentive programmes and compensation 
packages to align agent and principal interests (Richards et al., 1998; Hariyoga, 2004). 
However, even where such a strategy is implemented where members’ interests become 
increasingly heterogeneous, additional high pay and incentives can be seen merely to add to 
the costs of coalition, and may encourage members to seek alternative “buyers”. 
In summary to section 3.2 the literature suggests that there are both direct and indirect costs 
of cohesion. Direct costs stem from the financial contribution made to cooperatives by 
members. In increasingly contested markets this contribution has become more significant.  
Additionally there are indirect costs which are incurred as a consequence of the free rider 
problem. These are two fold. In the first instance these are incurred as a direct consequence 
of the free rider problem. That is the loss of overall gain as a result of individual 
opportunism. In the second they emerge from the costs incurred by the cooperative from the 
monitoring, control and lobbying actions of members and managers. 
3.3 Conclusions  
From the literature it would appear that where cooperatives are seeking to achieve leverage, 
the success of the cooperative to deliver those benefits depends on the cohesion of the 
cooperative. A failure to deliver may be, as is suggested in chapter 2, a function of the power 
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dynamics within a supply chain. In this chapter it is also suggested that where the costs of 
coalition are high the cooperative may still fail to deliver, even where conditions are such 
that leverage might be achieved. As seen in figure 3.1 below, if costs are higher, or simply 
perceived to be higher, than alternative marketing channels then the cooperative will become 
unstable and possibly collapse. 
Chapter 4 draws upon the past two chapters and concepts of power and dependency and free 
riding in order to develop an exploratory framework that will constitute the basis of the 
research. This means that chapter 4 is central to this thesis and will underpin the process of 
adductive and reproductive interpretation of the phenomenon found from interviews, 
published and unpublished data that informs the development of the case studies.  
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CHAPTER 4  
THE EXPLORATORY FRAMEWORK  
4.0 Introduction  
The previous three chapters have outlined some of the factors that are likely to affect the 
success of cooperatives, as expressed in existing literature on cooperative action.  These 
chapters have focused on two issues in particular. Chapter 2 has looked at the factors that are 
likely to determine the ability of cooperatives to deliver potential benefits in terms of farm 
gate prices and margins. This chapter has used insights from Power Dependency Theory and 
suggests that the ability to deliver benefits is a function of relative structural power. 
Cooperatives have been identified as balancing mechanisms, and have the role of either 
increasing the power attributes of the cooperative through reducing alternative sources of 
supply to buyers, or through increasing the dependency of buyers through increasing the 
utility of the product offered by the cooperative. 
 
In chapter 3 it is suggested that in order to be effective cooperatives (in particular traditional 
cooperatives) must maintain the engagement or loyalty of members to ensure cooperative 
cohesion, in essence a function of a cost benefit calculation on the part of members, who will 
need to believe that the benefits they attain from membership will be greater than the costs. 
As suggested by key literature (Olson, 1965), it has been argued further that where the 
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benefits are non-excludable, this can give rise to free riding which will undermine  the 
effectiveness of the cooperative as a countervailing power. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to bring together these two themes into a single exploratory 
framework. As discussed in chapter 1, the exploratory framework suggests that these 
apparently alternative explanations of cooperative success would appear to be intrinsically 
linked.  Specifically, it is an intuitive underpinning expectation of this thesis that where 
cooperatives have proved unable to benefit through leverage, members’ incentive to 
participate is reduced. Furthermore, where the cohesion of the cooperative is weakened this 
has an iterative impact on the ability of the cooperative to deliver.  
 
The following sections outline the nature of the framework. Section 4.1 outlines the nature of 
the argument inherent to the framework, 4.2 outlines the leverage argument, 4.3 that of the 
cooperative framework. These two sides of the argument are brought together in section 4.4, 
in which the aims and objectives of the research are also outlined.  
 
4.1 Summary of argument 
 
This section briefly summarises the arguments within this chapter. The chapter is central to 
the research thesis as it outlines the framework that allows the investigation of the factors 
that determine cooperative success. The framework proposed in this chapter, as informed by 
the two bodies of literature, suggests that the problem is iterative. The success of the 
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cooperative depends on the ability of the cooperative to provide leverage and thus financial 
benefits, but continuous delivery of leverage is in itself dependent upon its cohesiveness.  
The basis of Emerson’s Power Dependency Theory is that cooperatives can improve the 
financial position of farmers by increasing motivational investment or reducing the number 
of alternative sources of supply for buyers, but, because of the free rider problem, leverage is 
also contingent upon the continuity and cohesiveness of the cooperative. It is possible to 
come to the conclusion that a cooperative that is providing leverage would be more likely to 
be successful. Where cooperatives are neither cohesive nor can generate leverage, it is 
suggested that they will fail. However, it is possible that even if cooperatives are cohesive 
they may not improve the farmer’s lot and even if a cooperative provides leverage the 
tension between individual and group interests can undermine the success of the cooperative.  
It is proposed that success is contingent upon the ability of the cooperative to both have 
sufficient power attributes to generate financial benefits from members through leverage and 
to operate cohesively. This can be seen in figure 4.1 below. 
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Figure 4.1 the potential outcomes:  the  leverage/free rider matrix 
The causal  relationships between these  leverage and cohesion factors can be represented in 
the terms illustrated by figure 4.2, as adapted from  figure 1.1. This diagram will form the 
basis upon which the exploratory framework will be built. The next sections will examine 
the detail of this framework with greater rigour. 
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Figure 4.2 the basic interelationships  in the exploratory framework
 
4.2 Understanding the delivery of leverage through motivational investment / status 
giving and coalition formation. 
As stated in Chapter 2, the literature on Power and Dependency suggests that the cooperative 
can achieve financial benefits for members if it ensures the dependency of downstream 
parties by increasing the motivational investment of buyers and or reducing the available 
alternative sources of supply. Power dependency literature provides insights into the 
distribution of margins between farmers and their buyers, and suggests that the cooperative 
offers the opportunity to amass individual resources in order to create higher returns for the 
collective whole.  
Work undertaken into determinants of power relations in vertical relationships suggests farm 
gate price is contingent upon the potential ability of both buyers and sellers to mobilise 
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power attributes. In turn, the distribution of power attributes depends on the relative scarcity 
and utility of exchange factors. This means that in order to deliver greater benefits than 
alternative market channels, the marketing cooperative in a buyer/seller relation needs to be 
less dependent than their buyers via the attainment and utilisation of power attributes. Power 
attributes or resource sets have been seen to be derived from properties both intrinsic to 
cooperatives and to the industrial environment in which they are located. 
4.2.1 Coalitions formation and creation of scarcity- Supplier power 
The Power Dependency Theory predicts that the balancing operation can be found in 
coalition formation, thereby reducing the ability of the dominant party to seek gratification 
elsewhere and creating a climate for the delivery of fundamental transformation, a reversal 
of the power balance between the farming sector and their customers (Hendrikse, 2004). The 
establishment of a cooperative represents a consolidation of the number of sources of supply 
for buyers, thereby enabling the reduction of competition, contestation and substitutability 
within the market. As held by Porter, businesses can improve leverage though building 
barriers to entry. These can include increasing the costs of entry for potential rivals through 
creating new markets, establishing economies of scale or developing inimitable products. 
Alternatively they could encourage action by buyers which would inhibit the exit of buyers 
from the market through such actions as specific investment within the particular products.  
By investing in economies of scale or inimitable products, the cooperative reduces 
alternatives and increases switching costs and, potentially, search costs for buyers. 
Cooperatives may also be able to improve their position further by placing obstacles either to 
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new entrants or to buyers switching to alternative suppliers as a result of problems of access 
to distribution that emerge where a few parties operate control over the distribution channels, 
which inhibits market entrants. 
Much of these strategies require specific investments by the cooperative in order to maintain 
their competitive position. The development of inimitable products similarly will require 
technical, human, physical, dedicated, brand investment in order to ensure delivery. As 
previously discussed, traditional cooperatives are restricted to membership as the main 
source of funds and this has proved often problematic.  
Figure 4.3 illustrates the ideas of Emerson in greater detail. For instance, it indicates that 
inimitable products can be attained through causal ambiguity, reputational effects or 
technical specificity. These factors have been described as power attributes or resource sets 
and are derived from properties both intrinsic to the cooperative and to the industrial 
environment in which the business is located. 
4.2.2 Coalitions formation and creation of scarcity- Buyer power 
As suggested in Chapter 2, even where the cooperative increases scarcity their buyers may 
retain a dominant position. In highly concentrated markets, where there are few buyers, few 
product differences, barriers to new entrants, effective economies of scale, largely 
standardised products and high switching costs for suppliers, the balance of power may rest 
more in the hands of the buyer, even after supply market consolidation from coalition 
formation. Buyer power declines in direct correspondence to levels of concentration and 
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contestation within the buyer’s side. It is in such circumstances that coalition formation in 
supply outlets will have the best chance of shifting the balance of power.  The risk with 
coalition formation is that when the buyer side is concentrated, there is little to intimidate 
buyers when there are a number of alternative suppliers.  In the light of the problem of 
respective balancing mechanisms Figure 4.3 also includes buyer-side considerations. 
4.2.3 Increasing motivational investment, status giving – buyer and supplier dependency 
Emerson also proposes that organisations are able to increase leverage, improving the status 
giving or motivational investment of their product or service. This means that they are able 
to supply a product upon which the buyer places greater value than alternatives within the 
market. That is, the product offers the buyer greater utility or functionality. In business to 
business relationships, it is contended that utility is a function of the extent to which it can be 
substituted43 by other products and is critical to the firm's revenue making activities (Cox et 
al., 2002). Products are more important to buyers where they contribute to the presentation 
of core competences by the buyer, they represent a significant proportion of their overall 
spend and are key to the delivery of the final product and image (Olsen et al., 1997).  In the 
context of the discussions in chapter 2, the power attributes of the supplier are know-how 
advantages, specialised investments and impact of the transaction on image. These can be 
attributed to inimitability and causal ambiguity. Attention has been also drawn to the 
distinction between attributes which affect operational importance, those attributes that relate 
to core competences of the supplier, and those which enhance the commercial importance of 
                                                                
 
43 Substitution in this context refers to economic substitution where two goods are held by the buyer to be of equal use and where an 
increase in price of one product will result in a shift in the demand for the other good. 
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a product to the buyer, which are measured in terms of impact of image and overall revenue. 
This distinction is more clearly inherent in the work of Cox et al. (2002). 
Figures 4.3: Outline of exploratory framework as expanded from figure 4.2, illustrating 
drivers of balance of power 
 
4.3 Cooperative longevity and cohesion 
As discussed in the previous chapters, the distinctive governance properties of traditional 
cooperatives mean that in the interest of completeness, any exploratory framework must 
consider the impact of the free-rider problem on cooperative success. This is to say that the 
precept that an individual is self-interested and in pursuit of individual gain is at the heart of 
the problem.  The Power Dependency Theory offers the understanding that collective action 
can redress power imbalances, but in parallel literature it is suggested that this is only 
possible where sanctions and incentives ensure conformance to the common good.  Where 
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this is not achieved, the problem of non-excludability from the common good, whereby an 
individual may benefit without bearing the costs of cohesion, can undermine the delivery of 
financial benefits to members and thus the longevity of the cooperative. 
4.3.1 Direct costs - Asset specific investments  
As suggested earlier in sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, the delivery of leverage for the cooperative 
is contingent upon the availability of funds, and asset specific investment can be classified as 
dedicated investment, brand investment, human investment, physical investment, site 
investment as well as, potentially, temporal investment. Cooperatives supplying into highly 
competitive markets have little option but to make significant specific investment in 
production capacity, new technology, human resources, new sites, and new products in order 
to improve their leverage position through either motivational investment or scarcity.  Such 
investments may also be required by the customer to be utilised for their benefit only. Even 
in the case of new products and brands these could be customer/retailer specific, particularly 
since the growth in retailer own brands.  
The implication of this is that members face increasing demands by their cooperative for 
funds. As the traditional cooperative is heavily constrained as to sources of funds under the 
Rochdale rules, this has meant that the member investment extends beyond the historical 
contribution through the cost of membership, and includes marketing costs and any on-farm 
investment required to improve farm efficiency.  Higher demands for finance can result in 
member disaffection. 
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There are three  reasons as to why investments made by the cooperative can be seen to be a 
cost to a member. Firstly, because of the Horizon issue  farmers  believe that they will retire 
from farming before the investment yields benefits. Secondly, there is the Portfolio problem, 
in which the investment is in a product not produced by the farmer. Finally, the farmer may 
need to make considerable on farm investment in order to benefit from the investment in 
cooperative activities. The problem of asset specificity increases in line with the number of 
products produced by cooperatives and therefore  is exacerbated as the activities of the 
cooperative become more and more diverse (Cook, 1995; Nilsson, 1999; Van Bekkum, 
2001). 
4.3.2 Indirect costs - costs of free riding  
Additional costs, or perhaps more accurately losses to benefits, emerge as a direct 
consequence of  non-excludability,  individual calculative opportunistic behaviour and the 
free rider problem. The concept of non-excludability explains that it is not possible to 
exclude individuals, whether a member or not, from gaining from the benefits generated 
from cooperative action.  In cooperatives where it is not possible to exclude individuals from 
benefiting from cooperative action, there is a potential for an overal loss in total gain as a 
consequence of the failure of individuals to bear the cost of cohesion.  
In the case of members, noted as internal free riders, as depicted earlier, there are three forms 
of  free riding behaviour, which are: over production,  non alignment of on farm activities 
and non investment in off farm developments. A further type of free riding can be perceived 
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to stem from the non-excludability of benefits to non members, that is, external free riding, 
which has at times been seen to be a positive outcome of cooperative action as well as a 
threat to cooperative survival (Staatz, 1987).  On the negative side,  the logic of collective 
action would suggest that members would experience a level of dissonance in bearing the 
costs when external parties gain the benefit of increased farmgate prices without bearing the 
costs. If all were to do so then the cooperative would not be formed or would fail, where 
members became disloyal and/or defected. The relationship between indirect costs and 
cohesion is illustrated in figure 4. 4. These are two fold. In the first instance these are 
incurred as a direct consequence of the free rider problem.  
4.3.3  Indirect costs- Monitoring, sanction, lobbying, negotiation, search, control and 
shirking costs  
As illustrated in figure 4.4 and chapter 3, the free rider problem means that there are costs 
inherent to collective action. These are direct costs of ensuring conformance, as in 
monitoring , lobbying, negotiation, search, control and sanction costs, and the indirect costs, 
which are a consequence of not achieving cohesion, as in allocative costs or costs of 
inefficiency. 
4.3.3.1 Monitoring, lobbying, negotiation, search and control costs 
Monitoring, lobbying, search negotiation and control costs are those costs associated with 
measures of  member coherence and have been discussed at length in Chapter 3 in the 
context of  transaction cost economics and the principal agency issue. 
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Transaction costs, known alternatively as influence costs, are incurred in the undertaking of 
any activity and in cooperatives rise in proportion to the disparity of members’ interests 
(Turner, 1990; Cook, 1994; Cook, 1995; Hariyoga, 2004). These costs are incurred as a 
consequence of information searches and the need to meter and lobby members (Hechter, 
1984).  
In addition, there  are the costs of  monitoring and controlling  managers, known as agency 
costs.  Principal Agency theory suggests there are two potential sources of conflict in the 
principal agency  relationship and these stem from a potential non alignment of managers’ 
and members’ objectives and levels of risk aversion (Porter, et al., 1987; Sexton and Iskow, 
1988; Klein et al., 1997; Richards et al., 1998; Hakelius, 1999; Iliopoulos and Cook, 1999; 
Gripsrud et al., 2000). This is an issue of particular significance where cooperatives have no 
external monitoring systems, such as external stakeholders. The framework suggests that 
where managers are without external control mechanisms,  x and allocative inefficiencies 
will follow. This imposes monitoring costs on the members. 
The position is exaccerbated where managers lack the competence to achieve competive 
advantage through  building and reconfiguring internal competences” (Teece  et al., 1997, p. 
516; Eisenhardt and Martin, 2000). Cooperatives have traditionally been a less attractive 
employment opportunity than alternatives, in that they have been perceived by the business 
community to be of a lower status with unfavourable remuneration packages. This reputation 
has had a significant impact on the levels of skills of the managers employed. Farmer 
directors, who operate as mechanisms of control, may have little experience in order to 
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monitor the nature of the decisions made. In effect this represents an additional 
principal/agency problem. 
The concept of an agency relationship may be expressed as the contract under which the 
cooperative members engage the manager to perform the service on their behalf. Where 
there is a lack of external control, high administrative costs may be incurred due to lack of 
management competence or actions taken by the manager, which are in their own interest 
rather than those of the cooperative members. Such costs could range from high sales costs, 
or the opportunity costs of poor decisions at a corporate, business or functional level that 
may result in lower returns than alternative types of governance (Katz, 1997; Katz and 
Boland, 1999; Hariyoga, 2004).  
Furthermore, the dilution of ownership (Jenson and Meckling, 1976) means that costs accrue 
not simply through the  monitoring and control of the actions of managers but also in the 
costs of employing more qualified managers. Where managers are deficient in management 
skills and experience of both operational and strategic decision making, there are potential 
opportunity costs of ineffectual decisions (Sexton et al., 1988; Howard and Klosler, 1991; 
Katz et al., 1997; Kyriakapoulos et al., 1999; Bruynis et al., 2001).  On the other hand, if 
competent managers are attracted through attractive pay deals and compensation payments, 
they risk being seen by members as opportunistic, particularly as the salaries they receive far 
exceed those received by the members they serve. Even where competent managers are 
employed, the extent of their control over member activities and their ability to reconfigure 
internal competences may seriously inhibit their ability to attain motivational investment. 
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4.3.3.2 Sanction costs  
Sanctions costs are those costs incurred in putting in place incentives to ensure that 
individuals conform.  Along with monitoring costs these were discussed in chapter 3 under 
transaction cost and agency costs.  These stem from the deployment of resources to ensure 
compliance that would not be deployed in alterative goverance structures. These  can be the 
costs of administering additional payments for conformance to retailer specifications, 
technical training for farmers or costs of disposal. Alternatively they can be the costs of 
failing to ensure compliance and the ensuing loss in efficiency. They can also include such 
costs associated with incentive programmes and compensation packages to align principal 
and agent interests (Richards et al., 1998; Hariyoga, 2004). 
Figure 4.4 Outline of exploratory framework as expanded from figure 4.2illustrating the 
detail of costs of cohesion and the freerider problem  
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4.4. Conclusion -  The exploratory framework – 
 
This leads to  the following position, suggested by Power Dependency Theory and Olson’s 
work on the “logic of the commons”.  The  success of cooperatives  depends  upon  both the 
ability of the cooperative to redress  power imbalances  between members and  buyers, either 
through  increasing power coalition formation, or decreasing the buyers’ power  through 
motivational investment, whilst  at the same time  protecting  the cooperative against the 
risks and costs of external and internal opportunism.  Figure 4.5 makes a provisional attempt 
to show the relationships between the interlinking causal relations. It shows both the 
relationship between coalition leverage and factors affecting the delivery of higher returns 
which are a function of the loss of cohesion and the costs of cohesion. 
Figures 4.5: Outline of exploratory framework as expanded from figure 4.2.,4.3 and 4.4 
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This suggests the following research focus as defined in two iterative, interconnected aims. 
The argument is that in the context of traditional cooperatives, the dominant format in the 
UK at the start of this research, in order to consider the ability of the cooperative to generate 
leverage, only a partial understanding would be arrived at if the research failed to consider 
the cohesion problem. 
This research aims use this exploratory framework to gain a deeper understanding of the 
determinants of cooperative success. This is done by applying the framework to three case 
studies. These concern Apples, Pigs and Dairy cooperatives; however, before proceeding to 
the case studies, in the next chapter the author defines her methodology. 
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CHAPTER 5- METHODOLOGY 
5.0 Introduction 
The aim of this research is to examine and understand the factors that lead to the success of 
agricultural marketing cooperatives in the UK. With the aid of an A priori model, the author 
has designed a research methodology with the intent to develop a theoretical framework.  
As informed by literature, the A priori exploratory framework suggests that in order to be 
successful the cooperative has to both be enduring and deliver improved farmgate prices and 
margins. The exploratory model suggests that this is an iterative problem that stems from the 
interrelation between leverage and cooperative cohesion. The purpose of the thesis is to 
assess the extent to which the model aids our understanding of the factors affecting 
cooperative success. This thesis is conducted through a case study methodology. Three 
cooperatives that might best be described as Traditional agricultural marketing cooperatives 
were selected for this research. This is because they represented the dominant format of 
cooperative at the time of the research.  
The research design needs to consider four interconnected issues: the research question, the 
research philosophy, the methodology and the research method (Lincoln and Guba, 2000; 
Creswell, 2009). The first part of this chapter will clarify the research question and the aims 
and objectives of this research as embedded within the exploratory framework. The chapter 
then goes on to define the research philosophy, its methodology and the research process as 
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well as the how the research has been designed to ensure reliability and validity of research 
findings.  
5. 1 Summary of Research Question  
In chapter 4, the exploratory framework suggests, based on Power Dependency Theory and 
principles held in Olson’s work on the “logic of the commons, that the success of co-
operatives is dependent upon their ability to rebalance the power relations between the 
farmers and their buyers through coalition formation, or status giving actions, whilst at the 
same time ensuring cooperative cohesion.  
The research question is, therefore:  
What are the factors that determine the success of cooperatives? 
Aim:  
|In the context of the research question, the aim of this research is to develop a theoretical 
framework to explain the determinants of cooperative success.  
Objectives: 
1. To derive an exploratory model from key literature of cooperative action, for the 
purpose of examining the causal factors for cooperative success. 
2. To examine the nature of the factors that affect cooperative success in the context of 
three case studies. 
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3. On the basis of the deeper understanding, to develop a theoretical model of success 
and failure that could be tested in a wider context.  
5.2 Research design  
This following section explains and examines the nature of the research design. In the first 
section, the potential philosophical positions or worldviews are explained. The section deals 
with the ontological and epistemological differences of a range of research philosophical 
positions from positivism to social constructivism. The nature of research philosophies or 
worldviews varies according to the following parameters: 
1. their conceptions of what is real, the ontology, 
2. the relationship between the researcher and the known; the epistemology. (Healy and 
Perry, 2000; Kidd, 2002; Lincoln et al., 2000; Creswell, 2009). 
The determination of the research philosophy or worldview enables the researcher to set the 
question and then devise a methodology that delivers verifiable and valid understandings of 
a phenomenon (Blaikie, 2000). The nature of what is seen to be real and how we recognise 
reality determines the validity of the process by which knowledge is discovered (Kidd, 2002; 
Creswell, 2009). This next section explains the distinctions between research philosophies 
and argues that the current underpinning ontological and epistemological position of the 
research tends more towards the realist stance, a paradigm increasingly evident in economic, 
organisational research (Casson, 1996; Easton, 2008).  
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5.2.1 Research philosophical worldview and design 
 How we conduct research and how we know whether research findings are a true 
representation of reality depends on the ontological and epistemological position of the 
researcher and the research question.  In the first instance, the ontology of a research project 
is determined by the recognition by the researcher of what constitutes “truth” or reality. As is 
evident from figure 5.1, there are a number of ontological positions taken, these range from 
the monist position of objective truth to the belief that truth is pluralist and conceptualisation 
of the observer.  
In addition, differences between research philosophies can stem from how we know reality 
or truth to be true.  Again at two extremes, truth may be objectively observable in certain 
paradigms or may be more intuitive and subjective in others. The epistemological stance 
defines the parameters of what we know to be true. Considerable effort has been made to 
clarify the issue for research students. Crotty has represented the problem of research 
philosophies, looking primarily at worldview as a continuum (Crotty, 1998).  Alternatively 
this has been represented as a quadratic that allows for more precise differentiation between 
the objective and subjective qualities of ontology and epistemology, as illustrated in figure 
5.1(Johnson et al., 2000). 
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Figure 5.1- ontological positions adapted from Johnson et al., 2000, p180. 
 
Figure 5.1 distinguishes between positivists, for whom truth and access to knowledge or 
reality are independent from the observer, and post modernists and social constructivists, for 
whom there are any number of realities, and these are known subjectively by the observer.  
Critical realism and pragmatism are shown to sit in the bottom left hand quartile, 
representing a belief that there is an objective reality but this is subjectively known. 
For positivists, truth and our access to knowledge are or can be apprehensible, observable 
and generalisable. The researcher needs to be an objective, unbiased observer and research 
needs to be designed to ensure that there is sufficient certainty that the presumed effect or 
dependent variable can be observed to be a consequence of the independent variable. That is 
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to say that those changes in the dependent variable can be attributed to variation in an 
independent variable. 
Previously, positivism has been the dominant approach to research design in organisational, 
management and economic research, (Johnson et al., 2000; Easton, 2008).However, it is 
apparent that the embeddedness of positivist approaches is beginning to wane, with greater 
prominence of more subjectivist paradigms such as realism and social constructivism (Knox 
and White, 1991; Boyce, 1996; Reed, 1997; Johnson et al., 2000; Fairclough, 2005; Morgan 
and Smircich, 1980).    
In contrast to positivists, social constructivists believe that knowledge or, more accurately, 
reality is a function of individual interpretation, and indeed there is no external reality 
(Marsh et al., 1998). This means that social structures are made up of shared knowledge, 
material resources and practices and thus the major task for the researcher is to uncover the 
nature of the internal reality of the social group/society. Valid findings should be credible 
and able to be confirmed by those investigated.  
Alternatively, there are pragmatists and realists who sit between the two extremes and hold a 
similar ontological position to positivists, in that they suggest that there is an external reality 
that exists independently from our cognitive processes (Morgan and Smircich, 1980; Marsh, 
et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 2000; Sayer, 1992; Johnson, et al., 2000; Easton, 2008).   
Realists and pragmatists are both distinct from positivism and each other but both hold that 
how truth is known is more subjective. The pragmatist embraces the idea that how one 
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recognises and finds reality depends on how the research question may be best answered 
(Blaikie, 1993). That is to say, if one way of thinking about a problem is able to explain or 
predict a specific event or phenomenon then it is an appropriate. Pragmatists believe in the 
power of thought and that true interpretations of reality are those that can be assimilated, 
verified and validated, i.e. are made true by the course of events (Johnson et al., 2000) 
In contrast, the realism paradigm, particularly critical realism, suggests that truth exists 
independently from our knowledge of it, but that people’s perception is theory laden. That is 
to say that the observer places their own constructs on reality. The critical realist espouses a 
rational action view of human behaviour, but relies less on the explanatory force of constant 
conjunction of empirical evidence and more on the position that events may be experienced 
differently amongst the social world (Bhasker, 1979; Putman, 1994; Casson, 1996; Lawson, 
1997; Moura and Martins, 2008). This means that our explanations of it are socially 
constructed and are contingent upon our ability to conceptualise and communicate our 
understanding (Trigg, 1980; Margolis, 1986; Putnam, 1981; Putnam, 1994b: p.476; Bhasker, 
1978).   
This has been articulated in terms of the distinction between intransitive objective truth that 
exists independently from our knowledge and the transitive, a reality experienced. It has 
been said to be through the exploration of the various transitive truths that the intransitive is 
determined (Johnson et al., 2000) Alternatively, this has been  conceptualised and 
communicated in terms of the presence of three domains (Bhasker, 1975; Outhwaite, 1987) , 
a  real domain that contains a generative mechanism (underlying cause), actual domain that 
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may be observed, but exists independent from the observer, and an empirical domain that  
represents the actual events experienced by the observer. This means that there is an external 
reality, of which certain elements may be accessible from the accounts of the observers, 
while others may only be uncovered through speculation over observed tendencies.  
This explains the presence of competing theories that provide alternative or parallel 
understandings of the phenomenon observed, an issue that is arguable at the core of this 
research problem, in which explanations of cooperative success have ranged from coalition 
formation and improved leverage (Emerson, 1962) to the free rider problem (Olson, 1965). 
The determination of their common referent, the real domain, is said to depend upon a 
process of retroduction, which allows for more rigorous examination of alternative 
understandings of actual domains (Bhasker, 1982, p.35; Johnson et al., 2000). Retroduction 
is based on the assumption held by critical realists that the phenomena observed by human 
agents are not theory neutral and is therefore it is necessary to examine rival explanations. 
Retroduction has been defined as a model of inference in which “events are recognised and 
explained by postulating and identifying mechanisms that are capable of producing them”, a 
process known as the logic of inference (Sayer, 1996, p. 107; Downward et al., 2007). In this 
research, it is believed that there is a monist underlying truth as to the causes of cooperative 
success, but that current explanations have failed to isolate the reality of such causes.  
In the next section, the author examines how the rigorous exploration and examination of the 
multiple ways in which the event is explained can reveal a closer understanding of the causal 
relationships. A retroductive approach enabled through the triangulation of data, method and 
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theory has allowed the author, with the aid of the exploratory framework, to dig below the 
socially construction preconceptions to the real intransitive truth (Johnson et al., 2000; 
Downward et al., 2007).  
5.2.2 Methodology or logic of inquiry  
The methodology used in this research is a case study approach. Methodology can be 
defined as a combination of methods and techniques, and the practices involved in 
implementing and in interpreting data (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002 p31; Olsen et al., 2005).  
The methodology is distinct from methods, which are simply the techniques of data 
collection and analysis (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002, p.31).  
In the development of a methodology there are a number of key decisions to be made. Firstly 
a researcher must identify the nature of the methodology to be deployed, qualitative, 
quantitative or mixed methods. These have been sub classified as seen in figure 5.2 
(Creswell, 2009, p.1244), which depicts the range of methodologies available. In the second 
instance, if, as in this research, case studies are seen to be the most appropriate research 
methodology, then there are further decisions to be made, such as the number of case studies 
and their unit of analysis. 
                                                                
44 Creswell describes these as strategies of inquiry.  
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The terms quantitative and qualitative relate as much to the methods of processing the data 
as to the extent to which data is numerical or verbal. In certain disciplines there has been a 
predominance of one method over another. However, an increasing number of researchers in 
business and organisational behaviour have deployed ethnography, case studies, survey, 
experiments and action research to conduct research, a phenomenon that is partially a 
consequence of the increased diversity of philosophical perspectives of the research 
undertaken in these disciplines (Buckley et al., 1996; Casson, 1996; Cassel et al., 2004; 
Zuber-Skerritt, 2004; Fleetwood, 2005; Moura et al., 2008; Easton, 2010). For instance, 
positivist research, perceived to lend itself more to quantitative methodologies such as 
surveys and experiential research, which normally rely on the statistical analysis of non-
parametric or parametric data as tools to determine observable cause and effect, is often seen 
to underpin explanatory generalisable research (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). In contrast, 
methodologies such as ethnography and grounded theory studies have a tendency to adopt a 
social constructivist perspective.   
Quantitative Qualitative  Mixed Methods 
Experimental studies  
Non-experimental 
designs e.g. surveys 
Narrative research 
Phenomenology 
Ethnography 
Grounded theory studies 
Case study  
 
Sequential – expand the findings 
of one method with another  
Concurrent –merges quantitative 
and qualitative data (Case 
studies) 
Transformative – action research  
 
Figure 5.2 Alternative methodologies adapted from Creswell, 2009, p.12. 
Case studies, on the other hand, have been used to examine research question from the whole 
range of philosophical traditions, from positivist to interpretivist or social constructivism 
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(Drake et al., 1998), and there are various arguments that suggest that case studies and case 
study design differ according to the philosophical stance. One argument is that case studies 
that are taken from a social constructivist or interpretivist position tend to be more 
explanatory or theory testing than positivist research (Scapen et al., 2002). Alternatively, 
others hold that theory testing or explanatory case research is generally positive in nature 
(Layder, 1993; Eisenhart, 1989). Meanwhile, in research conducted for the purpose of theory 
development, where a richer insight into complex reality is perceived to be required, a more 
subjective epistemological position is often adopted (Guba et al., 1994).  
Yet, the issue is frequently articulated in terms of the nature of the question (Yin, 1994; 
Rowley, 2002; Yin, 2009). It is argued that case studies are of particular value in the 
examination of two types of questions. Yin argues that questions best fitted to case studies 
are what questions in exploratory research or how and why questions in explanatory work 
(Yin, 1994). In the context of this exploratory study, case studies offer the further advantage 
of multi-perspectival analyses and holistic in depth investigation of a phenomenon that 
requires more rigorous research (Feagin et al., 1991; Yin, 1994, p. 23). Case studies are 
particularly well suited to exploratory research where existing theory offers inadequate 
explanation of “causal powers” and thus are of particular value in light of the research 
objectives of this thesis (Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 548-549; Lutz et al., 1989; Yin, 1981; Adams 
and White, 1994, p.573). They enable the researcher to bring out the details from the view 
point of the participants by using multiple sources of data (Yin, 1994; Stake, 1995). In other 
words, this methodology allows for the examination and collation of multiple data sources, 
which enable the researcher to “trace out links over time”, and thus more in-depth 
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examination of the relationship between the real and the actual domains (Easton, 2001; 
P.211; Dul et al., 2008). 
5.2.3The validity of case study design- The choice and number of case studies  
The issue of validity and how we can ensure that research is a verifiable representation of 
reality is central to the delivery of a research project. As with other methodologies there has 
been considerable debate in case study research with regards to this problem (Eisenhart, 
1989; Yin, 1994; Merriam, 1998: Gerring, 2007). Factors to consider in the development of 
a valid case study research methodology include: the number of case studies, the unit of 
analysis, the logic linking data to propositions through the triangulation of data sources, 
methods of data collection and theoretical constructs.   
Case study design must take into consideration both the sources of the data and their 
validity. Case study research is known as a triangulated research strategy, and requires 
multiple sources of evidence to ensure construct validity (Yin, 1994). Yin, (1984) identified 
four types of triangulation: Data source triangulation, when the researcher looks for the data 
to remain the same in different contexts; Investigator triangulation, when several 
investigators examine the same phenomenon; Theory triangulation, when investigators with 
different viewpoints interpret the same results; and Methodological triangulation, when one 
approach is followed by another, to increase confidence in the interpretation. Triangulation 
using different methods normally assumes both quantitative and qualitative, but can also 
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represent different qualitative data. These two types are distinguished in terms of either the 
within or the between method of triangulation (Denzin, 1970; Webb et al., 1996).  
Alternatively, it is argued that one should triangulate on pragmatic grounds in order to 
determine the degree to which the actual domain degree represents the real. Logic of 
inference or retroduction suggests that triangulation is important in order to gain an 
understanding of the transitive dimension of knowledge, and can also extend into the coding 
of data, which can include content, discourse, and grounded analysis (Downward et al., 
2007).   
In this study, data have been triangulated both from the perspective of a variety of sources, 
but also from a method or methodological perspective. This means that the research has 
drawn from semi structured interviews, published financial data, unpublished company 
accounts, government information and company reports and archived historical reports and 
publications. These will be discussed in more depth in section 5.3. It can also be argued that 
the exploratory framework as seen in chapter 4 is also a means of triangulating potentially 
competing theories, with the objective of arriving at the inherent causes (see objective 3).  
A further issue with regards to validity relates to the number of case studies selected. As 
illustrated in figure 5.3, case study methodologies can be made up of a single case study or 
multiples.  The rationale for the use of single case studies has been that they may be of value 
to confirm or challenge a theory or present a unique or extreme case (Yin, 1994). Single-case 
studies are arguably also ideal for revelatory cases where an observer may have access to a 
phenomenon that was previously inaccessible and may be of value where a longitudinal 
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study is undertaken. It is argued that whatever the rationale, they are particularly vulnerable 
to claims to bias and indeterminacy (Yin, 2009). Alternatively, it is argued that valid 
research can only be yielded through at least 4-10 cases, although the thread of the argument 
leads one to conclude that the discussion in the context of theory testing is taken from a 
positivist stance. The rationale behind this is that fewer case studies allow little scope for 
generalisability in that they lack rigour (Eisenhart, 1989). However, others have suggested 
that theory development and indeed theory testing research strategies can be achieved 
through 4 or less and even one case study (Yin, 1994). This position is more pragmatic in 
that it describes how researchers should be guided by their sense of the complexity of the 
context of the research and the implications for external validity (Yin, 2009). 
 
Figure 5.3 Adapted from Yin 2009 – types of case studies  
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This research has chosen to undertake three case studies, with the view that multiple case 
studies are often considered more compelling and more robust (Herriot and Firestone, 1983; 
Yin, 2009). There are several other rationales as to the choice of the case studies. The three 
case studies selected were seen to complement each other by replicating the findings under 
different conditions, through replication logic, and, in part, address different aspects of the 
overall theory, as well as offer the opportunity to examine rival explanations (Johnston et al., 
1999).  
A further issue facing the researcher with regards to validity relates to the units of analysis 
and their number. As illustrated in figure 5.3, there may be one or more units of analysis 
within any case study, i.e. a holistic approach or a number as in embedded design (Yin, 
1994). As apparent in figure 5.3, holistic designs focus on a single unit of analysis. Holistic 
designs offer certain advantages, particularly when there are no apparent logical subunits or 
where there is a holistic theory which underlies the case study. As the unit of analysis of this 
case study is both at the level of the cooperative as a whole and the farmers that are 
members, it can be seen that the three cases studies are of an embedded design.  This is 
because the focus of the study is on the ability of the cooperative to generate benefits for 
members’ over time and the maintenance of member cohesion.  
5.2.3.1. The choice of case studies in this study 
In selection of the case studies for this research, it was recognised that each case study is a 
whole study, not simply a sampling unit (Johnston et al., 1999; Yin, 1994). This means that 
cases were not randomly sampled from the population, but selected on the basis of those best 
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suited to investigate the theoretical constructs derived from Emerson and Olson’s work, 
replicate the findings under different conditions, address different aspects of the overall 
theory, as well as offer the opportunity to examine rival explanations (Glaser and Straus, 
1967; Johnston et al., 1999).  
While all cooperatives chosen were nearer in nature to traditional cooperatives, each of the 
three identified had relaxed an element of the Rochdale principles.  
The three case studies identified are as follows: 
1. Case 1 has been selected because of the belief that its limited size, and the relative 
scarcity of one of the products sold – the Bramley apple would suggest that there 
would be evidence of both internal cohesion and scarcity.  The case study examines 
the top fruit sector in general and makes specific reference to the Bramley apple, 
which because of the uniqueness to the UK and the dominance of the cooperative as 
a Bramley apple supplier has few competitors.  The Society of Growers of Topfruit 
(SGT) is one of the key suppliers of Bramley apples within the UK. It operated under 
closed membership rules, and was supplied with external funding from Brussels. 
2. Case 2- First Milk, by contrast was at the beginning of this research one of three 
major cooperatives for a product that in its high value liquid form faced limited 
threats from overseas suppliers. This cooperative was thus selected as it potentially 
represented a case of potential scarcity. Furthermore, in an apparent attempt to secure 
leverage through the development of regional cheeses, the cooperative was seen to be 
of interest in the consideration of the extent to which added valuing could generate 
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motivational investment. However, the size of the cooperative and the diversity of on 
farm dairy production systems suggested that it would be open to problems of 
internal cohesion, and external free riders. In addition, external funds were supplied 
through the Welsh Assembly. 
3. Similarly, Case 3 was selected on the basis that it would be able to achieve either 
motivational investment or increase scarcity, plus as a small cooperative that 
demonstrated characteristics of internal integrity. Yorkshire Farmers Marketing Ltd 
is well established and it is one of 5 key cooperatives supplying pork to abattoirs and 
processors in the UK but is faced with horizontal competition from Danish and 
Belgium companies who hold a high proportion of the sales to the multiple retailers. 
However, this cooperative has recently developed added value products which it is 
labelling as local. External funds were made available for development from the 
EFFP and the Regional Development Agency. 
5.2.4 Data collection and analysis - implications of data sources for validity  
The approach to quality, validity and reliability of data is highly dependent upon the 
ontological and epistemological position of the research (Kirk and Miller, 1986; Warren, 
1991; Warren and Cragg, 1991). In a positivist context, validity is generally held to be the 
extent to which changes in the dependent variable can be attributed to variation in an 
independent variable, (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, p. 290; De Ruyter et al., 1998). “Proof” or 
“disproof” is a function of determining appropriate observable measures to test the 
relationships between cause and effect. Such tests need to consider the validity of the 
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proposed relationship between the phenomena and the effect,  internal validity, the extent to 
which the measures effectively measure the theory, construct validity, the extent to which 
the measure effectively tests the theory, external validity, the extent to which it is 
generalisable, and context validity, the extent to which  the results are reliable ( Healy et al., 
2000, Lincoln et al., 1985, p. 290) In short, validity tests should be designed to ensure the 
effectiveness of the measures and the generalisability of findings across contexts. 
In contrast to the positivist view, the more subjective classical realism paradigm offers the 
position that the discovery of the objective truth relies heavily upon the subjective 
assessment of the researcher.  This, in real terms, is a departure both from the positive 
perspective and the diametrically opposed position of social constructivists, where research 
quality is associated with subjective belief in findings (credibility), sufficient evidence to 
support beliefs (confirmability), a  consistency in approach to research as well as the 
usefulness of findings to understand other scenarios (transferability). In essence, researchers 
perceived that neither framework was a robust test in the realism paradigm, to the extent that 
Healy proposed six alternative criteria (Healy et al., 2000). These amounted to: ontological 
appropriateness, a condition which suggested that truth was contingent upon collective 
interpretation, contingent validity45, and multiplicity of perceptions of participants thereby 
requiring the triangulation of multiple informants46, methodological trustworthiness47, 
analytic generalisation48, and construct validity49 (Healy et al., 2000). These are illustrated in 
                                                                
45  i.e. boundaries are fuzzy and cannot be explained by direct cause and effect  
46 conception that there is a window of reality through which a picture can be determined through triangulation with a range of perception  
47 This refers to extent to which the research can be audited by developing a case study data base use of quotations – it is suggested that this 
can be seen to be similar to the positivist conception of reliability. It is broader but similar to consistency.  
48 theory building – back to the concept that must be predominantly building not testing – not that it shouldn’t be tested but has to be built 
and confirmed or disconfirmed before being considered generalisable  
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table 5.4 along with the nature of the dimensions of the research design that are designed to 
ensure these.  
Figure 5.4 Summaries of tests of quality of research 
quality of tests  dimensions of research design to ensure research quality 
construct validity   selection of appropriate case studies to theory, 
 determination of appropriate data sources 
 sampling techniques e.g. snowballing  
multiplicity of perspectives  determination of appropriate number of interviews to illicit an 
objective perspective,  
 triangulation of  multiple interviewees  
ontological appropriateness  appropriate sources of data- triangulation of multiple sources of data 
and interviews 
 sampling techniques e.g. snowball samples plus unit of analysis 
Contingent validity  triangulation of data   
 within method triangulation  
 theory triangulation 
 
methodological 
trustworthiness  
 systematic application examination of the data presented using 
measures and where appropriate content analysis 
analytical generalisations   theory testing as application to construct  
 determination of measures for variables set out in the theory 
 
Figure 5.4 shows that in order to ensure research rigour, with construct validity, multiplicity 
of perspectives, ontological appropriateness as well as analytical generalisations the design 
of the research needs to take into account:  
1. appropriate  selection of  cases with sufficient case studies to make 
analytical  generalisations 
2. appropriate section of data sources and sampling methods 
3. appropriate selection of measures to ensure construct validity 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
49 refers to  how well information about the constructs in the theory are being measured in the research 
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4. triangulation of data with the multiple informants and data sources to 
ensure multiplicity of perspectives  
5. The determination of a unit of analysis that best tests the theoretical 
constructs for the purpose of evaluation and improvement, to ensure 
ontological appropriateness. 
In effect, it is argued that whilst validity cannot be completely assured, the use of multiple 
sources of information, plus the systematic use of measurements based on Emerson, Porter 
and Olson can ensure construct validity, methodological trustworthiness and internal 
validity leading to an understanding of the ontological appropriateness, as well as 
potentially support analytical generalisations. For criteria used for systematic measurements 
see appendix 1. 
5.2.5 Method and Sources of Data and validity 
As argued earlier, the reliability of the results depends on how the design of the research 
assures validity, trustworthiness, ontological appropriateness, and multiplicity of 
perspectives.  In order to ensure validity the research method was designed to ensure: the 
triangulation of data, effective sampling and effective analysis of data. This next section 
explains the 3 steps involved in the gathering, transcription and coding and analysis of data.  
5.2.5.1 Step 1- data collection 
In step 1, the data collection took place over a three year period, 2007-2010, and drew on a 
range of data sources, including published and unpublished secondary data including 
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financial accounts, existing research, company reports, and government reports, archived 
data and reports/publications, trade journals and other trade publications, and primary 
sources such as interviews.  Interviews held with farmers, competitors, buyers, buyers’ 
competitors, and cooperative managers and directors provided detailed information from the 
varied empirical domains. Published and unpublished data and resources provided an 
additional basis for both retroduction and triangulation. The range of sources allows for both 
in method and between method triangulation. The specifics of data triangulation can be seen 
as endnotes located in appendix 1. This provides details of the sources which can be cross 
referenced with the numerical notation in each of the case studies. 
5.2.5.1.1 Interviews 
Informants were drawn from all the critical sides of the exchange relationship and included 
members, farmers outside the cooperative, directors and managers of the cooperative, 
directors and managers of non-cooperative firms, buyers and government and professional 
bodies supporting the industry. Informants of non-cooperative firms were selected on the 
basis of the extent to which they were direct competitors of the cooperative. As far as 
possible, to ensure a range of perspectives of all parties, a number of sampling designs were 
employed, including snowball sampling as well as random sampling techniques, with a view 
to identifying multiple informants and thus ensuring construct validity (Yin, 1994).  
Following initial interviews, key informants such as government agents and key players 
within the cooperative were asked for contacts with members, buyers and competitors. From 
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this a series of interviews ensued, and at each stage the interviewee was asked if they could 
suggest other parties to interview50.  
In parallel, farmers were randomly selected from data banks such as the yellow pages, quasi 
government databanks, trade magazines, and attendance lists at agricultural shows. Where 
farmers were members of the focus cooperative they acted as a mechanism for triangulation 
with the snowball sample; where they supplied other buyers they served as an access point to 
alternative supply chains from which further snowballing techniques were employed. 
Interviews with farmers continued until the full range of farming methods and key buying 
companies were represented.51 In each of the case studies the number of interviews was 
selected in order to ensure a wide cross section of viewpoint and position, which for the 
Dairy and Fruit sectors amounted to 30 each, details of which can be found in appendix 2. In 
the pig sector, while there was considerable response and interest from farmers, the number 
of interviews within this sector was restricted by the consolidation of the sector, and the 
reluctance of the two key processors to participate in this study. This meant that this case 
study relied more on published data in order to support the evidence supplied in some 20 in 
depth interviews with farmers, policy makers, and cooperative and non-cooperative parties. 
This strategy was not constricted to the Pig sector. Businesses and individuals within those 
businesses in the other two case studies were highly reluctant to participate in the research 
                                                                
50 Details of interviewees are to be found in appendix 2 
51 For instance, there are intensive, semi intensive and more traditional methods of growing apples, whilst there are 7-10 farming 
techniques involved in the dairy industry. 
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and where this took place information was acquired from other specialists, or sometimes 
constrained to data published by representative and government bodies.  
Interviews were semi structured and based on the key questions that emerged out of the 
exploratory framework. However, they were structured to allow them to be recorded (Please 
see appendix 2, and 5). Where interviews were recorded this simply involved the direct 
transcription of the interviews. Where participants had refused to be recorded, detailed notes 
were taken during the interview, which, directly following the interview, were transcribed. 
Financial records were also given by most participants and these triangulated with details 
from the interviews. This stage was in fact the first stage of immersion in the research 
findings; in effect, the design of the data collection had certain characteristics in common 
with a grounded approach without the implicit theoretical constructs that partially informed 
further investigation. Over time, interviews became more extended, as they were informed 
not only by the exploratory framework but by themes to emerge from discussions with 
earlier participants. Interviews typically were 40 minutes to an hour long, with later 
interviews extending considerably beyond that timeframe. 
5.2.5.1.2. Published data 
The research draws upon a range of published data which provide key sources of information 
to evaluate the issues of industry structure, respective market share, supplier competitors and 
buyer competitors, company turnover, current and future developments within the sectors 
involved, in terms of potential entrants, changes in national and international legislation, and 
consumer trends. This information was utilised to both triangulate information from 
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interviews and in some instances as a prime source of data. In the determination of power 
positions prior to the emergence of retailers within each of the sectors, the findings from 
published information, particularly from research undertaken at the period in question,  
became a key source of information. Listing of resources deployed with evidence of 
triangulation of information is found within Appendix 5 of the thesis. 
5.2.5.2 Step 2 Analysis of Data- familiarisation and coding  
Step 2 involved, as recommended by many researchers, initially reading and rereading the 
transcripts in order to become immersed in the data set; in addition, the author found that it 
was valuable to listen to the recordings at the same time as reading the scripts (Braun et al., 
2006). The author then went on to code the interviews, documents, and other documentary 
and archival evidence. This data was initially analysed and coded according to the 
exploratory framework using content analysis, the themes for which were derived from the 
exploratory framework, followed by a more loosely determined thematic analysis.  The issue 
for consideration was that of how coding should be undertaken. Silver (2008) highlighted 
that colour codes are an effective way of defining "blocks" of text to provide a visual cue of 
the different ideas/themes represented in the data and are useful to distinguish the different 
themes embedded in the interview data. However, others (Boyatzis, 1998; Saldana, 2008; 
2009) made reference to circling, highlighting, bolding, underlining, or colouring rich or 
significant participant quotes or passages, with words and short phrases.  This research used 
a combination of methods depending on the form of analysis undertaken, including memos, 
words and bolding of text. 
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5.2.5.3 Step 3 Analysis of Data- analysis techniques 
In step 3 detailed analyses of the data took place. This involved, in the first instance, coding 
the data according to content and meaning, as is consistent with Content analysis. However, 
in the interest of triangulation of data, the research drew upon a combination of analysis 
methods, including content analysis, a thematic analysis and comparative analysis, 
descriptions of which and of alternative qualitative data analyses are found in appendix 3,  
 Content analysis is perhaps one of the most widely used and certainly older techniques and 
requires the researcher to intensely examine the text and classify it into an efficient number 
of categories that represent similar meanings (Weber, 1990) Content analysis has been 
defined as a means through which many words of text may be compressed into fewer 
content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Berelson, 1952; Krippendorff, 1980; 
Weber, 1990).  It has been described as “any technique for making inferences by objectively 
and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages” (Holsti, 1969, p.14).  
Data were cross tabulated from content analysis based on the terms identified within each 
subsection of the theoretical framework. A more in depth analysis was undertaken of the 
themes of conversation, initially in the context of the exploratory framework and 
subsequently on the basis of thematic analysis that fell outside the framework. This research 
distinguishes between content analysis and thematic analysis, which acknowledges the ways 
in which individuals make sense of their experience (Braun et al., 2006).  Information was 
then triangulated with data derived from other data sources, in order to unpick and unravel 
the real domain. 
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What makes the combined techniques particularly rich and meaningful is that their reliance 
on coding and categorising of the data allays the common criticism of content analysis that it 
has the potential to lose the richness of the information by turning it into quasi- quantitative 
data. Thematic analysis based on conversation looks at the semantic relationships between 
words and the meaning placed on the events (Braun et al., 2006). Thematic analysis differs 
from content analysis in that unlike content analysis it pays greater attention to the 
qualitative aspect of data, in that it focuses upon identifiable themes and perceived causes of 
events.  Thematic analysis, unlike other qualitative methods such as conversation analysis, is 
not based on a specialised theory, and the task of the researcher is to identify a number of 
themes that reflect their textual data. In this research a number of themes emerged but were 
modified over time. 
This meant that whilst Content analysis offered a way of identifying both the extent to which 
the exploratory framework was reflected in the interviews and other documentation, thematic 
analysis allowed for emergent themes. In effect, this was longitudinal as where there 
appeared to be emergent themes within a set of interviews or documents within a case study 
these were then added as points of exploration in the following interviews and collection of 
documentary evidence52.  
The final analysis tool involved the comparison of data from across cases. The use of 
comparative analysis enabled the researcher to draw out the intransitive through cross 
                                                                
52 Appendix 5 shows in depth demonstration of the sources and the triangulation of the data.  
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tabulation of the three cases. Comparative analysis, or Qualitative Comparative analysis as 
it is sometimes called to distinguish it from statistical comparative examinations of data, 
interprets the data qualitatively whilst also looking for causality between the variables.  The 
initial stage of tabulation looked at the presence or not of the themes identified by the 
previous two analyses, using predominantly a binary system of yes or no.  The main areas 
included in the comparative analysis are displayed in appendix 4. 
5.3. Conclusion 
The intention of this chapter was to explain the research approach and explore the rationale 
for the chosen research method. The philosophical assumptions of this work are that there is 
a monist truth but that there is a need to dig below subjective conceptualisations of the 
observers to an intransitive truth. The research has used a case study approach in order to do 
this and has undertaken rigorous triangulation of data on the basis of sources of data and 
analysis method. This research methodology is coherent with the assumptions of the research 
philosophy. Figure 5.5 below summarises the research approach. 
Figure 5.5 Summary of research design  
Summary of this study’s research design 
 
Research philosophy  Realism  
Ontological approach, monist concept of truth 
Epistemological approach, multiple representations of theory 
laden realities, within which there is an underlying truth 
Methodology or logic of 
inquiry 
Multiple case studies that allow for multiple-perspectival 
analysis 
Two units of analysis, the cooperative as a firm and individual 
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firms as part of a collective. 
 
Data collection  Selection of  interviewees from across the supply chain through  
snowball and random sampling  
Published and unpublished, company, government and non- 
government reports. 
Triangulation of data and methods of analysis within case 
studies and between case studies 
Data analysis  Content analysis, Thematic analysis – within case study 
analysis  
 
The results of these findings are explored in the following chapters.  Chapter 6 offers an 
introduction to the case studies. Each of the following chapters showcases one of the three 
case studies examined in the context of this research. The case chapters conclude with the 
key points identified within the context of each study.    
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CHAPTER 6 - PREFACE TO THE CASE STUDIES 
6.0 Introduction  
In earlier chapters it was argued that government policy has emphasised the importance of 
cooperative action as a means of improving the profitability of agricultural producers. 
Collective action was seen by the government to provide small farmers with the means to 
reverse power imbalances through increasing absolute or relative scarcity and/or 
motivational investment. The government hopes that encouraging cooperative action in the 
sector will enable the UK farming sector to become more sustainable and successful. This 
thesis questions the logic behind this policy, and whether cooperatives will offer farmers a 
countervailing force against horizontal or vertical competition.  
In the next chapters, through the vehicle of an initial exploratory study, the author will 
examine the extent to which UK farming cooperatives are in fact increasing leverage and 
maintaining cohesion. The author also examines the possible linkages between the two 
themes. That is, the author explores the intuitive expectation that greater leverage will assist 
cohesion and cohesion will assist great leverage. In other words, cooperatives can enter a 
virtuous circle. If, across the sector, agricultural cooperatives are able to achieve both 
leverage and cohesion then it is likely that the UK government will deliver the desired-for 
alleviation of the crisis in the sector. If they can’t, the efficacy of the government policy will 
be in doubt.  
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The research findings suggest that there does indeed appear to be an iterative relationship 
between leverage and cohesion. Cooperatives are unable to improve leverage when faced 
with a highly competitive buyers’ market. Their ability to generate leverage is further 
undermined by the offensive strategies of competitors in a highly contested market.  
Historical evidence that cooperatives have effectively either closed the market through 
relative or absolute scarcity is not consistent with the findings here. The inability of 
cooperatives to close the market is often attributed to the lack of cohesiveness within the 
collective. This research, in contrast to previous research, suggests that cooperatives are 
unable to effectively increase gross benefits through absolute and relative scarcity and or 
motivational investment from the buyer. However, it suggests also that the continued 
survival of cooperatives is contingent upon their ability to manage costs. Where costs exceed 
benefits cohesiveness is threatened; a function of calculatively rational agents and members 
are presumed to defect. The problem is that cooperatives are threatened if the individual 
actor is able to experience the benefits of collective action without bearing the costs and this 
may result in the breakdown of the cooperative. Those benefiting from the cooperative 
without bearing the costs may be either members of the cooperative or parties external to 
cooperative action.  The purpose of the next three chapters is to explore the value of the 
exploratory model, as identified in chapters 2 and 3, in the context of three case studies.   
6.1 The basis of selection of the three case studies 
As discussed in chapter 5 three case studies were selected to explore the issue of the value of 
cooperatives and whether cooperative action can generate benefits to farmers. These 
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cooperatives were representative of cooperative activity in their sector at the time of the 
research. As discussed in chapter 1 they operated under predominantly traditional 
cooperatives but in disparate terms were evolving into New Generation cooperative 
governance structures.  
Case 1 is examined in chapter 7 and focuses upon a top fruit cooperative, located in Kent, 
called the Society of Growers of Topfruit (SGT). The cooperative was established in the late 
1960s. A closed cooperative with sources of external funding, it is the smallest of the 
cooperatives explored as part of this research and is now one of the few remaining top fruit 
cooperatives in the UK. The second case study examines one the largest UK milk 
cooperatives, First Milk, which has diversified considerably over the last few years, funded 
in part through government funds. This cooperative was formed more recently, as an indirect 
consequence of the dissolution of the Milk Marketing Board in the early 1990s.  
The third and final cooperative, Yorkshire Farmers Livestock Marketing Ltd (YFLM), is 
once again a venture of long standing, established in the 1930s, but in a manner similar to 
First Milk.  
As discussed in section 5.2.3.1 the case studies were selected with a view to address different 
aspects of the overall theory. The choice of case studies was informed by the theoretical 
framework derived from Emerson and Olson, and cooperatives. SGT was selected as it was 
small in size, a factor that should have led to a high level of internal cohesion. Furthermore, 
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the cooperative specialised in the Bramley apple, which was unique to the UK; a source of 
potential increase of relative scarcity.  
First Milk, like SGT, was selected because of its potential as a mechanism through which to 
create relative scarcity, being a cooperative that controlled 18% of British milk supply, with 
little threat from imported substitutes.   Furthermore, as a larger cooperative with a more 
heterogeneous membership, it was supposed that the cooperative would be less stable due to 
the greater potential for internal shirking and uneven distribution of costs. Even though the 
story of collective action in the dairy industry extends back to the 1930s, this case study is 
primarily concerned with the most recent period and in particular the period post 1995, when 
retailers became the principle source of consumer supply. 
Although First Milk was also selected for its potential for the creation of what might be 
considered relative scarcity, it was thought also to have the potential to increase the 
motivational investment of buyers through its investment in regionally branded cheeses. The 
criteria for the selection of YFLM reflected some of the criteria of each of the other two. 
YFLM, as a small cooperative supplying the mainstream buyers with a standard commodity, 
might prove to increase relative scarcity whilst also demonstrating characteristics of internal 
integrity. However, as with First Milk, YFLM had the potential of increasing the 
motivational investment of buyers with its venture into added value pork products. 
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6.2 The following chapters  
The following three chapters explore the initial theoretical framework in the context of each 
case study, starting with the Society of Growers of Topfruit (SGT).  The resultant discourse 
is a result of the collation and rigorous synthesis of a wide range of materials. The researcher 
has attempted to illustrate the details and rigour of the research with an end note system that 
is located in chapter 13. The case studies are generally structured sequentially around the 
research questions and theoretical framework. Initially they examine the leverage position, 
before looking at the implications of costs and the way the distribution of costs affects the 
sustainability of the cooperative. The findings appear to be out of line with the initial 
framework in that in each of the case studies the cooperative has continued despite its 
inability to increase leverage either through motivational investment or scarcity.  The next 
three chapters will explore this facet and the reasons.53 
 
 
 
 
                                                                
53 The roman numerals within the text refer to the endnotes which offer some of the sources of information upon which the case studies are 
based. This is designed to demonstrate validity of research rather than be a complete record. The names of interviews are recorded in 
appendix 2, but for ethical reasons appendix 1 simply makes reference to their role. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE STUDY ONE - SOCIETY OF GROWERS OF 
TOPFRUIT (SGT) 
7.0 Introduction 
This chapter presents the first case study, Society of Growers of Topfruit (SGT). SGT is a 
society with a history spanning 5 decades and was initially established as a counter measure 
of head to head competitionxlvi. However, this study is primarily concerned with the most 
recent period, when cooperatives were predominantly seen as a measure to counterbalance 
the power of an increasingly concentrated retail sector. Nevertheless, it is important to 
distinguish between the two periods in order to clarify the impact of the highly consolidated 
buyers sector, and consequently, the shift in the function of the cooperative as a mechanism 
to deliver benefits to members.   
SGT was established prior to the entry of the UK into the Common Market, and at this stage 
was primarily seen to be a means to promote the improvement of farming practice when 
faced with the probability of high levels of competition from more efficient European 
growers. This role has grown, in line with more extensive market liberalisation following the 
Uruguay agricultural agreements of the early 1990s. Consequently, European policy makers, 
concerned with the potential for increased horizontal competition, began to place even 
greater emphasis on collective activity and launched Producer Organisations (POs) as 
vehicles for the distribution of EU funds and incentives for cooperative formation. 
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Despite receiving funds to develop husbandry methods, efficiency improvements and 
marketing desks, SGT saw prices deflate in line with the consolidation of the multiple 
retailer sector; a condition not attenuated by increasing horizontal competition from overseas 
substitutes. It was anticipated that SGT would become a mechanism to safeguard the 
position of its growers in the face of the more efficient and/or lower cost overseas growers.  
More importantly, that it could create relative scarcity in an increasingly consolidated 
market. What is clear is that despite having a significant share of the English Topfruit 
supplied to the second largest UK retailer, SGT has failed to deliver benefits. As the smallest 
agent within the sector, with limited ability to expand and with limited access to alternative 
distribution channels, it is unable to influence price. Its position is inhibited further by the 
retailer strategy of dedicated buying agents. Nonetheless it is also apparent that despite a 
lack of benefits, the longevity of the cooperative has not been challenged. This is firstly 
because of relatively low direct costs, and secondly, a consequence of the continued 
longevity of the cooperative, an event that is largely due to Producer Organisation status and 
the high costs of exit to members.   
The PO status of SGT has had further implications for the leverage position of the 
cooperative in dealing with multiple retailers. Although exit barriers in the form of financial 
benefits inhibit member defection and increase the longevity of the cooperative, the relative 
size of the cooperative in comparison to the major buyers inhibits its ability to lever value 
and, moreover, has a negative impact on the prices received within the sector as a whole.   
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7.1 Historical background to the sector- dealing with horizontal competition  
The history of the SGT cooperative spans five decades, although it is apparent that its 
activities, its suppliers and customer base and the market structure of its customers have 
changed over this period. 
7.1.1 The historical structure and characteristics of the top fruit sector  
This case study examines the collective action within the top fruit sector. The term top fruit 
in the UK predominantly refers to apples, dessert and cooking, and pears, although in 
broader terms defines all fruit grown on trees. Historically, in the UK the topfruit sector 
dessert and cooking apples have represented some 80% of top fruit production, with the 
remainder in the production of pears and cider apples.xlvii  Until the UK’s entry to the EU, 
the growers’ share of the edible topfruit market constituted around half of the total tonnage 
of apples and pears consumed in the UK. This case study focuses upon SGT, which was 
established around 1971, prior to the UK’s entry to the European Market.xlviii 
“SGT was originally set up for Geest in the days of John Leanard and Frances Nicholas…at 
the time they were set up this was the start of the Common Market” ( Marketer SGT) 
 
At that time the topfruit sector was highly fragmented, with many buyers and sellers. In 
1967, Wye College conducted a survey which indicated that over 72% of fruit was supplied 
from over 1,500 growers of topfruit through to over 3,000 wholesalers, located in 37 
wholesale markets.  Fruit was then distributed to or collected from the wholesale markets by 
some 29,000 greengrocersxlix. The remaining 28% was supplied either direct from growers 
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(8%) or through growers/importers to distributing wholesalers.  After succession to the EU, 
poorer quality fruit was sold at an intervention price to an indeterminable number of 
processing companies. At that time, over 85% of fruit bought by consumers was bought 
from independent operations of which 48% could be attributed to sales from village stores 
and 14% from market stalls.  
Figure 7.1 Supply chain prior to retail consolidation
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7.1.2 Horizontal competition and impact on the top fruit sector on entry to the European 
Market 
The apples grown in the UK were predominantly English Cox, Russets and Bramleys, grown 
on low yielding standard orchards, and sales were largely spot transactions, although larger 
buyers would buy directly from growers or distributing wholesalers under contract.l  At this 
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point in time traders were perfectly and easily substitutable because of the number of 
alternative suppliers and the low switching costs for both buyers and traders. Corroborative 
evidence is limited, but evidence from farm gate prices during the 1980s suggests that there 
was an equitable power relationship between buyers and sellers, with an equal distribution of 
economic surplus. The 1991 figures would appear to corroborate these power relations, in 
that average farm gate prices were high during this period and represented over 50% of the 
household price, at circa £585.60/tonne at a time when the household prices averaged at 
£1100 per tonne.li  As such prices were at an all-time high and during this period SGT could 
be seen to have contributed to the equitable power balance. It had a primary function, as had 
the other 10 cooperatives, of promoting on-farm efficiency and safeguarding the competitive 
position of topfruit growers in the UK. lii. 
On the entry of the UK into the common marketliii, growers in the top fruit sector and UK 
policy makers became increasingly fearful of the threat from European growers. More 
advanced production techniques in Europe had resulted in better fruit quality, lower costs of 
production and with the accompanying risk of a deflationary effect on UK top fruit prices. 
EU growers commenced their programme of improving production techniques in the late 
1950s and had invested extensively into more intensive planting schemes and more disease 
resistant varieties and rooting stocks.liv Traditional orchards were characterised by low 
density planting, standard rootstocks, and less productive traditional varieties that resulted in 
low yields per hectare. In funding the grubbing up and replacement of unproductive 
orchards, the EEC had successfully enabled significant increases both in efficiencies and in 
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the quality of yields.  France and the Netherlands and other EEC states increased the 
numbers of trees from around 100 to up to 1800 per hectare. The introduction of varieties 
such as the more disease resistant French golden delicious resulted in an increase in class 1 
apples, as such varieties on dwarfing rootstocks were less prone to blemishes and other 
quality defaults.lv   It was thus apparent to English growers that the threat to their livelihood 
was not simply a function of the lower cost of production in the EEC, but also of higher 
horticultural standards and more uniform characteristics of topfruit than were traditional 
within the UK sector.lvi 
As a means of addressing the disparities in quality and efficiencies, SGT was set up with the 
support of a number of government mechanisms, including the Agricultural Act of 1967.lvii 
This act had a provision for funding husbandry methods, with priority given to cooperatives 
and their members. Cooperatives were seen as a mechanism through which funds might be 
distributed in order to improve husbandry methods, in line with European competitors.  It 
was designed to have the dual effect increasing productivity at the point of harvesting and of 
increasing yields per hectare.  
Corroborative literature is limited, but there are suggestions that funding initiatives were 
successful, at least in part. Records, which stem from the decade following the UK’s entry to 
the EEC show that over £5 million was invested in the topfruit sector by the UK,lviii with the 
effect that average yields per hectare increased by 0.4%.lix  The SGT Marketer and growers 
themselves corroborated that there had been improvements in productivity during this 
period. 
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“Farming methods  became more efficient and effective and growers have a better 
understanding of the implications of rootstocks of volume and quality of yield, and a greater 
understanding of the process of storage” ( Manager and SGT grower)  
Nonetheless it is obvious that these increases were insufficient to redress efficiency 
differentials between UK growers and their European counterparts. This can be 
demonstrated by comparisons between the levels of intensive production within member 
states. Whilst in the UK intensive production of apple orchards was increased to 5.8% of the 
total production area by the end of the 1980s,lx  in France and the Netherlands the area of 
intensive production had increased to 26.6% and 73.7% respectively, some 20.8% and 
67.9% higher than their UK counterpart. The outcome of this in terms of efficiency is 
particularly evident when one notes that by 1992 average yields in the UK were around 50% 
lower than in France and other European countries. This meant that, although they did 
become more efficient, they failed effectively to reduce the productivity gap and thereby 
achieve the objectives defined by the UK government. lxi 
Nevertheless, over the short term, collective action did stave off imports and safeguard the 
position of English growers.  The cooperatives’ hold over the contractual relationships with 
larger buyers, that were negotiated prior to the UK’s entry to the common market, ensured 
for them higher prices than received by their European competitors.lxii The remaining sales 
of fruit were predominantly spot market transactions sold through the wholesale markets that 
became vulnerable to the of market invention mechanisms on prices under EEC regulations. 
Under the EEC regulation, in circumstances when prices fell below the market price agreed 
by the EEC commission as a result of oversupply, designated parties were given the statutory 
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right to withdraw fruit. This fruit was then sold on to the processing sector at what was 
known as the intervention price. The practice was administered by the market inspectorate, a 
role apparently held by the cooperatives, and one that in practice enabled the cooperatives to 
regulate the market in favour of the UK grower.lxiii  When faced with the risk of the 
withdrawal of their fruit from the UK market, European growers switched their efforts to the 
world market, in which the presence of export subsidies provided greater security of 
returns.54lxiv 
The UK had persistently higher costs of production and lower fruit quality than its European 
counterparts, but its ability to compete was further undermined following the Uruguay round 
of GATT agricultural agreements, when the UK market was once again opened up to 
external competition.lxv  Pressure was placed on the EU to reduce exports, since the world 
market was flooded with subsidised topfruit. In an attempt to address the problem of the 
deflation of world prices, EU policy makers had to reconsider the support given to the sector. 
In line with the Agricultural Agreement they reduced export subsidies and intervention 
pricing and reviewed and revised the function of horticultural cooperatives. 
The gradual removal of export subsidies brought about greater internal competition between 
topfruit growers within the European Union. Export subsidies in the European Union 
declined by 61% between 1995 and 2000, a figure of three times the cuts agreed under the 
terms of the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). This move drove EU growers to switch their 
                                                                
54 Up to 50% of topfruit would be withdrawn from the market and would receive the lower intervention price 
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efforts towards supplying the UK market. Notably, between 1997 and 2007 the percentage of 
UK topfruit, as against EU or third country fruit, sold by UK retailers, had declined to 
around 20% of the total, a decrease of 17%. This was followed by the partial dismantling of 
protectionist measures like the reference price system and the introduction of the more 
lenient entry price tariff, which opened up the market to the underdeveloped countries. In 
particular, the UK saw a rise in imports from Southern Hemisphere countries, such as Chile 
and South Africa, of about 60%.  Whilst this was a function of trade liberalisation, it had the 
further effect of stimulating the production of topfruit in underdeveloped Third Countries, 
with a net increase in volume of production in China of some 13 million tonnes, a figure of 
over 100 times the total annual UK production.lxvi  
Measures to promote collective action were implemented in the EU and UK to encourage 
greater efficiency and collective marketing under regulations 2200/96 and 412/97.lxvii  These 
regulations, by encouraging the establishment of producer organisations, put in place a 
funding instrument to further promote EU husbandry efficiencies. By the provision of the 
regulations, that provided 50% of all on farm and off farm investment costs, in for example, 
new rootstocks and varieties, husbandry methods as well as marketing costs were match 
funded. Under these regulations the role of SGT was extended and while earlier efforts had 
been focused primarily upon increasing farm efficiencies,  under PO status  the cooperative 
held a more proactive role as a countervailing force and took a more strategic view of  
supporting and marketing local and regional products and producers.lxviii  
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However, these changes did not appear to effectively stem the erosion of benefits and share 
of economic surplus and prices were seen to fall below those attained in 1980. 55 Average 
farm gate prices for dessert apples fell below £300 per tonne by 1994 and while prices 
increased to around £400 per tonne between the years of 1996-2001 (fig 7.2) they did not 
return to their previous levels, as a consequence of the switch by retailers to alternative 
marketing agents.lxix The position of UK growers was exacerbated further by the 
introduction of new technology in the form of atmospheric storage which was designed to 
extend shelf life, and for some varieties for year-long availability.lxx 
 
Figure 7.2: Price per tonne for dessert apples between 1991 and 2009 DEFRA and MAFF 
Basic Horticultural statistics 
The sector was to experience another shock in the form of vertical competition. The 
emergent position of grocery retailers within the fresh produce sector, coupled with the 
inability of English growers to compete on price and quality with European and Third 
country growers, undermined the position of the cooperative still further. It is to this that our 
attention now turns. 
                                                                
55 In this case study, benefits can be equated to farm gate prices, this is because the cooperative members are charged a marketing fee, so 
that the figure received by the farmer equates to the gross price that gained from the buyer ( see case study 2) 
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7.2 Retail consolidation and the sustainability of the cooperative 
 
However, subsequently the cooperative was to be faced with greater competition, namely 
head to head competition as the retail sector consolidated. Consolidation had been a gradual 
process, as had the introduction by the major retailers of Fresh Produce as a destination 
product, and growers continued to make substantive returns and margins. It wasn’t until well 
into the 1990s that farm gate prices and margins started to significantly decline. Despite the 
inability of the cooperative to leverage price, the cooperative was sustained.  
7.2.1 Retail consolidation and the ability of SGT to counteract vertical threats derived from 
retail consolidation  
Retail consolidation has been identified as a critical factor in the ability of SGT to compete 
against more competent growers from the EU and developing countries.  In 1996, the top 10 
retailers made around 73% of food retailers’ sales, but by 2006 concentration levels had 
increased so that just the top ten retailers held around 74% of the market. Similar figures 
were reflected over the same time period in the sales of fresh fruit.  From 1996, when 
approximately 76% of all fresh fruit sold in the UK was sold by the larger multiple retailers, 
by 2006, just 4 retailers sold around 60% of all retailed fresh fruit. .lxxi   
This consolidation coincided with a change in the profile of top fruit within the retail store. 
By 1995, fresh produce, including top fruit, had become a destination category for the major 
retailers, who became the key purveyors of topfruit in the UKlxxii. Destination products are 
those products that influence the consumer’s choice of shopping destination. Top fruit was 
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now very much ‘something of a mixed blessing in that as a destination product particular 
care needed to be taken by retailers’ buying staff to ensure quality standards and safeguard 
against product wastage. 56lxxiii. I 
The consolidation and the position of top fruit as a destination category were changes that 
also coincided with the Uruguay round of Agricultural Agreements. As noted earlier, farm 
gate prices failed to resume the levels prior to changes to EU policy during this period, in 
what became a “perfect storm”.  That is increased global competition within the top fruit 
sector heightened the problem of head to head competition for SGT 
Detailed analysis indicates that changes to the market structure in the context of 
liberalisation had a significant impact on the cooperative’s ability to create sufficient 
leverage to ensure returns to its members. Its situation did not seem to be helped by the 
decision to remain a closed cooperative with limited membership, as this placed SGT at 
particular risk as the retail sector consolidated. Other agents, at this time, recognised the 
potential threat of multiple retailers and took the option of demutualising or expanding into 
the export sector. lxxiv 
In terms of the specifics as to why SGT was in such a weak position vis-à-vis the retailers a 
number of factors are relevant. While ostensibly SGT held a relatively unique position in  
                                                                
56 Destination products are those products that influence the consumer’s choice of shopping destination. 
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supplying English topfruit only; this was not an effective counter balance in a situation 
where substitutes in the form of UK and overseas suppliers were readily available. 
In addition, while topfruit has become a destination category for the retailers, there were 
limits to the retailers’ motivational interest, even in the case of the supply of Bramley apples, 
a product unique to UK and promoted via the Bramley Apple Consumer Campaign.  One 
senior buyer summed the situation up in these words: 
“If one was not to stock it, the people would ask for it- and this would lose business to the 
competition... (However) Bramley is not really a critical product; it has not the same impact 
of not stocking coca cola”.  
Therefore, the retailers had readily available substitutes for SGT produce and a limited 
motivational interest.lxxv 
There is another change in the market that has had a further impact upon the power resources 
of SGT, that of the development of category managers by retailers. 
The development of this retailer controlled intermediary within the mainstream food 
marketing channel was a further attempt by the retailer to reinforce their power position.lxxvi 
Although there is evidence that the two category managers for Sainsbury’s were also 
required to continually improve the quality of topfruit through working with suppliers and 
resolving issues such as poor handling, the primary function of these managers was to reduce 
the costs of purchases to their customers, the retailers.  
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In this specific case, SGT had to deal with category managers contracted by Sainsbury's.lxxvii  
The aforementioned primary role of these category managers is clear from comments made 
by category managers in the interviews: 
“In order to discriminate ourselves we need to constantly protect and constantly meet the 
needs of our customers and seek and develop suppliers to offer value to Sainsbury’s, we are 
constantly looking to improve value for our customers,…… We need to focus on the strategic 
opportunity for the buyers” (a category manager).  
The concern that category managers should meet the cost parameters of Sainsbury’s was 
reflected further in an interview with another category manager for Sainsbury’s. “The 
development of the concept orchard was designed to enable retailers’ greater insight into 
growing practices and potential for efficiencies” 
These positions were confirmed by some of the growers: “Claims were that marketeers 
accepted demand for lower prices, rebates and cash for market share deals from multiples, 
which cut heavily into growers’ net returns”  
 
 
In terms of the specific effects of category managers on SGT’s power resources, one grower 
provided a clue: “In establishing a single supply chain, this reduced our ability to easily 
switch our supply to the wholesale sector in times of surplus.” (Grower SGT) This point we 
can now develop. 
 
Specifically, in the case of Sainsbury’s, their two category leaders, Chingfords and Orchard 
World, had dedicated over 90% of their business to Sainsbury’s and were contractually 
constrained in their selection of additional buyers.  Retailers, on the other hand, could easily 
switch category managers in a supply market that, despite the high investment costs of 
packhouses, would appear to be characterised by relative ease of access and exit and thus 
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high levels of contestation. In this situation Sainsbury’s are able to switch suppliers or 
instigate the emergence of alternative potential suppliers, with limited cost implications.  
Recent history leads to the distinct impression that they are quick to switch suppliers where 
expected performance measures have not been met.lxxviii  There is a repeated allusion to this 
aspect of retailer behaviour, as is evident in the following discourse.  
“They tend to be 2 year contracts which are awarded on a PICO basis, - the commercial 
goals are to achieve higher gross margins and more of market share” (R Balucki) 
“Somerfield’s – WWF were supplying Somerfield, got removed from this. There is a constant 
need to maintain services levels, businesses plans and etc. with the supermarkets”. (J 
Morgan) 
In effect, this appears to have been the situation in the case of Chingfords.  Whilst Chingford 
Fruit dates back to 1966, its current size and turnover is purely a function of their contract 
with Sainsbury’s.  It is now one of the leading fresh fruit import and supply companies in the 
UK. In order to meet Sainsbury’s needs and requirement they are committed to make high 
levels of investment both in storage facilities57 and distribution networks. These again are 
dedicated to the Sainsbury’s contract.   
This level of investment was extended further in the early noughties when WWF (World 
Wide Fruit), as one of the original three category managers for Sainsbury’s, was delisted and 
Chingfords took over their share of the supply The high levels of investment as well as the 
knowledge by suppliers of the risk of being delisted, allow Sainsbury’s to place significant 
                                                                
57 In fact this is a joint venture with a distribution company, Turners, known as Profresh 
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pressure on the category manager to manage transactions at the lowest price. Sainsbury’s 
have a further hold over Chingfords, in that many of their buyers and marketers are former 
Sainsbury’s employees.  
“Buyers for Chingfords are unlikely to put pressure on Sainsbury’s since many of them are 
former employees” (Grower) 
“Buyers for Chingfords know our business in that many of them have also worked for 
Sainsbury’s” (Sainsbury’s buyer) 
Crucially, in terms of the power resources of SGT, as a means of ensuring continuity and 
minimising costs of supplies still further, Chingfords encouraged SGT to reduce their 
customer base from four to two key retailers. In the event, the retailers chosen by the SGT 
board were Sainsbury's and Asda, and Sainsbury's was selected as their key customer.  
 
Now the loss of the Sainsbury’s contract would result in quite significant implications to 
SGT members’ livelihoods. There was now a high level of fear of being delisted by 
Sainsbury’s as it represented over 60% of SGT total sales. This, of course, further eroded the 
bargaining power of the cooperative.  
 
To add salt to the wound, since the introduction of Chingfords, benefits have also been 
eroded due to the imposition of additional commission, which amounts to 2% on top of an 
existing 6%.  The chair of SGT commented: 
“It was clear that it was Michele of Chingford’s who was the negotiator of prices with 
Sainsbury’s, and not Derek. The original function of SGT was done by others”… “This is at 
the cost of an additional 2% commission on top of the 6% commission charged by SGT” 
(Chair of SGT) 
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So, we see a whole host of developments that changed the power resources of the two parties 
in a manner that led to more and more imbalance in the relationship and, most recently, to 
total buyer (i.e. retailer) dominance. The commercial results have been predictable. Farm 
gate prices may fluctuate more for Bramley apples than for dessert apples and, in the main, 
show a more consistent increase over time (see figure 7.3). Nevertheless, over time the 
retailer’s share of prices has increased for both apple categories.58  It is notable that for all 
top fruit retail returns have increased by around 20%.lxxix Published figures show that over 
the last 16 years, growers’ share of the retail price has declined from 48% to 30%, and 
Sainsbury’s share has increased from 33% to circa 38-40%.lxxx These are however gross 
margins, what is significant is that farmers experience a higher share of the channel cost 
post-harvest, particularly since the introduction of farm gate pricing. Total post-harvest 
costs, including transport, grading, packaging, storage and levies, could be over £500/tonne, 
some 5/8 ths  of the farm gate price. This is reflected in the comment of one farmer:  
.”Prices received by farmers are continually eroded by the increased costs of delivery to 
retailers, packaging, transport etc.”… 
The problem for SGT is that even where there are few substitutes, as in the case of Bramley 
apples, a product unique to UK and promoted via the Bramley Apple Consumer Campaign, 
there is limited evidence of it being able to act to change the balance of power. The 
countervailing forces are just too strong. 
                                                                
58 There is a further intervening factor here in that the limited demand for fresh Bramleys by the consumer means that this product is 
extremely price sensitive, marginal increases in volume, as was apparent in the early noughties, bring about a significant decrease in farm 
gate prices.  
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Figure 7.3 Farm gate prices for culinary appleslxxxi 
 
 
And yet, despite all this, SGT has nevertheless continued to supply Sainsbury’s with top fruit 
for well over a decade, and when this research was carried out, there was no sign of it 
discontinuing the relationship or dissolving it because of lack of benefits. This is because, 
according to one SGT marketer: 
“The costs of serving the wholesale sector would be of less interest to our members due to 
the high costs of  managing the greater number  ( of wholesalers and food processors), 
particularly where there are no contracts” (SGT  marketer)  
Even the less compliant grower-members feel that while the dedication of sales to two 
retailers runs counter to their interest, the cost of switching or extending the portfolio of SGT 
deters the cooperative manager from switching marketing channels.  
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7.2.2. Longevity and cohesion – the cost of coalition  
The cooperative has survived despite certain levels of friction between members of the 
board, and this could be linked to the apparently low costs of coalition.  Those that are 
particularly negligible are monitoring, sanction and agency costs. 
In the breakdown of costs the following points emerge. SGT managers are  some of the 
highest paid in the sector, with an average salary of £44,500,59lxxxii but the marketing 
commissions, which are in effect the direct costs charged to members,  are 30% lower than 
those of their nearest competitors.  This is because of lower staffing levels within SGT than 
those apparent among direct competitors and is a consequence of lower monitoring costs 
incurred by management and minimal intervention by managers in members’ on-farm 
activities.  In effect, this is in part a consequence of PO status, where the availability of 
match funding and the need to improve specifications to meet the astringent demands of 
retailers reduces the need for intervention on the part of the management team. 
The manager has been able to reduce further the marginal costs of coalition, specifically 
those of transaction costs This has been achieved through both limiting the numbers of 
customers and, as required under the terms of PO rules, constraining members to sell all their 
produce through the cooperative.lxxxiii   
                                                                
59some  19.3% higher than the nearest competitor (Norman Collett) and some 50% higher than the WFL (Worldwide fruit; the largest 
player 
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Even if a member does supply buyers alternative to the designated retailers, contracts are 
negotiated individually by the member; members are required to pay a marketing 
commission to the cooperative even if the marketing cooperative takes no active part in the 
negotiations. Commission is paid at a reduced rate, but it is required to be paid on all fruit, 
including class 2. This means that instead of dispersing sanction costs across members, those 
members who consistently fail to meet retail standards, usually as a result of limited 
investment in physical assets, are individually penalised. This also enhances the level of 
satisfaction among compliant members and the coherence of the coalition.  
“Derek does a good job, but that cannot be said for all,.... however this has little effect on 
us, the poor growers are those who bear the cost” ( Grower) 
SGT members experience higher marginal costs from the supply of their key customers than 
would be experienced in the supply of alternative customers such as wholesale and the 
manufacturing sectors. These are particularly found in the form of asset specific investments. 
Asset specific costs are higher in the supply of multiple retailers and include measures put in 
place to safeguard against non-delivery of the astringent variable product specification set by 
retailers, but high levels of contestation mean these are not idiosyncratic to the multiple retail 
sector; any improvement in quality of product in one marketing channel has a reciprocal 
improvement in others.lxxxiv That is to say that any improvement in fruit quality for the 
retailers also results in quality improvements for fruit disseminated to other wholesale/ 
retail/catering operations. In addition, topfruit growers experience higher costs in the supply 
of the multiple retail sector as a result of higher operational costs derived from the 
transportation and packaging requirements of the major players.   
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In the first instance, regarding Asset specific costs, multiple retailers demand higher 
specifications than regulated under the EU and the exact specifications will vary year on year 
according to the success of the harvest. In search of quality improvements growers look to 
improving both the quality of fruit grown and the quality of products delivered to 
packhouses from the farm. Such costs stem from a number of sources: replanting 
programmes in order to offer new and more disease resistant modern varieties, husbandry 
techniques, pre-grading techniques both during and post cultivation, and the more resilient 
packaging provided by a dedicated supplier to Sainsbury’s.  
The need for higher investment stems from the need to achieve more astringent 
specifications than those set down under the EU Horticultural Standards. Sainsbury’s are 
seen to raise specifications above EU standards for class 1 fruit at will, and may do so 
without prior knowledge or consultation, especially in bumper harvest years, and efforts 
made by growers to improve the quality of production only raise the benchmark. This means 
that much fruit that is ostensibly class 1 can be rejected on the cusp of the quality 
parameters. 60lxxxv   
Cottage Farm, the SGT packhouse, was submitted to penalties of up to £20 000 if packed 
fruit was found to be in breach of specifications and as a result demonstrated a pattern of risk 
averse behaviour, which resulted in elevated levels of rejection, exacerbated when a limited 
throughput of English fruit drove the packhouse to seek additional customers from overseas. 
When fruit was rejected by the packhouse as below class 1, members experienced a high loss 
                                                                
60 Around 60% of SGT fruit is packed by a non-grower member of SGT who also packs for a number of other agents including key South 
African importers such as Outspan. 
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of benefits. This was because fruit was sold daily at a spot price to the processing sector, a 
price subject to the level of supply at that point in time. Losses experienced by the grower as 
a result of packhouse rejection have increased following the removal of intervention prices 
after Uruguay. lxxxvi 
Were the fruit to be sold directly either to the wholesale sector for supply into the catering 
and independent retail sectors or through future market contracts between the grower and 
processors, net prices would be higher than those received as a result of non-conformance to 
retailer specifications, even though the top line price drops by 50% or 70%. This is because 
wholesale and processing operations charge less for transport and grading.61,lxxxvii 
These, whilst they impact on bottom line figures, because of the influence of the multiple 
retail sector on the quality demanded by the rest of the sector, cannot be considered as 
significant costs, or costs of a significant magnitude or durability. 
As a means of countering the risk of stock withdrawal by the packhouses, growers have 
made considerable investment in pre-grading systems. 62  Fifty per cent of investment costs 
are found by the EU, which significantly reduces the magnitude of the investment, so that 
without match funding, the costs of pre-harvest or post-harvest grading systems63 could be 
                                                                
61 packhouse charges for grading for retail can be up to £100 per tonne 
62 These can be pre-harvest or post-harvest systems – pre-harvest system is a husbandry system which greatly increases the production of 
class 1 fruit, whereas postharvest requires investment in machinery that can be used on farm to separate out the different fruit 
classifications. 
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perceived to be excessive.lxxxviii Whilst PO funding does much to mitigate these costs, 
nonetheless growers experience a variety of escalating costs 
“The income for growers is vast, for instance Ian has been helped with special tractors, pre-
graders and stores paid for by the tax payer” (SGT manager) 
 However, they are not idiosyncratic as the grower is still able to supply additional 
alternative contracts with wholesalers and processors without loss of investment.  
7.2.3 The longevity of the coalition, the distribution of costs to members, and non- 
excludability  
As intended, it is the PO status that has ensured the longevity and cohesiveness of SGT.  
Match funds attained by growers under the PO programme are depreciated over a five year 
period. Were the member to leave the cooperative prior to the full depreciation of this 
investment, the whole asset, including the growers’ personal investment, would be forfeited.  
Growers are incentivised to maintain their position within the cooperative by the threat of 
forfeit. The need for continual investment in improvement of husbandry practices means that 
they are locked into the cooperative. In essence, it is in the interest of the farmer to remain a 
member, but in order to benefit from the cooperative he needs to draw continually upon EU 
funds, which further inhibits his exit from the cooperative.  Yet the other 10-12 UK POs 
within the top fruit sector are not locked into the cooperative in the same way. Some 80% of 
commercial producers, a total of 240 growers, are members of Producer Organisations, 
including Northcourt who supply WWF and Mid Kent Growers who supply Norman Collets. 
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Members in many other POs are not in principle constrained to supply to their current 
agents, although it is rare that they switch buyers.lxxxix  
“Growers are conservative by nature” (Marketer Orchard World) 
Whilst the other 10-12 POs have the same funding opportunities as SGT, their freedom to 
switch agents also means the marketing agents are keen to maintain their supply. The 
marketing agents are not cooperatives and in order to ensure supply growers are offered 
greater support than offered by SGT, including the costs of running packhouses, technical 
developments and advice in terms of growing methods in exchange for a marketing 
commission, and are not seen to have a negative impact on the sector as a whole.  This is 
recognised by the sector, as illustrated by the extract below. 
“Many of the problems experienced by apple growers are a result of the producer 
organisations. The structure of the POs is very much designed around the European model 
which is that all producers in an area belong to the same cooperative” (main grower within 
Mid Kent growers) 
7.2.4 Summary of previous sections 
These findings suggest that not only has the cooperative failed to increase benefits to its 
members, but that the cooperative has still continued to operate as a collective. This case 
study shows that both high exit barriers for the cooperative as a firm and for members of the 
cooperative can result in the sustained existence of collective action.  SGT has attempted to 
increase relative scarcity and motivational interest, but has not been successful largely due to 
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the presence of a large number of acceptable substitutes, limited entry barriers, and the risk 
of being delisted by the retailers. The position has been further exacerbated by the 
introduction of category managers and the high dependency of the cooperative on their key 
customer Sainsbury’s. Yet, the failure of the cooperative to benefit growers has not resulted 
in the defection of members to alternative channels. This could in part be a consequence of 
low costs of cohesion experienced by members in the cooperative. Transaction costs are 
minimised by the management of the cooperative, whilst asset specific costs are mitigated by 
EU funds provided under the aegis of their Producer Organisation status.  However, the 
longevity of the cooperative members is not simply a function of cohesiveness, but due to 
high exit barriers imposed through PO status. 
7.2.5 Impact of the longevity of the cooperative on the sector as a whole 
Yet, the longevity of SGT has a negative impact on the leverage position of the sector as a 
whole. Where cooperatives, such as SGT, experience high costs of switching buyers, buyers 
are presented with the opportunity to place greater pressure on prices paid to farmers. The 
failure of the cooperative to switch buyers has a negative impact on the prices received by all 
agents. This position is further exacerbated by both the low search costs for the retailer that 
stem from the proximity of the relationship with Chingfords, and the transparency of  the 
sector and the costs of production. In the last instance, a demonstration and experimental 
orchard, run on behalf of Sainsbury’s by Orchard World, enables the retailer not only to 
understand the current implications of weather, husbandry systems on UK production, 
quality and costs but also makes it possible to examine ways to cut costs and thus prices still 
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further. Other marketing agents have demutualised and/or extended their supply base to 
include overseas growers, in an attempt to shift power balances albeit marginally, but as the 
smallest agent, with a membership restricted to 20 growers and a larger proportion of its 
supply locked into one buyer, SGT not only failed to increase surplus for its own members 
but undermined the position of others.xc   The former cooperative Home Grown 
Fruits/Northcourt growers became Worldwide Fruit, and on its demutualisation and merger 
with ENZA had the opportunity to gain access to funds from external investors. This allowed 
the former cooperative to invest in facilities and infrastructures and thereby generate greater 
efficiencies of scale. xci 
 “The reason they demutualised was to increase flexibility and drive the value of the 
company. There are 5 directors, employees are employed under Worldwide Fruit, this 
mitigates against risk of investment, and the profits in the bigger company. Profits can be as 
much as £1/2 million” (R Balucki) 
However, whilst this action did improve efficiency and increased margins, any advantage 
gained was quickly curtailed on the delisting of WWF.  In increasing Chingford's proportion 
of their market share and by stipulating that SGT should remain as a key English fruit 
supplier, the increases in investment in facilities that were dedicated to Sainsbury’s further 
increased the dependency of Chingford. The reliance of both Chingford and SGT on the 
Sainsbury’s contract when faced with fear of delisting persuaded Chingford to place greater 
pressure on SGT prices.  
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Led by the high levels of transparency of information within the sector, and the apparent 
readiness of the retail sector to switch suppliers: Asda, for example, has switched its fruit 
suppliers twice in the last 6 years, the net impact, despite the presence of the lobby group 
English Apples and Pears and considerable media attention, is a deflation of the price for 
topfruit across agents. What is being evidenced and is substantiated by DEFRA statistics is a 
negative yardstick effect which is at least in part attributable to the presence of SGT in the 
market.  
7.3 Lessons Learnt 
The examination of SGT shows limited evidence that the cooperative has at any stage of its 
history successfully increased benefits to its members. None the less the cooperative has 
continued to operate as a collective for the last 40-50 years. This case offers an interesting 
insight into the ability of a closed member small cooperative to increase relative scarcity. In 
this case study, we learn that both high exit barriers for the cooperative as a firm and for 
members of the cooperative can result in the sustained existence of collective action but this 
may be to the detriment of the sector as a whole.  These lessons are explored in more detail 
below.  
7.3.1 Creation of leverage through absolute scarcity/relative scarcity and/or 
motivational interest 
The findings in this case study are that SGT has attempted to increase relative scarcity and 
motivational interest, but has failed predominantly because of the presence of a large number 
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of acceptable substitutes.  Even with the support of the Bramley apple campaign and English 
Apple and Pears Ltd, the consumer is not significantly swayed by distinctions of 
provenance. The apparent consumer indifference to provenance means retailers are able 
readily to substitute suppliers from around the globe. The ready availability of alternative 
suppliers, particularly since Uruguay, means that agents face the continuing threat of being 
delisted by the retailers, in a market where there are not only limited entry barriers but few 
alternative buyers, a position that has been reinforced by the creation of category leaders. 
This is because category leaders that are required by contract to dedicate or largely dedicate 
their supply to one retailer are particularly vulnerable to post contractual hazards. Their high 
dependence on one income stream means that as a consequence they are encouraged to place 
pressure on farm gate prices.  However, the failure of the cooperative to benefit growers has 
not resulted in the defection of members to alternative channels. This has not occurred, 
which might suggest that members are not acting according to the principles of calculative 
rationality. However, on further investigation this appeared not to be the case. 
7.3.2 The longevity and cohesion of the cooperative  
The case material suggests that member loyalty is not a function of the receipt of benefits, 
but of the significant financial penalties if the cooperative member were to leave. The 
exploratory model suggested that the cohesion and thus the longevity of the cooperative 
would be undermined were marginal costs to exceed marginal benefits. In this case, findings 
suggest that transaction and agency costs incurred by members are not in excess of marginal 
benefits and indeed are comparable to those incurred by the UK farmer who is outside the 
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cooperative. This condition is not replicated however in the case of asset specific costs, but 
these are of a lesser magnitude as a result of match funding under the PO framework.  Nor 
are they idiosyncratic investments in that as retail specifications become more stringent there 
is a corollary effect across all retail formats.  This suggests that asset specific investments 
made by members are not costs but exit barriers in that members would incur double the 
amount of asset specific costs were they to attempt to defect. The cooperative is thus 
sustained not because of the ability of the cooperative to generate benefits, or even possibly 
due to low marginal costs over marginal benefits, but due to high exit barriers imposed 
through PO status.   
7.3.3 Problems of non-excludability  
The presence of exit barriers for members has had an impact not only on the prices attained 
by members but also by non-members, The presence of exit barriers has had a deflationary 
impact on prices for the sector as a whole.  
External free-riding or the Yardstick effect is normally considered to have an inflationary 
impact on prices for a commodity sector, in that it offers an alternative buyer to farmers 
(Nourse, 1945). This case suggests that the inability of SGT members to switch to other 
agents means that in an already highly contested market, where suppliers are under constant 
threat of being delisted, the presence of the cooperative has the reverse effect to what might 
have been predicted.  
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7.4 Conclusion 
This case study was selected because as one of the very few suppliers of English only top 
fruit and a closed member cooperative, which constitutionally constrained member 
defection, existing literature suggested that there was a potential opportunity to improve 
leverage.  Intuitively, it was felt that the formation of the cooperative, particularly where 
consumer interest in British food and provenance had been heightened by the media and 
pressure groups, would have a positive impact on their leverage position. Furthermore, both 
the literature on Entrepreneurial Cooperatives and the exploratory model suggested that in 
restricting its membership the so called closed membership cooperative would be able to 
more effectively restrict supply of topfruit to the retail sector and increase relative scarcity. 
Lastly, it was believed that that the constraints on member defection would constrain the 
lack of cohesion within the cooperative: a dimension found within existing literature to 
undermine both the longevity of the cooperative and its ability to generate benefits. 
However, these preliminary ideas relating to the success of cooperatives are not evident 
within this case. What is apparent is that cooperatives can survive even where they are 
unable to lever any benefits for their members. Indeed, where cooperatives enforce cohesion, 
cooperatives can be seen to survive despite a detrimental effect on the sector as a whole. 
Clearly this case study provides interesting insights for the development of understanding of 
the factors affecting the ability of, in this case, transitional cooperatives. 
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CHAPTER 8 
 CASE STUDY 2 FIRST MILK 
8.0 Introduction  
The next case study examines one of the three cooperatives that emerged out of Milk Marque 
in 1999.  First Milk remains one of the two largest milk cooperatives in the UK and operates 
particularly in the South Wales, Cumbrian, and Scottish milk fields. This case is used to 
explore the value of the cooperative as a mechanism to improve the profitability of dairy 
farmers in a sector which traditionally has been vulnerable to post contractual hazards. The 
cooperative was, at the time of the research, one of the larger traditional UK Cooperatives. 
However, it was believed that the introduction of external funding, mainly from the Welsh 
Assembly, would have attenuated the problem of internal freeriding normally found in 
traditional cooperatives that are reliant on members for additional funds for investment. 
The case first examines the period prior to First Milk, during which collectives either 
possessed market power in the end market in addition to control of the milk supply, or, 
simply, had control over the milk supply. To this end, attention is drawn to both previous 
collectives: the Milk Marketing Boards and Milk Marque, and shows how the decline of 
doorstep deliveries and the emergence of a highly contested retail sector have significantly 
impacted the power leverage position of First Milk and other key cooperatives within the 
sector.  
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At the time of the English and Welsh Milk Marketing Board (EWMMB), and price subsidies 
from the EU, farm gate prices had been successfully fixed through the control of milk supply 
and the subsidisation of excess, but this changed after the Uruguay round of agreements on 
agriculture.  With the removal of export and price supports systems the UK government 
opened up access to milk supplies.  
It achieved this by disbanding the MMBs and by the promotion of a number of voluntary 
cooperatives and dairy organised milk groups. Of these, Milk Marque was the largest, with 
initially over 80% control of the supply of English and Welsh Milk.  As a consequence, Milk 
Marque was able, over the short term, to increase farm gate prices. Over the longer term, 
their key customers, when faced with highly inflated milk prices, bypassed the cooperative 
and attained a direct supply from farmers. This led to the erosion of membership, as the 
larger farmers, enticed by attractive payment packages, left the cooperative to supply directly 
to the dairies.  As Milk Marque’s percentage of market share of supply declined, so too did 
x-efficiency levels, a factor exacerbated by rises in transportation costs based on increased 
fuel costs.  
Counter measures of forward integration by Milk Marque were thwarted by a Competition 
Commission report in 1999, with the resultant emergence of First Milk.  However, even on 
the acquisition of milk processing facilities and a 33% market share in UK cheddar cheese 
production as well as a majority share of milk supply, the cooperative has failed to realise 
the benefits anticipated. This failure may be attributed to the emergence of a dominant retail 
sector across dairy products and increased contestation across the dairy processing sectors, 
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as well as the onus on First Milk to invest heavily in processing plants in order to achieve 
comparable levels of technical and x-efficiency. Their position was made worse by higher 
investment costs and problems in raising sufficient funds. 
Up until now, the cooperative has continued to survive, although other cooperatives, such as 
Dairy Farmers of Britain, have failed.   It is notable that the cooperative fulfils the two 
important roles of sustaining farmers located in remoter areas and as a mechanism to manage 
seasonal over supply through redirecting excess milk to produce butter and skimmed milk... 
In this case study, there is again evidence to suggest that the cooperative has influenced 
prices for the sector as a whole. The rest of the chapter will explore how the failure to deliver 
benefits to members is a function of the inability of the cooperative to increase leverage 
against the retailers when faced with increasing marginal costs and heavy investment into 
new ventures and plants.  
8.1 Historical background to milk supply within the UK and how early cooperative 
measures successfully addressed power imbalances 
This second case study examines collective action in the Dairy sector and examines the 
position held within the exploratory framework that in order that cooperative activity be 
effective, the coalition needs to generate sufficient net benefits to maintain cohesion, and 
those benefits should be exclusive to members. This case study specifically focuses upon one 
of the most recent cooperatives, First Milk, established 1999-2001.  The history of collective 
action within the dairy sector has spanned well over 80 years, in which initial efforts to close 
the market through monopolistic activity began in the early 1930s with the establishment of 
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the Milk Marketing Boards.xcii  They were eventually dismantled, following the drive to 
increase the competitiveness within the dairy sector in response to the Uruguay round of 
agricultural agreements.  
“you had  statutory boards,  it was before my time but you remember the milk marketing 
board, it gave some sort of protection to price … but what it lacked was some 
entrepreneurship” ( Mansell Raymond) 
8.1.1 The historical structure and characteristics of the Dairy sector  
The establishment of cooperatives for the protection of farm gate prices has been particularly 
important in the dairy sector. Milk is not only highly perishable, but is “harvested” once, 
twice or  even three times a day for  the 10 months of  lactation, with peak periods of supply 
during spring and early summer months. These factors mean that farmers need to dispose of 
the product rapidly, which makes them particularly vulnerable to post contractual 
opportunism and thus the risk of low farm gate prices.  The logistics of the problem have 
been made more difficult by the move of rural populations to urban conurbations ever since 
the growth of industry in the 19th century.  
 In the UK there was and is a strong tradition of liquid milk consumption. It constitutes 50% 
of all milk supply, with cheese and butter traditionally produced during the spring and 
summer months as a means of reducing excess.  Following the industrial revolution, it was 
necessary to supply liquid milk to urban populations, and this wrought a significant change 
to channels of distribution.xciii  In pre-industrialised Britain, the dairy sector was highly 
fragmented and creameries were located in most market towns, and were supplied by an 
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even more fragmented sector of mixed farming64. The farmers themselves also sold milk and 
cheese direct to consumers.  
However, increased urban demand brought changes to distribution and the development of 
railway dairy networks. The relocation of dairies to urban areas made it possible to supply 
liquid milk to the mass populace in urban areas.xciv  This change was made possible when 
marginal costs of transportation could be minimised. The minimisation of the cost of 
transport was a factor critical to milk as a product of which 90% is water.  The development 
of a railway network was only feasible where there were sufficient volumes of milk to be 
transported and where there were adequate funds for the investment.  
The requirement for significant investment in collection dairies, dedicated railway terminals, 
rail stock and urban dairies endorsed the need for consolidation within the dairy sector and 
the formation of national dairy companies such as Express Dairies. By 1930, in the UK, the 
number of dairy companies had declined, with key players such as Express Dairies, United 
Dairies, Nestlé, Cow and Gate, and CWS taking a large share of the marketxcv. By 
comparison with today’s market structure, the sector still remained relatively fragmented, 
with more than 9000 small businesses, such as St Ivel, Buttercup Dairies and Cheshunt 
Dairies, as well as smaller family firms located in most market towns and villages, but there 
was consolidation nonetheless.xcvi   
                                                                
64 Usually the terms used respectively to denote collation and processors of liquid milk and cheese/butter producers 
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The consolidation of the dairy sector resulted in a shift in power and loss of income for 
farmers. This was at least in part a consequence of a clear bifurcation of milk and cheese 
distribution systems.  Milk destined for consumption as liquid milk, around 50% of the 
volume, was sent by rail to urban dairies, whilst milk destined for cheese production   
continued to be located near the sources of supply.xcvii This meant that once milk was sent by 
rail to urban dairies, supplies could not easily be switched to alternative markets. As a 
consequence, where milk was found on arrival at the urban dairy to be in excess of demand, 
if the milk was retained by the dairy, farmers were forced to take a price which barely 
covered the cost of production, or if returned, would suffer complete loss of earnings.xcviii  
One particular offender was Nestlé, who persistently reduced the price paid to farmers to 
below the cost of production once the milk had been dispatched. Farmers had become 
particularly prone to moral hazard as the dairy sector continued to consolidate during the 
First World War and the Great Depression.xcix To address these issues and ensure the 
continuity of supply, the UK government established 5 marketing boards65who had the 
statutory right to purchase and collect all milk sold across the UK.    
In establishing the MMBs the government was able to reverse power imbalances, a position 
that was enhanced by the adoption of a tendering system for buyers and forward integration.  
As suggested by a Farmer Director for First Milk, “It gave some sort of protection to price --
- again it gave some sort of profit”.  
                                                                
65 Of which three were established in 1933, including the EWMMB (the English and Welsh Milk Marketing Board, the Scottish Marketing 
Board, the North of Scotland Milk Marketing Board and the Aberdeen and District Milk Marketing Board. The Northern Irish Milk 
Marketing Board was not established until the  1950s  
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8.1.2 Horizontal competition and market liberalisation 
Sixty years later, these statutory monopolies were superseded by a more liberalised market, 
characterised by both non-cooperative dairies and voluntary bargaining cooperatives such as 
Milk Marque. This was driven by the perceived need to increase the level of contestation 
within the dairy sector with a view to promote innovation and efficiency.c The sector, 
although strongly protected from overseas competition by both EU price subsidies and the 
Milk Marketing Boards, was forced under the Uruguay agreement to decrease direct support 
to farmers.  EU price mechanisms had stimulated the production of milk well in excess of 
demand.  
Within the terms of the Common Agricultural Policy, all excess supply was bought under 
intervention price systems for the production of butter and ingredients and sold on the world 
market. The introduction of a large volume of dairy products, including butter and skimmed 
milk, on the world market had the effect of deflating world prices. The British demand for 
pasteurised rather than UHT milk may have exacerbated this problem. This is because milk 
is naturally a seasonal product and in traditional spring calving systems, when cows were 
dried off during the winter months, production volume would drop. In order to have 
sufficient volume throughout the year, farmers would increase their overall production 
capacity, thereby increasing production in the summer months in excess of demand. There 
was an attempt to reduce overcapacity through milk quotas and legislation designed to 
promote competitiveness between EU dairy companies, but these failed to address the 
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problem.66  The protectionist measures had further implications. Price support systems and 
the lack of global competition have significantly impaired technological and product 
innovation.  As one farmer commented: 
(protection supported prices, but on) “ the down side you were relying  then on private 
sector,  PLCs  to develop added value and  the incentive wasn’t there because basically 
prices were set and if you didn’t sell liquid milk on the door step  you turned it into powder  
and you got intervention for it, didn’t you. Once you got into CAP, there was no incentive for 
added value whatsoever” (Farmer Director, First Milk). 
 
This led to the decision to deregulate, a strategy that coincided with the entry of European 
dairies into the UK market through a series of acquisitions and mergers, a necessity for the 
EU dairies if they were to access the UK market. ci 
In 1994, Milk Marque took over 80% of the supply originally controlled by the EWMMB 
and initially increased benefits to its members.cii Average farm gate prices rose between 
1994 and 1997 by between 11% and 16%. Furthermore, UK farm gate prices were higher 
than average prices received by dairy farmers in nearly all other EU member states.ciii   Milk 
Marque, under terms laid down by the Conservative government of the time, was divested of 
the EWMMB processing capacity, but sustained its leverage position by charging higher 
prices to liquid milk dairies that required a continual supply of milk throughout the year.civ 
The prices were determined by an auction system but were differentiated according to the 
                                                                
66 There  was a directive which allowed the free trade of UHT Milk across the EU, however at this point only  1% of sales of all milk in the 
UK was UHT, this hindered effectiveness of this legislation 
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buyer’s need for continuity of supply. Prices demanded for the so called “market led” 
contracts that required a level supply throughout the year were notably higher than for 
supply led contracts. This mechanism was primarily devised to encourage greater demand 
for milk during peak periods of production and prices. 
Market conditions were becoming increasingly concentrated and contested by 1999, where 
the 4 largest dairies held 51.7% of the market share in a period where dairies predominantly 
delivered directly to the doorstep of consumers. cv67 Liquid dairies were investing heavily in 
both acquisitions and mergers and in new processing plants and became increasingly 
unwilling to be held hostage to premium milk prices.cvi Dairies, which required a               
continuous supply and therefore were paying more per pint than their counterparts in cheese 
and ingredients, were unable to substitute UK grown milk with imports and sought to bypass 
Milk Marque by encouraging farmers to supply them directly. 
 Farmers were incentivised, through the medium of preferential pricing and interest free 
loans, to form dedicated milk groups, by a number of dairies including those of Nestlé and 
Northern Foods.  This was of particular interest to larger farmers who, within the pooled 
farm gate pricing systems operated by both the MMBs and Milk Marque, saw that they were 
required to shoulder a greater proportion of the burden of transport costs. This became an 
issue of particular significance following the switch from rail by the milk supply chain 
following the Beeching Report.cvii  
                                                                
67: Express dairies, Avonmore, Unigate and Dairy crest who had broadly even shares of the market, 68% was held by the 7 largest. 
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The non-cooperative dairies reinforced this fear by producing a now standard package of 
incremental prices depending on milk quality, volume of collection and an agreement to 
every other day collection, replacing the one size fits all payment system. Over the period 
from 1996/9 the dairies engineered the defection from Milk Marque of over 1300 members, 
thereby reducing the membership by a third by 1999 from around 4500 at the point of 
establishment, and consequently augmenting levels of productive and x-inefficiencies within 
the cooperative.cviii  Whilst it was quite generally believed that the failure of Milk Marque 
was a consequence of opportunistic behaviour of rivals, this point was put succinctly by one 
farmer director for First Milk. 
 “Yeh  I have had that from more than one source, We pay the penny a litre because it will 
take us three years at least to poach the members away from Milk Marquee and then we are 
in control we can recoup all that we have paid over and above” 
 
In the absence of processing capacity, but with a high dependency on the four key dairy 
companies who held around 60% of market share68,cix the cooperative was unable to generate 
net benefits to members and this led to even greater levels of defection. Those who left the 
cooperative were the largest, most accessible farmers, chosen on the basis of the volume of 
milk produced and the proximity of the farm to centres of population. This tactic ensured 
that the haulage costs were lower than those experienced by the cooperative members.69cx  
Price differentials between Milk Marque and the dairies/creameries in 1994 were at 1.44 
pence per litre; these were raised by 1999 to 2.34ppl. Although prices paid by Milk Marque 
                                                                
68 Express Dairies, Robert Wiseman, Unigate and Dairy Crest 
69 It would appear that the defection was despite measures introduced by Milk Marque requiring that farmers notified the cooperative by a 
specific calendar date, if they planned to switch buyers within the preceding 12 month period. 
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increased per litre during the period of 1994-1996, by 1997 prices began to be eroded to 
below the cost of production. In effect, the defection of the larger farmers was not in the 
interest of the collective as a whole.  Attempts to halt the defection and protect net benefits 
through modernising the payments systems and acquiring processing facilities were 
thwarted.  
In terms of the latter, Milk Marque had acquired processing capacity at Aeron Valley and 
North Brandon farms, giving an estimated capacity for the manufacture of 15,000 tonnes of 
cheese, with the intention of developing the butter and skimmed milk product sector, 
probably in order to influence the intervention price on butter and skimmed milk through the 
development of state of the art facilities.70 cxi   
 However, this venture was to fail, as dairies/milk processors, who were fearful that they 
might lose control over both milk supply and retail, appealed to the Office of Fair Trading to 
investigate the potential for anticompetitive behaviour.  The OFT investigation took place in 
1996 and the findings were that only if the cooperative were to subdivide into smaller 
business units would forward integration be permitted.cxii 
8.2 The emergence of First Milk 
The core of this case study examines the ability of First Milk to generate leverage through 
relative scarcity through either control of a proportion of the supply of milk or through the 
                                                                
70 The Intervention Milk Price Equivalent is calculated by allowing for processing and manufacturing costs; if these are lower this in effect 
raises the IMPE. The IMPE is a derived milk price, and the milk price it delivers is dependent on a number of variables, including product 
yields, butter and SMP manufacturing costs, and manufacturing profits (MDC, 2000). 
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delivery of added value products. It also examines the development of branded cheddars in 
the context of increasing leverage through the improved motivational investment of retailers. 
First Milk has been unable to act as an effective counterbalance, and the findings suggest 
competitors have successfully encouraged members to defect, which has threatened the 
longevity of the cooperatives, as this has augmented cost of membership for the remaining 
members. 
8.2.1 First Milk and its ability to counteract vertical threats derived from retail 
consolidation increasing scarcity 
Three cooperatives emerged from the dismantling of Milk Marque, which were First Milk 
(Axis), Milk Link and Dairy Farmers of Britain (Zenith), who respectively covered Wales, 
Southern and Northern England. However, by 2002, a series of mergers with other 
cooperatives established in 1994, including the Milk Group and Scottish Milk, resulted in 
three key cooperatives that drew from milk fields across the whole of mainland Britain, all of 
which survived until 2009.cxiii These were Dairy Farmers of Britain, First Milk (Axis) and 
Milk Link, all three of whom, in a strategy of forward integration, invested heavily in all 
three dairy sectors: milk, butter, skimmed milk powder and cheese.  The expectation was 
that through forward integration First Milk would: a. increase scarcity, both through the 
creation of an alternative marketing channel, as well as through its role as a milk balancing 
mechanism during periods of seasonal excess, b. increase their share of economic surplus 
through the elimination of intermediaries, and c. reduce marginal costs through the reduction 
of costs of transportation in locating processing of, in particular, creameries close to the 
more remote milk fields.cxiv 
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While the cooperatives bought facilities close to remote milk fields, they failed to deliver 
benefits to members. This was in part a consequence of the switch by consumers from daily 
doorstep deliveries to biweekly purchases from retailers during the twenty year period 
between 1984 and 2004. This shift in consumer purchasing behaviour had a significant 
impact on the distribution of power within the supply chain.  Were the dairies to have 
remained the predominant distributor of milk to consumers in a market with low levels of 
contestation, the action of forward integration might have effectively increased leverage of 
the cooperative against its principal competitors.  This, is in line with existing research 
findings, suggests that only where there is both control of the aggregate supply and forward 
integration with direct supply to the consumer can cooperatives hope to effectively increase 
benefits to farmers (Cook, 1995; Bijman, 2002).   
The decline in doorstep deliveries took place over a number of years.  In 1984 doorstep sales 
accounted for 89.8% of milk sales;cxv this had fallen to 45% by 1995, and fell further by 
around 50% to 22% by 2000.cxvi. It wasn’t until 2004 that retailers dominated the sector with 
a 90% share of the liquid milk market, of which just less than 50% was bought from the 
largest 4 companies.cxvii This shift towards retail sales brought about a number of challenges 
to dairies in a market where a high proportion of the products were sold under multiple 
retailers' own labels.  
It also triggered a series of exits from the dairy sector. Some players, like Unigate, moved 
into food processing.  For the consolidated sector that remained, the retailer switch to own 
label milk increased costs of supplying milk whilst at the same time increased the cost of 
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switching for suppliers, and eroded the dairies’ proportion of the surplus. Evidence supplied 
by DairyCo, a quasi-government organisation that ostensibly represents the interests of the 
Dairy industry, demonstrates how the share of surplus of processors between 1995 and 2009 
has decreased from 38% to 29% of the milk price, with a more dramatic increase for retailers 
from 3.1% to 34.9%. These changes are summarised in figure 8.1 below.cxviii  
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Figure 8.1 comparisons of retail, wholesale and farm gate prices and margins 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1995 1996 1999 2006 2009 
 ppl  margins % ppl ppl margin ppl % ppl margin ppl% ppl Margin ppl% ppl  margin ppl% 
Farm 
gate price 
24.5  58.2 24.9  56.6 17.8  43.8 18  34.9 23.8  37 
processor 
price 
40.8   40.4   32.7   36   42.7   
processor 
margin  
16.3 40.75% 38.7 15.5 38.4 35.2 14.9 46 36.6 18 50 34.9 18.9 44 29 
retailer  
price 
42.1   44   40.6   51.6   65.1   
retailer 
margin 
2.1 3.1% 3.1 
 
3.6 8.2 8.2 7.9 20 20  15.6 30 31.2 22.7 34.9 34 
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In line with other products, the key retailers consolidated their milk supply base and 
implemented a strategy of nominating category leaders, thereby enhancing their position of 
leverage.cxix This had the effect of concentrating milk supply into the hands of three key 
suppliers: Arla, Wiseman and Dairy Crest, who held 90% of the supply of milk. Whilst it 
might have been expected that single or dual sourcing strategies might reverse the power 
balance in favour of the dairies this has not proved to be so. This is because in order to 
service the needs of the retailer and meet their capacity requirements, dairies have needed to 
invest heavily in state of the art facilities, both to increase their capacity in order to supply 
the heavily concentrated retail sector and as a means of reducing costs of production in order 
to increase their declining margins. cxx   
Between the years 2001-2011, Robert Wiseman invested £1 bn on the development of their 3 
key plants of Bridgewater, Manchester and Droitwich in order to meet the demands of their 
three key customers. cxxi The net result may have weakened their position in relation to their 
customers. They may supply 30% of all retail sales, which amounts to some 1.545bn litres 
per annum, and supply Sainsbury’s and Tesco respectively with 50% and 45% of their 
volume sales, but this has not led to a strong leverage position, and evidence suggests that 
this is because of the costs of the heavy investment into the new state of the art dairies which 
were needed to allow Wiseman the opportunity compete in highly contested horizontal 
markets.cxxii  The establishment of new dairies has enabled Wiseman to reduce processing 
costs of milk by 3p a litrecxxiii but this had little impact on their margins.  Their position 
appears to be weakened further as retailers switch, with apparent ease, between the three key 
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dairy companies. It is notable that Sainsbury, for example, shifted a third of their supply, 
making a 50:50 split between Dairy Crest and Robert Wiseman in 2004.cxxiv   
As a marketing manager in FM commented, “There is a risk, Asda and Tesco can kick one 
out, at the moment prices are going upwards because of under supply, which is different 
than from the previous 5 years but this is because people are trying to get bits of their 
business which is stupid because the buyers will simply exploit this” (First Milk marketing 
manager) 
In the same year, Tesco consolidated its supply base and cut the number of their suppliers 
from 3 to 2.71 Others, such as Asda, moved to single sourcing, supplied through Arla, but are 
not locked into the exchange relationship.  Retailers are in the power position to put pressure 
on wholesale milk prices and this in turn deflates the prices paid to the farming sector.   
In order to reduce their heavy reliance on the dairy companies and gain a share of the 
wholesale price, First Milk and the other two large milk cooperatives have attempted to 
redress the power imbalances and invest into the Dairy processing sector.  The cooperative 
has failed to stem member defection but has continued to pursue a strategy of forward 
integration.  Yet unlike its sibling cooperatives, the First Milk board shunned direct 
investment in a highly contested processing market, but instead invested in existing milk 
processing companies over a number of years.cxxv Beginning with the merger of Axis with 
Scottish Milk in 2001 to form First Milk72,cxxvi  it acquired shares in Robert Wiseman and 
has made more recent investments in joint ventures with Milk Link and Arla at Westbury 
Dairies.  
                                                                
71 Arla and Robert Wiseman 
72 One of the cooperatives which emerged from a Scottish MMB 
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The merger with Scottish Milk strengthened the position of First Milk in that it increased its 
share of UK milk supply to 18%, with potential sales of at least 2.2 billion litres from 4500 
members. It also opened an avenue into established interests in liquid milk dairies, and 
cheese, butter and ingredients processing.  Scottish Milk operated a wholly owned dairy 
which produced 30 million litres of Scottish milk, UHT milk and butter, and had an 80% 
interest in McClelland and Son who ran the Scottish Pride cheese production. Scottish Pride 
had been formerly owned by the Scottish Milk Marketing Board but had become Scottish 
Pride PLC following deregulation. However, the firm ran into financial difficulties in 1997, 
and the production of cheese and butter once more came into the hands of Scottish Milk.cxxvii  
The merger of Axis with Scottish Milk, to become First Milk, did not, however, offer the 
cooperative any share of the higher value liquid pasteurised milk processing, although it 
provided a means of reducing the milk excess. The limited processing capacity of circa 200 
million litres per annum and lack of state of the art processing facilities meant that they had 
no influence over butter and skimmed milk powder intervention prices.cxxviii  None the less 
the merger did facilitate their market entry at a more prominent level. One farmer in 
Whitland said of the merger: 
 “I was very enthusiastic because we were struggling really as a small cooperative within a 
very large pool. They brought proper experience in terms of managing these processing 
units – I am quite keen to see our milk being processed by our organisation, a cooperative, 
simply marketing the milk was never top of my priority list” 
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The decision to acquire a 15% share of Robert Wiseman, by First Milk in 2004, was a 
further attempt at forward integration without the extensive investment required from a new 
start up. In acquiring shares in Robert Wiseman and a place on the board, the directors 
perceived that net benefits would rise in line with such factors as reduced costs of 
negotiation, and greater control over the prices paid to farmers by the dairy as well as on the 
ability to pass on to farmers a proportion of the share of processing returns earned through 
their investment. 
However, whilst this manoeuvre substantially reduced initial investment, First Milk failed to 
recognise that benefits to be attained had been seriously eroded by the consolidation of, and 
contestation in, the retail sector. As a key supplier of liquid milk to Sainsbury's, Tesco and 
the Coop, it was envisaged that investment in Wiseman would provide them with sufficient 
leverage to increase net benefits paid to members, and although the value of their investment 
in Wiseman substantially increased during the first 7 year term, it is apparent that First Milk 
has from the start been unable to translate these gains into farm gate prices. 
It can be seen that despite supplying 15-20% (some 340 million litres per annum)cxxix of their 
total supply of liquid milk to Robert Wiseman, a figure that represents a 22% share of the 
Wiseman milk supply and thus 7.5% of the total cxxxsupply of UK liquid milk, the farm gate 
price of 24 p per litre for members supplying the Tesco contract was 3.77p lower than the 
price offered under the Dairy Crest Sainsbury’s contract for direct supply.cxxxi,cxxxii Though 
24p per litre represents a higher price than the 17.15p per litre received by many First Milk 
farmers, members consistently receive farm gate prices within the bottom quartile of the 
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price league, a factor linked to the high cost of investment of forward integration on their 
entry into the milk and other dairy units. In comparison with farmers supplying direct to 
Wiseman, on average, First Milk farmers receive some 3-5p less per litre.cxxxiii   
That current prices offered by Wiseman are some of the lowest of the sector would appear to 
be a function of retailer price wars and its dependence upon the retailers. This can be shown 
in particular by events in August 2008, when despite a steady increase in prices since the 
unprecedented low price of 17.15 p litre in 2007,cxxxiv  Robert Wiseman was forced by Tesco 
to introduce a new stock keeping unit, that of Fresh and Low, which was sold by retailers for 
just £1.06.cxxxv Although claims were made at the time that this deal had not in effect 
undermined the farm gate price, the price for both farmers supplying direct to Wiseman and 
those who used the intermediary services of First Milk fell by 10% to 21.4p per litre for First 
Milk members, and became one of the lowest paid in the country.cxxxvi 
It would appear that despite investment in the liquid milk processing sector, the cooperative 
has consistently found itself unable to aggregate supply in conditions of highly contested 
retail and dairy sectors with few alternative buyers. It is apparent that its inability to perform 
on price against companies who are in effect competitors, such as Robert Wiseman, Dairy 
Crest and Saputo in Wales, is a function of their investment strategy.cxxxvii  Members, in 
particular larger farmers, unlike those who supply direct, are required to bear a proportion of 
the burden of the costs of investment.cxxxviii  This was expressed in the following terms by a 
larger Pembrokeshire Farmer. 
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“The capital contribution we are having to make to buy our processing has taken 1.5 -0.5 
pence a litre from us and they say enough is enough. The price that we are contributing to 
sort of get into the market, it is now that we really should be seeing payback time. This, the 
capital we have being putting in, the fact that we have stuck with them, it should be now 
moving up in the price range, we should be moving up well.”  
Many farmers expressed dissatisfaction with the level to which they were expected to invest 
in the First Milk business. A farmer who farms 320 acres with 155 cows in Scotland said 
“(burden of cost of investment) it was as high as 1p per litre, it is currently at 0.5p per litre, 
but it was as high as 1p per litre which would be over 2 years ago.”  
In effect, they experience higher marginal costs, as a function of collective action, than those 
who supply alternatives. This is the result not only of investment by First Milk in the dairy 
sector, but also of high levels of investment within cheese production. 
The cooperative has latterly invested heavily in cheese production and in particular in 
branded cheese production. This initiative was undertaken to, on the one hand, improve 
leverage by removing excess milk at periods of surplus and mitigating the fall in milk prices 
and, on the other, improve leverage over the longer term increase in motivational interest of 
the retailer as the regionally branded cheeses become more established in the eyes of the 
consumer. The investment in production facilities in close proximity to the remoter milk 
fields was thought to have the additional benefit of reducing the cost of collection, which 
would further enhance the farm gate price.cxxxix The same Scottish farmer suggests this when 
talking about the investment in processing: “First Milk has always sold it as a basis to 
increase the milk price. In reality it was to stop the milk price dropping any further, if that 
makes sense --with the cost of Haulage” 
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The net effect though was to reduce perceived net benefits, as members unilaterally 
shouldered the costs of investment. Other initiatives to reduce transport costs included a joint 
venture with Dairy Farmers of Britain which was designed to save over £8 million a year in 
haulage. This was in addition to the procedures of milk swaps; agreements between 
cooperatives to collect the milk from farmers outside the group as though it was under the 
collector’s contract.cxl  
Current restrictions on access to funds experienced by traditional cooperatives, for whom 
external funds are restricted to short term bank loans, has resulted not only in a position of 
high financial leverage but is also accountable for the lower than average farm gate price 
received by members, who are required to forfeit 1p per litre as security against the loan. For 
farms operating at lower yields or located in more remote areas, First Milk offers the best 
option.cxli However, for larger more centrally located farms, and indeed younger farmers, 
such forfeits generate a considerable perceived loss of income.cxlii 
Finally, the position of the cooperative is made more difficult in that they have shouldered, 
as had the MMB’s and Milk Marque before them, the cost of reducing the cost of 
procurement of both materials and skills for First Milk members.73 Yet the cause of the 
problem in terms of the value generated from such investments cannot be attributed to these 
factors alone. Rather, in market structures where the buyers’ market is not highly 
                                                                
73 In order to promote best practices First Milk established First Direct, which offers members preferential rates through collective 
acquisition, and the Academy, which is the educational or knowledge transfer unit.  
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concentrated and contested and where milk is not used as a loss leader, these measures could 
prove successful and improve the benefits delivered to members. 
8.2.2 First Milk and its value as a counterbalance to vertical competition, increasing 
motivational interest 
It might be anticipated that, if the cooperative could successfully either increase the 
motivational interest of buyers or even reduce marginal costs, benefits to members would 
improve. Investment in the creameries was certainly in line with the “adding  value” domain 
of government policy, in which brands were linked products to place as in Haverfordwest 
Cheese Company, the Lake District and Isle of Bute Creameries, but these endeavours have 
required considerable levels of investment and the cooperative is faced with heavy 
competition from others within the  market place.  
Some  50- 60% of cheese and 50% of butter is imported into the UK both from EU and from 
other long term trade partners such as Australia and New Zealand, with 81% of cheddar 
cheese imports arriving from Eire.cxliii  
The investment into the cheese sector took place over a number of years. This was 
substantiated by one farmer who claimed a key part in the negotiations:“We looked at ways 
of getting scale size, Axis bought the plant that has now closed down at Lampeter and Aeron 
valley. It was on the purchase of Aeron Valley from Milk Marque,  I knew we couldn’t make 
any money out of it in the short term,  but over the longer term !!…” 
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These acquisitions resulted in the attainment of both an 80% share in the McClelland 
businesses in Stranraer and Rothesay and a significant share of the retail own label 
market.cxliv By 2008, First Milk had increased their market share to 33% of the cheese 
market. cxlv However, despite the merger, First Milk had still little knowledge of head to head 
negotiation with retailers and McClelland continued to take this primary role.  
First Milk directors were concerned about their lack of negotiating skills and resources and 
the acquisition of 20% of Dairy Crest in Haverfordwest was made also with the view to 
redress this deficit. First Milk formed a subsidiary company: Haverfordwest Cheese Limited, 
and there followed a distinct shift in strategy from simply the acquisition of interests towards 
sole control.  
 In 2004, there had been an unsuccessful attempt to exclude Lactalis, the major French Dairy 
company, from acquiring 20% of the Scottish cheese processing business from McClelland. 
This failure was at least in part can be attributed to the delays in decision-making and 
problems of attaining investment funds peculiar to the governance and capital structures of 
the cooperative.  In contrast, they retained their 20% share of the Dairy Crest business when 
later on Dairy Farmers of Britain attempted to oust First Milk from their position in the 
Dairy Crest Creamery at Haverfordwest. However, in order to safeguard their position in the 
Haverfordwest Creamery against further threat of sale they bought out the majority share of 
the cheese company for the sum of £62 m in October 2006cxlvi.  This acquisition secured both 
the Haverfordwest Creamery and another creamery, that of Aspratria in Cumbria, both of 
which are located in remote milk fields.  It is worth noting that the highly dynamic nature of 
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the market at that point in time was a function of the increased contestation within the sector 
as retailers placed increased pressure on prices. The sale of creameries by Dairy Crest was an 
attempt to increase x-efficiencies in light of the increased penetration into the UK market of 
Irish cheddar from Irish demutualised cooperatives such as Kerry, amongst others.  
In order to set up creameries and match the competitors’ operational efficiencies, the 
cooperatives were required to find a considerable amount of capital.  Between 2004 and 
2008 investment had reached some £5.6 million, which was funded by both the Welsh 
assembly and bank loans of which some £2.6 million was invested in new cheese vats and 
buildings, with a further £3 m investment into whey processing equipmentcxlvii.   
Subsequently, there was a joint venture in Westbury Dairies that was made in conjunction 
with Milk Link and Arla,74 established as a means of balancing the supply of milk by 
producing powder and butter. 
In many respects, this investment strategy seems to have been potentially more problematic 
than the liquid milk sector. Returns from collective investment and thus net benefits for 
farmers were considerably lower than for the liquid milk sector, particularly where, as in the 
cheddar sector, the retailer own labels dominated the market.75cxlviii  
                                                                
74 This was originally a joint venture between the three sibling cooperatives until the demise of Dairy Farmers of Britain 
75 With Cheddar Cheese , retailer own brands hold 60% of the market in 2008 
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As can be seen in table 8.2, there has been a persistent decline since the AOA in both gross 
margins and share of retail price.76  Since 1994, margins have been eroded by the removal of 
intervention prices and the more readily available and increasing number of substitutes both 
from traditional sources such as Eire, New Zealand and Australia, and from mainland 
European competitors such as Lactalis and Arla. At times farm gate prices and wholesale 
prices for cheese milk rose as a result of rising world dairy commodity prices. This happened 
in 2007cxlix  and again in the first half of 2010, but is not anticipated that this will be a longer 
term trend, not least because of both the high level of investment in processing plants and the 
period of time it takes to produce cheese.77 It takes at least 2 years to produce mature 
cheddar.  
In poaching First Milk farmers, dairy companies such as Arla and Lactalis have left First 
Milk with a high proportion of members located in remoter areas, from whom the costs of 
collection are higher than average. In the effort to reduce transport cost the cooperative has 
been forced to invest in creameries located near the milk fields. 
 The need to reduce transport costs has resulted in the introduction of milk swaps and joint 
transport ventures with Dairy Farmers of Britain, which took place in 2003, and these 
measures have resulted in savings of between £5-8 Million a year.cl  Nonetheless, these 
measures have failed to stem the increasing costs of collection, which are rising in line with 
fuel costs.  
                                                                
76 These are calculated on the basis of cost of purchase minus the costs of sales, and therefore do take account of the fact that 10 litres of 
milk will generate 1 kilo of cheese but do not take account of processing costs.  
77 since it takes 10 litres of milk to produce 1 kilo of cheese that must then mature for 12 months to 3 years. 
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In the effort to further cut costs of transportation,  First Milk were encouraged to offer price 
incentives to  First Milk farmers to switch from liquid milk to compositional milk 
contracts.78 This strategy was particularly important in areas remote from centres of 
population.  
The switch to compositional milk contracts brought a potential for higher payments per litre, 
but has implications for farmers in terms of the cost of production where higher protein 
content is required for cheese production. One farmer, despite difficulties in achieving 
requisite protein levels in compositional supply due to land fertility and the cost of feed 
compound, has none the less found that compositional delivers a safer return because of the 
more stringent criteria for cell counts and biocounts79 for liquid milk. As he says: 
“And just recently we were offered the choice as to whether we wanted to stay on 
compositional contract or opt for liquid milk contract- the price difference is marginal. We 
are just over protein level 3.3. 3.32 so it is definitely  border line in terms of their contracts – 
we have been offered the choice and we chose to stay on the compositional and the reason in 
that is because the hygiene requirements are higher on liquid milk” ( Whitland farmer) 
As a means of improving their leverage position against the retail sector, First Milk has 
sought to develop more branded products. This would appear to have improved their 
position, in that there is a price differential of around £2000 a tonne, as where retailer own 
brand generates £1000 per tonne, the price per tonne for branded can be in the region of 
£3000cli.  First Milk launched 3 regional cheeses produced entirely from milk from the 
region under which they are labelled. The brands are denoted as Lakeland (Aspratria 
                                                                
78 This is milk with a higher protein level than liquid milk, a requisite for cheese production 
79 Measures of hygiene and animal health 
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creamery) Pembrokeshire (Haverfordwest) and Isle of Bute and the cooperative has also 
introduced a line of organic cheeses, again regionally identified.clii  
In part, this has proved successful. The regional range is now supplied to Tesco, Asda and 
Morrison’s. In 2007, First Milk held a 20-33% share of the UK cheddar market, largely 
because they inherited the key customers from Dairy Crest; they supplied all Asda's own 
brand cheddar. In the first instance, this offered the cooperative a certain degree of leverage, 
but ease of switching by retailers due to the ready substitutability of even branded cheddar 
means that any period over which they are able to increase prices has been short lived. 
This was apparent from the price drop they experienced when they attempted to renegotiate 
their 2007 price with Asda. In 2007, First Milk had control of Asda's own brand cheddar 
cheese and extended their offering to include their own regional cheeses, the combination of 
which offered them the opportunity to instigate a £400 price hike per tonne. A year later, in 
July 2008, the price received per tonne rose by a further £300.cliii  
However, on the renegotiation of the contract in January 2009, 8000 tonnes of Asda branded 
smart price mild cheddars were switched to their major competitor Lactalis.cliv First Milk 
remains a major supplier of cheese and continues to supply their regional cheeses to Asda 
and Morrison’s, but has now reverted to its previous leverage position. 
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As a result First Milk prices for compositional milk are lower than those of its major 
competitorsclv. This can be predominantly attributed to two key factors:80 the lack of real 
differentiation between branded cheddars, and the high costs of investment in the facilities.  
It is apparent that branded products offer little perceived product differentiation. As a 
manufactured product rather than handmade cheddar, the branded cheese, remains easily 
substitutable and is unlikely in the future to increase the motivational interest of its buyers. 
Even though the brands have been given a clear regional identity, and retailers including 
Asda have ostensibly supported the local food agenda, in reality these local cheeses are made 
under factory conditions and are easily substituted in the minds of the consumer with   
brands such as Seriously Strong Cheddar (Lactalis) and Pilgrims Choice (Dairy Crest).  
Alternatively, with some 243 million litres of milk to put into cheese production, any attempt 
to enter the niche market of handmade cheeses might prove to be problematic. 
                                                                
80 Notwithstanding the earlier points made regarding the higher marginal costs of coalition given the role of the cooperative as balancing 
agents and costs to the cooperative such as seasonal adjustment payments, etc. And the additional costs of knowledge transfer and member 
support. 
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Figure 8.2 comparison of retail, wholesale and farm gate prices and margins for standard mild cheddar  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1995 1996 1999 2006 2009 
 ppl  margin % 
ppl 
ppl margi
n 
ppl 
% 
Ppl margin ppl% ppl Margin ppl% ppl  margin ppl% 
Farm 
gate price 
24.5  69 22.0  59 25.8  47.2 18  48 23.8  42.9 
processor 
price 
27.9   25   29.0   20.9   27   
processor 
margin  
3.4 12.2% 9.5 3.0 12% 8 3.2 11% 5.9 2.9 14% 7.75 3.2 12% 5.7 
retailer  
price 
35.5   37.1   54.7   37.4   55.4   
retailer 
margin 
7.9 22.25
% 
22.25 12.1 33% 33% 25.7 47% 47 16.5 44% 44 28 51% 51 
210 
 
8.2.3 Longevity and cohesion-the costs of coalition  
First Milk, as previously indicated, faces problems of the cost of coalition.  Classically, the 
traditional cooperative faces all the problems of financial gearing associated with 
governance structures.  First Milk has established new creameries on the Isle of Bute and at 
Haverfordwest; they have had the classic difficulties in raising capital. This is because they 
have not as yet established B shares or other forms of external funding and are reliant on 
bank loans, for which they have raised the collateral from the retention of a proportion of the 
milk price. Many farmers have criticised this strategy and hold that the retention of money 
for collateral reduces the net benefit, to invest in businesses which are of little value. 
“So I didn’t feel that we were part of it, they were taking money off us and giving us totally 
worthless share options” ......... (Thomas) 
 As noted earlier, members receive on average 2p a litre less than their counterparts who 
supply direct to Wiseman. During the period of acquisition of Wisemans, this differential 
could be partially accounted for by the requirement of members to contribute 1.5p of their 
farm gate price for a period of 5 years, in order to raise collateral of around £28 million.cxi   
As the result of Welsh Assembly funding there has been notably lower requirement from 
members for the acquisition of Dairy Crest, and the new cheese brands and money retained 
by the cooperative from milk cheques at the time of the research amounted to 1p per litre.cxii  
Prices do remain relatively low, however, in comparison to competitors; and as a 
consequence members perceive that there is an unfair burden of costs, particularly if they 
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produce milk for the liquid market. This differentiation between compositional milk and 
liquid milk appears to have materialised at the same time as the shift from rail transportation 
of milk to carriage by road and the move towards “every other day” collection.  
The reasons for differentiation are related to the protein content needed for cheese 
production. While cows’ milk tends towards a protein level of around 3 grams per litre, this 
deteriorates over quite short periods of time, despite refrigeration. This means higher initial 
average levels of protein need to be present in the milk in order to have the minimal milk 
protein levels for the cheese market. This is particularly so where there can be a delay of 3-4 
days between milk production and its delivery to the cheese factory. In order to achieve 
higher protein levels farmers often need to seek specialised feed compositions and thereby 
incur higher on-farm costs, the extent of which vary according to the soil and geology and 
topographical structure of their land.  
As previously stated, with the higher proportion of remoter farms, the cooperative needs to 
diversify into cheese production in order to reduce the costs of transporting milk, but the act 
of diversifying into an added value activity that adds no real value increased both the costs to 
those farmers on compositional contracts and the perception of uneven and unfair burden of 
costs between members. The contractual terms given to farmers make them acutely aware of 
the destination of their milk, and means that farmers resent a reduction in milk price where 
the investment it serves is not to their direct benefit.  
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Where members are able, they are leaving the cooperative. Dairy companies continue to 
poach farmers through higher milk prices. It thus can be said that the differentiation of milk 
coupled with high transport costs increases the problem of member defection, and this 
further undermines the financial security of the cooperative, with the net result of further 
member defection. Eric Evans, a young although a relatively small farmer, for example, was 
approached by Dansco:“I left Milk Marque/First Milk in April 1999, because one of the 
instigations was the seasonal adjustments to price, the seasonal adjustments were a killer, 
and once I left First Milk I was £14 000 better off. They were offering 0% interest free loan 
for up to 75% of the milk cheque, it helped me pay for the bore hole, and Dansco paid the 
fine to leave First Milk”  
Liquid milk farmers have been continuously incentivised to leave the cooperatives. Farmers 
located close to and supplying Wisemans, for instance, find that they receive between 2p and 
6p more per litre than First Milk farmers who supply the same dairy.  Poaching not only 
affects the liquid milk farming business and now there is an increasing trend by the 
creameries to poach farmers who supply compositional milk. Prices have declined 
accordingly for remaining members. Lactalis, joint owners with First Milk of McClelland 
cheese, are offering Scottish farmers an average of 1p more than the First Milk at the time of 
writing, and, as serious competitors for the cheese processing sector, with key brands such as 
the President brand and Seriously Strong Cheddar, this action not only undermines their 
position with regard to costs of production and financial leverage, but also their ability to 
sustain their core business with the major retailers.cxiii 
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With a bank loan of £80 million, high financial leverage contributed considerably to the 
financial loss of almost £10 million suffered by First Milk in 2009/10.  Their financial 
position was also threatened by the demise of Dairy Farmers of Britain, with the loss of both 
their milk swap and haulage arrangements increasing their operating costs.55   
Unlike their sister cooperative Dairy Farmers of Britain they continued to trade, despite the 
net loss of over 100 members56. As a means of stemming member exits and increasing the 
price paid to farmers, First Milk sold 5.7% (4,170171 shares) of their stake in Robert 
Wiseman  for a sum of  £18,765,769cxiv.  With further savings made on haulage, salaries and 
administration, by March 2010, the company again traded at a profit (£360,000) and reduced 
its borrowing by over £10 million. This was despite the loss of total turnover by some 8% on 
loss of their Tesco retail own branded cheese contract to Kerry.cxv  
8.2.4 The distribution of costs between members and the non-excludability of benefits  
It may still be argued, however, that the future sustainability of First Milk is in question. 
Because of  the continued investment by competitors within the sector, while they fight to 
maintain the limited numbers of buyers available, it is problematic whether their efforts can 
effectively generate sufficient net benefits to accommodate all but the less efficient, more 
remote, albeit more loyal farmers.  
                                                                
55 Operating costs are subtracted from the price per litre paid by the buyers, prior to the determination of milk price for members and    
therefore are not recognised by members. 
56 The net loss hides a much greater movement of members, with the failure of Dairy Farmers of Britain in November 2009; First Milk 
acquired many of their members, so that the loss in terms of the total membership, of 100, undoubtedly represents a much larger 
movement. 
214 
 
Nevertheless, it is apparent that they serve a useful function within the Dairy sector. It has 
been recognised for some time that the pressure of cooperatives within the dairy sector 
increases prices for the sector as a whole. There is substantive evidence that in the absence 
of cooperative activity farmers are more prone to post contractual hazards.  Furthermore, 
First Milk actions in 2007 and 2008, with regard to the price per litre for compositional milk 
have resulted in a critical price hike across the sector. Where in 2007 they raised their 
average price per litre by 0.45 ppl, these hikes had a similar impact on prices paid by their 
major competitors.cxvi Dairy Crest raised prices by 2p amount over the same period.  
But it does not appear to be a position in which they can be complacent.  Subsequent events 
would suggest that their presence in the market can have a negative as well as a positive 
impact on British Milk prices. In January 2009, prices were cut by First Milk by 1.25p per 
litre, which was held to be a consequence of the fall in the price of milk across Europe.cxvii 
Subsequent drops in price were announced by Arla of 2ppl, Dairy Crest of 1.75p per litre and 
Wisemans of 2.2ppl.cxviii In this instance it is claimed that these were the effects of the 
reduction of world prices on the prices of European Milk, but it highlights how a drop in 
milk price by First Milk is swiftly copied by non-cooperative firms. This pattern, where non-
cooperative firms replicate the price drops of First Milk, has been repeated over time, with 
similar events taking place in April 2010cxix, and while it might be assumed that the pressure 
to drop prices is of equal intensity upon all parties, it is apparent that non-cooperative firms 
allow First Milk to take the lead. 
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 If these patterns are considered in the light of the cost of coalition, it is apparent that with 
high dedicated investments, loss of membership and a greater burden of costs on remaining 
members, there is considerable danger of a negative yardstick effect.  Over the longer term, 
as the cost of coalition increases due to the rise in transportation costs and the decline of the 
sector as a whole, with consequent low returns to farmers and a declining number of 
processing plants, it is doubtful whether the cooperative can continue to survive.  
 8.3 Lessons learnt 
The examination of cooperative action within the dairy sector suggests that here again the 
cooperative has failed to deliver benefits to its members. The exploratory framework held 
that cooperatives are unlikely to survive where benefits are not created, either through 
increasing either scarcity or utility, and where cooperatives are not cohesive.  This case study 
suggests that while at the present time the cooperative survives, it fails to deliver increased 
margins and farm gate prices. This is despite proactive forward investment in the high value 
of liquid milk and in the cheese processing sector.  
8.3.1 Creation of leverage through absolute/relative scarcity and/or motivational 
interest. 
These findings suggest that unless cooperatives generate benefits through either scarcity or 
increased motivational interest of buyers they are unlikely to succeed over the longer term.  
While the Milk Marketing Board was able to successfully create absolute scarcity and thus 
fix prices, prior to the Uruguay round of Agricultural Agreements, First Milk has been 
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unable to replicate this position.  This is because of the highly competitive final product 
market.  This case offers an insight into an interesting limitation of the conceptual 
framework and places a question mark over the ability of cooperatives to create absolute 
scarcity in heavily contested market places. First Milk, following in the footsteps of Milk 
Marque, introduced measures to forward integrate and these again have not yielded the 
benefits anticipated.  It is apparent that they are not unique, in that the other two sibling 
cooperatives, Milk Link and Dairy Farmers of Britain, have experienced similar difficulties, 
which is clearly a function of the emergence of multiple retailers and the transformation in 
the distribution of power between the dairies and retailers following the decline in share of 
the liquid milk of doorstep deliveries.  
8.3.2 The longevity and cohesion of the cooperative  
The case study shows that the longevity of the coalition is reduced as the perceived costs 
rise, which according to the exploratory framework would suggest that the cooperative may 
be unstable.  In this case study high marginal costs in the form of dedicated investments have 
materialised as a consequence of the need to address the inability of the cooperative to 
deliver benefits to farmers. Indeed, there are parallels to the position of Milk Marque: prior 
to their actions that led to the OFT report. In both instances members have experienced cost 
increases as a result of allocative and x-inefficiencies because of dedicated investments.  
This is a consequence of the need for investment across dairy sectors, in particular the 
investment costs in cheese processing. These are high because the majority of members are 
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located in areas which are remote to centres of population and the liquid dairies. The heavy 
costs of transportation make this option the most desirable, despite the proliferation of 
cheddar cheese producers worldwide and the ability of retailers to easily switch suppliers. In 
the second instance, the poaching of more accessible farmers by competitors has resulted in 
x-inefficiencies which have increased in line with the marginal cost of collecting.  In effect, 
these events suggest that people are behaving with calculative rationality, switching buyers 
where perceived costs exceed benefits. 
8.3.3 Problems of non- excludability 
This case study shows that as a consequence of the heterogeneity of interests of members the 
cohesion of the cooperative has been threatened by the predatory behaviour of alternative 
milk buyers. This was made possible because of the perception by certain farmers that they 
were bearing a disproportionate share of costs. Farmers selected by the dairies for direct 
supply are/were enticed through higher farm gate prices, the costs of which were offset 
against lower collection costs. Over the longer term, the uneven burden borne by First Milk 
as a consequence of the actions of the Dairy companies has resulted in the reduction of the 
price paid to First Milk members. Price reductions experienced by First Milk members have 
swiftly led to a price cut for farmers supplying non-cooperative alternative buyers. However, 
it is also apparent that without the presence of the cooperative, prices for dairy farmers might 
be even lower. If the conditions faced by farmers prior to the establishment of the Milk 
Marketing Boards in a less consolidated market is any indicator, the high perishability and 
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continuous harvesting of liquid milk makes dairy farmers particularly vulnerable to moral 
hazard. 
8.4 Conclusion 
As in the previous case study, this case study suggests that the continued presence of the 
cooperative is not necessarily a function of its ability to generate improved farm gate prices 
or margins. However, in this case its continued existence appears under greater threat. 
This case study was selected with a view that a large cooperative might prove to be an 
effective balancing mechanism through the creation of relative scarcity. Contrary to 
expectations, First Milk was able neither to improve leverage through controlling the milk 
supply nor to differentiate its product. This suggests that in highly contested markets where 
retailers are able easily to switch suppliers and where the product holds little operational and 
commercial importance to the retailer, a cooperative firm is   unable to lever greater value. 
The findings also suggest, as anticipated, that as a large multiproduct cooperative, the 
cooperative did experience a loss of cohesion and member defection. This was, however, 
largely a consequence of the predatory behaviour of competitors.  
In this case, the defection of members has brought about higher marginal costs for the 
remaining members as x-inefficiencies have increased. This increase in marginal costs for 
members has led to costs being in excess of benefits received. With few alternative buyers 
for these members the cooperative continues to survive.  
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 Attempts to address this problem have led to high investment in cheese processing, within 
three key remote member locations. This has further increased the marginal costs of the 
cooperative for its members, besides presenting the cooperative as a firm with significant 
levels of financial gearing.  Ironically, if one looks at the failure of Dairy Farmers of Britain, 
the sister company of First Milk, it was the excessive financial leverage rather than the loss 
of benefits that caused their failure.  
  
220 
 
CHAPTER 9 
CASE STUDY 3 – YORKSHIRE FARMERS 
LIVESTOCK MARKETING LTD 
9.0 Introduction 
The focus of this next case study is Yorkshire Farmers Livestock Marketing Ltd, one of 
around 5 cooperatives in the UK who operate in the Pork sector.  Established in 1932 as a 
bargaining association, it acquired bacon production facilities in 1934. As in the examination 
of both the topfruit cooperative SGT in chapter 7, and First Milk in chapter 8, this case is 
used to explore the value of the cooperative as a mechanism to improve the profitability of 
pig farmers in a marketing channel where the majority of sales are to the highly concentrated 
retail sector.   
In recent years there has been a notable decline in the number of UK pig farmers and despite 
the increased consumer demand for pork it is evident that prices paid to all parties 
throughout the UK pork supply chain have fallen.57 This trend may be attributed to the 
increased leverage of multiple retailers and the pressures they have placed on abattoirs to cut 
prices. As a consequence, abattoirs have sought to substitute the UK supply for lower cost 
EU pork. Yorkshire Farmers Livestock Marketing Ltd still supplies Vion and Tulip in the 
                                                                
57 These are demonstrated as oscillations in farm gate prices which are a result of the lag between price signals to farmers and the time 
when the product becomes available to market. 
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UK but the volume supplied is but a small proportion of the business of the two largest UK 
players in the abattoir and meat processing sector.  
None the less, the cooperative has an influence over the weekly pig prices. Weekly 
fluctuations in numbers of marketable pigs, a notable characteristic of the pig industry, mean 
that in any one week abattoirs risk a shortfall in supply from contracted farmers.  YFLM has 
the capacity to redress any shortfall and is therefore is able to negotiate above normal prices 
for members.  In addition, YFLM members largely find that the costs incurred to operate the 
cooperative are lower than alternatives. This is despite considerable investment in additional 
revenue generating activities. Findings suggest that members perceive that the cost of 
coalition is low because of the range of services offered to members, tailored to individual 
member needs. Marketers at YFLM attain an in-depth knowledge of the pig farmer’s 
business, his stock and production methods and are able to offer both a sales and advice 
service that best fits their needs. The value of YFLM to farmers is in its ability to 
significantly reduce on-farm costs and risks, including the costs of monitoring the market, 
short-term contracts, indemnity against non-payment, and the advisory service on herd 
health. Nevertheless, members are still at risk, as a consequence of the pressure on prices by 
downstream parties, as the price they receive per kilo of pork is often lower than their on-
farm operating costs. 
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9.1. The historical background to the pork supply chains, collective action within 
the UK, and underlying EU influences on the competitiveness of the sector  
This case study examines the success of Yorkshire Farmers Livestock Marketing Ltd, a 
small to medium sized pig cooperative that was originally established as a cooperative in 
1932. cxx  The cooperative was set up to maintain prices, to reduce the price oscillations 
peculiar to pig production58 and to protect the sector against the increase of cheaper 
importscxxi. 
9.1.1 The historical structure and characteristics of the pig sector 
The pig meat supply chain consists of producers, pig marketers who supply either auction 
houses, agents,  abattoirs, or vertically integrated abattoirs, processors, and specialist 
manufacturers who sell directly to the retailer/caterer. Carcasses are broken down into prime 
cuts, like steaks, which are sold predominantly to retailers, and cheaper cuts, usually sold to 
food manufacturers or exported. Farmers will, depending on the nature of their farm, select 
to produce either light weight pork pigs that will be ready for market in 4 months or heavy 
pigs, bacon pigs, which may take around 30 days more to reach the market weight of up to 
95 kilos dead weight. Mature sows can produce 2-3 litters a year, and may produce up to 
around 12 piglets every 140 days. However, it takes 12-15 months for a gilt, a young female 
pig, to reach maturity. It is this biological lifecycle that is generally seen to be at the root of 
the price oscillations; the “cobweb effect”, within this sector.  It describes an effect during 
                                                                
58 This is known as the cobweb effect. 
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which there are two years of rising prices, followed by two years of decline. cxxii The cycle is 
generally attributed to the biological processes and the lag between the farmer’s decision to 
change production and the point where the commodity is available for consumption. The 
explanation of this cycle is that investment in pig stock and production will take place when 
prices are high, which inflates production over a two year period. Once production exceeds 
demand, then there follows two years of declining prices and farmers exit the market. As pig 
stock levels decline, prices will recover to their original position. These self-perpetuating 
cycles of pig prices were for a long time seen to be both the cause and the consequence of 
the inefficiencies and non-competitiveness of the British pig industry. Other factors, such as 
farm practices 59 and husbandry systems,60 genetics and feeding systems,61 were considered 
to be uncompetitive and it was in this context that the UK government  made steps towards 
the redevelopment of the sector and YFLM was formed.   
It was evident as early as 1932 that more efficient methods of production in mainland 
Europe were undercutting the prices, at which stage the British government brought in 
legislation, British Agricultural Policy 267, to redress this problemcxxiii. This led, in 1933, 
to the inauguration of a marketing scheme for bacon pigs that was designed to promote UK 
production of bacon. At the time UK fresh pork producers were already protected by a 
sanitary embargo on imports.cxxiv  
                                                                
59 Types of pig farms. Pig farms can be classified into three broad types which can be subdivided into those farms that solely produce 
weaners, those farmers who finish pigs and those who undertake the whole process,  
a. Outdoor breeding selling, 
b. Indoor breeding selling  
c. Mixed indoor and outdoor breeding:  
60 These are distinguishable according to  housing, i.e. housed indoors on slats, housed indoors on straw , between which there is a variation 
in terms of both the cost of the straw and the time taken in cleaning out the areas, and outdoor reared pigs, which are slower growing and 
require more feed to reach required weights 
61 There are two key feeding methods, which have different cost implications. Wet systems have higher set up costs but savings are made 
on the cost of feed, while dry feed systems are a mixture of cereals, proteins, vitamins and molasses, which have minimal set up costs but 
cost more to procure. 
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Figure 9.1.:  Simple supply chain for Pork  
 
In the 1930s the pig sector was highly fragmented in all stages of the marketing channel 
from farm to plate.  Meat was predominantly purchased by the consumer from butchers, who 
sourced from and often owned the local abattoir.62 Pork was largely purchased at livestock 
auctions, although it should be noted that around 12% was contracted either through agents 
or direct from farmers.  Livestock that was not sold locally was predominantly transported 
by rail.cxxv One of the key objectives of the 1933 policy was to establish quota restrictions by 
the development of a system of contracts between pig producers and curers. In these 
contracts curers were required to pay a fixed price in order to give a “small profit to 
producers over the actual cost of production”cxxvi and it was in this context that YFLM were 
formed. 
Some consolidation had taken place in the butchery sector prior to the establishment of 
YFLM. Notable names like Dewhurst, Vestey, Matthew Meats were established in the early 
                                                                
62 A practice that continued until the 2nd world war, when the ministry of war took over the management of stocks and supply 
Farm Auction 
 
Processing  
Abattoir 
 
Retail 
Agents  
225 
 
1900s. Even so, these larger butchers were but a small fraction of the total number of 
butchers and there were probably over 150 000 separate business entities within the UK at 
that time.63   The supply chain during these years had a further advantage over current 
markets in that all parts of the pig had an economic value and included not only choice cuts 
such as pork loin but also pig’s trotters and chaps and other such delicacies. Current 
difficulties in generating economic benefit, particularly within the UK, have been associated 
with “carcass balance”, a term used to denote the proportion of usable cuts.  
By 1934, the members, who had initially benefited from collective bargaining power and the 
influence of YFLM over the fixed price, had gained a further advantage by the acquisition of 
a processing plant for the production of bacon. In addition, the cooperative had the option of 
supplying lightweight pigs direct to the relatively fragmented butchery sector.cxxvii  While 
documental evidence is limited on the number of the pig cooperatives at the time, it is 
possible that YFLM held around 5% of market share.cxxviii. What is clear is that when YFLM 
was first established, they were one of few parties supplying deadweight pigs under contract.   
YFLM presented their members with a number of advantages both in the marketing of 
fatstock and in the encouragement of more market orientated pig production. The 
cooperative also offered members economies of scale through joint use of equipment, 
breeding stock and marketing as well as the ability to increase the level of relative scarcity of 
both pork and bacon. As one of the cooperatives that arose as a result of the British 
                                                                
63 The precise number of butchers  was not specifically recorded until the commencement of their decline in the 1980s but with 143 900 
retail outlets, which include all food and beverage retailers with the exception of grocers, it is probable that there  were over 30 000 
butchery outlets, of which around 1/3 were part of multiple operations. 
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Agricultural Marketing Acts of 1931 and 1933, YFLM was in place at the time when efforts 
were being made to control the impact on domestic cured pork prices of the increasing 
volumes of imports from, in particular, Denmarkcxxix. The bacon restriction scheme inhibited 
imports and by 1934 the volume imported had declined by circa 50% to 6.3 million CWT. 
These measures increased self-sufficiency in pork meat to 78% of consumption and 29% in 
bacon, which represented a 100% increase on 1927 figures.cxxx  
Encouraged by the quota restrictions, which limited the permitted imports, YFLM acquired 
slaughtering and bacon processing facilities in Malton, North Yorkshire as a way to reduce 
the perceived risk experienced by farmers from opportunistic behaviour by selling under 
contract. The British government had attempted to restrict opportunistic behaviour and 
protect farmers through the introduction of fixed farm gate prices under the Pig Marketing 
scheme. Their particular concerns were that there were wide variations in the price paid 
under contract by abattoirs due to variations in kill out weights.64 The cooperative undertook 
to protect farmers, but farmers had an innate distrust of wholesalers and processors, doubting 
their willingness to deal fairly and honestly with the farming community.cxxxi  These 
contracts had a further advantage  in that  they encouraged farmers to extend the period of 
production in an era prior to refrigeration. YFLM owned the slaughter house and bacon 
factory until well into the  early 1970s.cxxxii As a YFLM marketer recalls:  
                                                                
64 This refers to the weight of the pig once slaughtered and gutted and it had been found that the kill out weight could range between 60-
75% of their registered live weight. 
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“Historically Yorkshire farmers owned Malton’s bacon company, There is a picture in 
Grampian office in Malton, a picture of the building in 1942, 1972, and on the top of this 
building written in white is Yorkshire farmers”, ( YFLM Marketer) 
9.1.2 Horizontal competition, EU membership and market liberalisation 
The measures introduced by the UK government resulted in greater self-sufficiency in both 
pork and bacon, but in the longer term this position did not prove to be sustainable. Three 
factors altered this position.  Firstly, Britain’s entry to the common market presented the 
cooperative with increased horizontal competition, as guaranteed pricing systems under 
fixed price regimes, import embargos and import tariffs on all pork products were lifted.cxxxiii  
Secondly, following the Uruguay agreement, the UK pig sector faced heightened 
competition from Europe, as international markets became less available as a consequence of 
the requirement by GATT to cut EU exports. The Uruguay agreement held that the EU 
should cut export subsidies by 36% of the 1988-1990 average for developed countries, with 
a corresponding reduction of import levies of 36%. By 1998cxxxiv, UK self-sufficiency in 
pork had decreased from 99% to 84%, with a corresponding decrease from 43%-40% in 
bacon, and with an average decline across the two categories from 98% in 1975 to current 
figures of around 50%.cxxxv  
The third event was a consequence of more stringent welfare legislation governing the UK 
pig sector, which deepened the cost differential between UK and, in particular, Danish pig 
production.  Coupled with the greater efficiency of, for instance, Danish slaughter operations 
and processors, built up under a cooperative structure in a position of oligopolistic and 
oligopsonic power, the UK sector was unable to effectively compete. By 1992 outputs were 
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10 times greater than their UK equivalents, where the average annual output in Britain was 
22 000 heads per annum against 250 000-500 000 in Denmark.  This had been achieved 
through heavy investment in Danish large scale integrated facilities.cxxxvi 
Similarly, comparative on-farm costs in the UK were some 30% cxxxvii  higher than their EU 
counterparts, with feed conversion to meat rates around 3.6:1 at that time. The British pork 
industry required a considerable amount of investment both on-farm and in processing to 
compete.  In an attempt to redress their position, the UK processors experienced another 
wave of consolidation. It was at this time the Malton bacon factory was acquired, probably 
first by Bowes, but certainly by Unigate in the mid-1970s. More generally across the UK,  
the numbers of specialist abattoirs had fallen from 808 in 1982 to 576 in 1992, and by 1993 
five key companies held circa 70% of the marketcxxxviii.  
Consolidation did not, however, stem the threat from Europe and the increase in imports 
from, in particular, Danish bacon continued to increase. Danish bacon, by this stage, held 
around a quarter of the UK market. Not only were the key players in the processing sector 
more efficient than their UK counterparts, but EU farmers were also able to operate under 
lower cost parameters than farmers in the UK. The introduction of EU welfare legislation in 
1999 in the UK, well before the 2013 deadline presented under the legislative framework, 
significantly undermined the competitiveness of the sector. Under the terms of directive 
91/630/ec, all tethering of sows and gilts was to cease and they were to be allowed to live in 
small groups. This move required considerable investment in pig accommodation. This was 
reflected in a statement made in an interview with a leading pig farmer: 
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“In 1997 – prices rocketed but production of pigs did not expand greatly at all. But then we 
had the stall holding ban which came in  1998 –and people had to spend money to convert 
and then there was  quite  few years of productive loss until people got used to the concept.  -
-- Prices collapsed in the back end of 1998 due to  the increase in production in Europe and 
….because of  how cheaply the European pigs could be produced at a lower cost of 
production by using bone meal, small stalls and all this sort of jazz”. 
 
 At the same time, the UK government implemented the Pig Industry Restructuring Scheme 
(PIRS), a plan designed to improve efficiencies. The implementation of the PIRS was 
designed specifically to facilitate the exit of less efficient farmers from the sector. The net 
effect of these two pieces of legislation was to inflate the costs of production to UK farmers, 
further undermining the competitive position of UK farmers against their European 
counterparts.65cxxxix   The impact on the UK sector of these measures took place despite the 
introduction of safeguards that were designed to ensure that all meat sold into the UK was 
produced to the same welfare standard.cxl  
 
This position should, however, be redressed by 2013, when all other EU farmers are required 
to conform to the same standards, but  the early introduction had a major impact on the 
sustainability of this sector and herd and sow numbers continued to fall.cxli  Notably, between 
2001 and 2007 herd numbers declined from 598 000 to 436 00066. cxlii  cxliii This would 
appear to have a major impact on the ability of the cooperative to sustain membership, as 
smaller pig farmers left the sector and larger farmers are increasingly supplying direct to 
processing companies. However, whilst horizontal competition destabilised the position of 
                                                                
65 The PIRS included two components: a pig outgoers scheme and a pig ongoers scheme. The outgoers scheme sought to reduce production 
capacity through the removal of less efficient producers, and improve core efficiency, whilst the ongoers scheme was intended to assist 
producers, and encourage larger holdings to take advantage of funding opportunities. 
66 This corresponds to a decline in the volume of production of around 50% over the same period, from 1,155 million 
tonnes to 0.739 tonnes in 2007 
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the UK producers, changes to the structure of supply to the retailers had the most significant 
impact on the ability of YFLM to ensure benefits to members. 
 
9.2 Retailer consolidation and post 1999 welfare legislation 
 
This section examines the period post retail consolidation with the view to understanding 
whether the cooperative can increase leverage in current market structures and whether 
members can attain a greater share of the surplus through cooperative action. Section 9.2.1 
explores how the distinct qualities of pork makes pig farmers particularly prone to moral 
hazard. This case study shows that the cooperative has done much to alleviate risk, but 
shows that the cooperative has failed to create relative scarcity or increase motivational 
interest over the longer term. This issue is explored in more depth in 9.2.2, 9.2.3 and 9.2.4, 
where it becomes apparent that the cooperative supplies a key service to smaller farmers and 
will continue to operate as a cooperative as long as such small farmers remain in the sector. 
9.2.1 Retail consolidation and the cooperative as a counterbalance – increasing relative 
scarcity 
As examined in section 9.1 of this chapter, the British consumer began to switch from 
traditional butchers to multiple retailers, although this was relatively slow in comparison to 
other product categories. By the 1990s, multiple retailers had only increased their share of 
market from 3% in 1963, to 44%, but by 2008, the top four retailers held 75% of the market 
share of all pork produce. Already threatened by horizontal competition, the pork marketers 
in general and specifically YFLM were faced with fewer alternative buyers for their produce.  
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Having already disbanded activity in slaughtering and bacon curing in the 1970s, they were 
predominantly supplying the retailers through abattoirs, who had latterly integrated vertically 
with the processing sector, a position which made it more difficult to increase relative 
scarcity.cxliv 
 
The dominance of the multiple retailers in sales of pork hastened a further consolidation of 
the abattoir and abattoir/ processing sectors. The consolidation of the sector was dramatic. 
By 2003, 21% of abattoirs were controlling 80% of the market, 75% of which was in the 
hands of 5 major players: Bowes, Cranswick, Geo Adams, Grampian Foods and Flagship 
Foods. In an attempt to increase their cost efficiencies, abattoirs/processors67 consolidated 
their activities into fewer units. Between1990-2003 there had been a 69% decline in abattoir 
numbers, from 1000 to 314.   Further consolidation was to follow andcxlv  by 2009 70% of 
the market was held by two major companies, both European owned: Vion and Tulip.  As  a 
YFLM marketer commented: “Tulip has 4 abattoirs ……they have 35% of the kill, whilst 
Grampian, which has now been taken over by the Dutch company Vion, the merger will take 
place in 4 weeks, they will have roughly the same amount of  the market” (YFLM marketer, 
August 2008) 
 
As well as being driven by retailer power, the consolidation has also been a consequence of 
the measures implemented under the 1995 food safety legislation.cxlvi Multiple retailers have 
                                                                
67 This makes reference to the emergence of fully integrated abattoirs and processing 
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sought to reduce their supply base and more closely regulate the slaughtering sector.  This 
has had the net effect of significantly altering the structure of the supply chain, an event that 
has had an even greater impact on the balance of power within the supply chain. 
 
In terms of the details of the consolidation, by 2009 the two key UK pork suppliers, Vion 
and Tulip, had acquired much of the competition. Tulip, the UK commercial subsidiary of 
Danish Crown, after a train of acquisitions, acquired Flagship Foods, who owned processing 
operations in the guise of Dalehead Foods and Roach Foods as well as the pig farming 
operation British Quality Pigs (BQP). This acquisition was designed to strengthen the 
leverage position of Danish Crown against the retail sector. Not only did the acquisition 
increase their market share of the abattoir and processing sector and enable, through 
restructuring, increased efficiency of production within the group, but it also gave the group 
a contract with Waitrose. BQP supplies Waitrose with 80% of their pork, a figure which 
represents an 8% share of the retail market.cxlvii Vion, a Dutch company, followed suit with 
the acquisition of Grampian Country Foods, and similarly not only consolidated its position 
within abattoirs and processing but acquired albeit a relatively insignificant upstream 
operation in pig farms and feed mills.68cxlviii  
 
The other two key players, Cranswick and Woodheads (wholly owned by Morrison’s), have 
predominantly consolidated their position to the expansion of their processing capacitycxlix.  
                                                                
68 It is perhaps worth noting that at the time of corrections Vion had abandoned the UK market because they were unable to generate 
sufficient margins  
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Stage Farm Broker Abattoir processor Distributor Retail
Vion
Tulip
Morrisons
Cranswick
Thames 
valley coop
Scot lean
Meadow
Quality
YFLM
  
Figure 9.2 Extent of vertical integration in the Pig supply chain (adapted from EFFP, 2009) 
 
In selecting an almost fully integrated supply system Vion and Tulip are able to reduce the 
costs and risks of supply. Tulip, in bypassing the marketing agents, will have saved between 
30-40 pence per pig in marketing fees, although in real terms savings would be limited as for 
the most part they operate under direct contract with farmers.  In acquiring Flagship, which 
included Dalehead Foods, Tulip has in effect bought out the bespoke pork market in terms of 
genetics and husbandry, 69 for which farmers receive a premium. cl  Arguably this contract 
could place either the retailer or the supplier at risk of moral hazard; however, there is 
insufficient information forthcoming to make a clear evaluation.cli  However, farmers see the 
supply to specific contracts as of value to their business, as indicated by one reputed pig 
farmer: 
                                                                
69 Waitrose require that pigs supplied to them are PIC 337  -A specific genetic mix of pig 
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“ Tulip  supply 3500 sows through the BQP operation, and that is nearly all dedicated to 
Waitrose------The Waitrose model is a good model, Waitrose have their own genetic 
specification, the PIC 377…  I am going to supply that particular supply chain to Waitrose” 
 
There was a further advantage for these two European players,  in that their entry into the 
UK market has offered them greater control over this relatively lucrative UK market and 
ensured access to pigs produced under EU welfare standards at a period of transition in 
Denmark. This was particularly important because of the impact of Uruguay on their export 
business. In essence, the decision to consolidate within the processing sector and the supply 
chain was an attempt to attain leverage over the multiple retailers, but even more to 
undermine the UK market where the Uruguay agreement placed constraints on their efforts 
in international markets.clii   
 
Yet it must be noted that all four abattoir/ processing companies continue to purchase from 
YFLM, although YFLM’s share of the market continues to decline. Just over 5000 pigs per 
week are sold by YFLM to the 4 key buyers and a total of around 3632 pigs per week are 
sold to the largest two operators, Vion and Tulip. This demonstrates a high degree of 
dependence of YFLM on these two key players, representing as they do 72% of their total 
supply. The remaining 28% of their weekly sales are supplied to the two key remaining 
parties, Woodheads and Cranswick; the latter a key supplier of Sainsbury's.cliii   
 
The reduction in the numbers of abattoirs supplying the mainstream retailers has had 
corollary effect on the number of auction houses, who now control less than 0.5% of pig 
sales; a decline of 16 fold from 1990. Of the remaining abattoirs, only 5-8 operations sell 
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pigs as either breeding stock, weaners or for slaughter.  The auction houses supply to small 
abattoirs and butchers.cliv One small Sheffield farmer who has 2 sows said:  
“I take around 14 live pigs to market in my trailer. The nearest market is Selby or York, 
Bakewell don’t do any pigs any longer. The Butchers will have a buyer (abattoir) who will 
be buying for them, He gets them killed. And then the butcher has his pick.”  
In this context, while it is unable to increase scarcity, the cooperative is still able to 
marginally to improve the farm gate prices and gross margin benefits. The weekly variations 
in the volume of production of pigs and tight but variable specifications as to   probe and 
weight levels mean that the abattoirs are consistently faced with a potential shortfall70.   The 
ability of abattoirs to draw upon YFLM for small top up volumes, when they experience a 
shortfall elsewhere, increases the price paid for pigs above the Deadweight Average Pig 
Price (DAPP). Prices for pigs are based on contractual terms, but the specific price paid 
depends on Deadweight Average Pig Price, a price which is calculated on the basis of the 
average price paid in the previous week. It is this mechanism that allows the cooperative to 
manipulate higher prices for their members. Many of the members are under contract to the 
key abattoirs, but the cooperative has a level of flexibility as it is able to offer two or more 
members “joint” contracts whereby if one farmer is unable to fulfil the volume the onus is 
placed on  the other to supply the shortfall.  In addition, there are the cooperative’s own pigs 
and these equally may be deployed to fulfil the shortfall. 
One pig farmers explains the arrangements: “We are now on a bit of a coop contract with 
Tulip, we are on a three week batch system. We should be weaning 800 pigs every three 
weeks – you would have 800 pigs but in real terms this is around 250. This is where the 250 
                                                                
70 Abattoirs offer contracts to farmers which not only vary according to whether the meat is destined for bacon or pork, but vary 
considerably between abattoirs and even individual farmers  
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a week contract comes from. You do have the odd week when you only have 150 and next 
week 300 – if we can’t fill out the contract Chris has other farmers he can draw upon to 
fulfil the contract”. YFLM pig farmer.  
Where this system fails is that there are a number of other members who are not under 
contract, but prefer spot transactions. Nonetheless, it is this ability to manage supply and 
demand at a weekly level for the processors, and thereby reduce the penalties charged by the 
retailers to the abattoirs for non-delivery, that enables the cooperative to increase the price 
paid for contracts by 3-4 pence per kilo above the published national average prices.clv This 
is believed to be predominantly on account of the size of the cooperative, in that the volume 
of pigs available to place in periods of excess is not seen to deflate the price in the short term 
to any real extent. There have been experiments to create a larger cooperative, but this was 
seen to have reduced their bargaining position. This perspective has been ratified by one of 
the marketers at YFLM, who stated that:  
“I have the feeling that if you get too big people can’t give you a decent deal because you 
are asking too much and if you stay slightly under the radar you can get a better deal, it is 
almost like  size can be an advantage but it can also be a disadvantage”clvi 
 
His view point had been greatly influenced by experiences in  circa 2003 during which  
collaboration between 4 cooperatives had failed to deliver improved leverage due to the 
greater difficulties experienced in periodic abattoir “rollovers,” in the placement of  excess 
pigs on the spot market.  “Rollovers” are a peculiarity of this industry and are those instances   
in which a pig farmer is contracted, for instance, for 150 pigs per week, but has a request for 
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fewer pigs one week than the designated number. The farmer is informed that a proportion of 
his pigs will be “rolled over” until the next week.  
 
Where excess production is amalgamated it reduces the sum of their bargaining power. This 
occurs not only in markets where there is overproduction of pigs, but also in shortage 
markets. This can result in a longer term deflation of prices, not least because the DAPP are 
determined by the average price paid to farmers during the previous week. Where there is 
excess, there is a danger that larger operatives will place the pigs at a price that is lower than 
that of smaller operatives, thus deflating the prices for subsequent weeks across the sector. In 
periods of shortage, although it might be assumed that collectively the cooperatives could 
increase scarcity, the reality of the situation is counter intuitive. This is because of the 
"perishability", the short window of opportunity in which pigs may be "placed". Pigs can 
normally increase their weight by over 1 kilo of weight per day. Under contract, in which 
there are strict weight specifications, any delay in delivery to the abattoir can result in dead 
weights which exceed the optimal and thus result in a reduction in the price paid per kilo.  
Thus the placement of pigs is urgent when they reach specified probe and weight levels.  
The issue is that when an agent has many pigs to place during weeks of surplus he has two 
choices. He must decide whether to retain the surplus until the following week, at which 
point, because of their weight and fat gain, the price per carcass would be penalised71. In fact 
the farmer is penalised twice, in that he can receive just £30 for the carcass and has the 
                                                                
71 In some contracts the price paid per pig could be significantly lower than the cost of production, at just £30 
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additional costs of feed for each day delayed. Pigs tend to consume between 2.3-2.9 kilos of 
feed per day at a cost of £300 per tonne. clvii clviii Alternatively, the agent could choose to 
reduce the price to a level which will sell to alternative markets. In either case, any price 
reductions will be calculated into the DAPP pig price in the following weeks.72  
Furthermore, in times of shortage, larger coalitions are unable to attain an equal to the 
increased prices attained by smaller coalitions, where buyers may switch with ease to 
European producers. 
 
It becomes apparent that YFLM is more able to act in the interest of the cooperative 
members than a larger cooperative, but neither large nor small are able to effectively close 
the market in the light of EU competition. Yet it is doubtful whether the influence YFLM 
holds over prices is to the advantage of the cooperative members over the longer term. 
Historical evidence suggests that the ease with which retailers switch pork suppliers through 
the vehicle of their category leaders has led to prices below the costs of production. Farmers 
have left the sector, which in former times, as supply dropped below demand, would have led 
to the “cobweb” effect in UK pig production.   
 
A further aspect which emerges from this study is that traditional cycles in pig prices appear 
to have been altered as a consequence of retail pressure on prices. Over the  10 years prior to 
this research, while there have been cycles in pig prices, price increases have not resulted in 
corresponding increases in the number of UK pig farmers or breeding sows. The pressure on 
                                                                
72 Pricing structures do vary across members depending on the retailer specifications.  Price structures range from cost plus models to 50% 
DAPP plus 50% cost plus. Variations are found also around weight and probe levels. Dead weights can vary from 55-75 kilos whilst probe 
levels can vary from 12-14 mm. In some contracts, above the ideal weights will not incur significant losses to price per kilo received by 
farmers, in others very severe penalties are incurred. 
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prices experienced by Category leaders, such as Tulip, as discussed earlier, has encouraged 
imports from mainland Europe and in particular Denmark. UKclix.   
 
As EU imports into the UK have increased, the natural cycle in UK pig production has 
become less apparent, and despite periodic price increases, the UK herd has continued to 
decline. This problem has been further exacerbated by a highly concentrated UK retail sector 
and the relatively high costs of production in the UK.clxclxi Subsequent increases in costs 
following the introduction of EU regulations on pig welfare in other member countries as 
well as the rise of the Euro against the pound have done little to help the sector. Current UK 
pig production numbers are not only significantly lower than levels of consumption but are 
also lower than 1998 levels. Not surprisingly, despite the decline in numbers of UK farmers, 
there has been no significant corresponding increase in price.  Farm gate prices rose between 
2007 and 2010, but not sufficiently to draw farmers back into the sector, despite a rise in 
price in 2008 to £1.36 per kilo, a level which allowed farmers to operate at a profit. 
  
An examination of the distribution of economic surplus throughout the supply chain shows a 
similar picture. In 2002, farmers received as much as 40% of the share of retail prices; this 
had declined to 25% by 2009 and currently stands at 20% (August 2011figures). YFLM 
members were attaining around 3 pence more on average depending on herd health, the  
feeding and husbandry systems and the spot price of wheat.  Variations in costs of 
production could mean that the price per kilo could for some farmers be 4p below the costs 
of production.clxii As one farmer said:“ I don’t want these publishing in Pig World but ..  
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total costs  came to xxx pence per kilo  and a net sale price of xxx pence per kilo,  this gave a  
net loss of -4.13 pence per  kilo.” 
 
Although another farmer on a wet feed system claimed: 
 
“our average price is 118 pence per kilo and our breakeven price is 112 pence so we are 
making 6 pence  a kilo” 
 
Although the evidence is less conclusive, it is apparent that abattoir margins have also been 
declining.  Claims were that in 2008-2009 abattoirs grossed  margins of  -5%, which meant a 
loss of £4 per pig, a figure that differs from the figure of  +2% as claimed by the 
Competition Commission in  2006, which  would suggest that margins for abattoirs declined 
by 7% over that period.clxiii  By 2010, it may be seen that margins have improved, where, for 
instance, it can be seen that a margin of around £4 per pig is received by abattoirs, which is 
more a consequence of improved efficiencies in the key abattoirs than improved wholesale 
prices73.clxivclxv  However, it becomes evident that entry of multiple retailers and their 
dominance within the market has not simply reduced prices through the compression of 
margins throughout the upstream supply chain but also reduced the impact of the traditional 
issue facing the pig sector, that of the impact of price oscillations on the pig farming sector74. 
This, however, has not been to the advantage of the sector as a whole, and the UK pig 
farmers, including YFLM members, have continued to exit the sector, irrespective of the 
above normal prices attained by YFLM.   
                                                                
73. Recent examples of rationalisation include plant closures made by Tulip in which a total of 1300 jobs were lost between the periods of 
2009-2010. 
74 As discussed earlier, price oscillations were traditionally a problem because pig farmers would enter or exit the market, depending on the 
price 
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9.2.2. Retail consolidation and the cooperative as a counterbalance – increasing 
motivational interest  
The decline in the numbers of UK pig farmers places the long term survival of the 
cooperative in question. The cooperative is fully aware of these dangers and over recent 
years has made some significant attempts to develop added value services and more latterly 
added value products to redress this position.  Where there is a surplus of funds raised from 
marketing fees from members and placement fees from abattoirs75, this is not returned to 
members but has for many years been utilised to invest in additional activities and 
services.clxvi  
These have included the setting up of YFLM piggeries as a means of protecting against 
deficit supply.  Another such initiative is the Yorkshire Outdoor brand, which was launched 
in November 2008.  The product was placed in Asda, Tesco, Costcutters, Morrison’s, and 
the Cooperative, and included sausage and bacon. Pigs were slaughtered at a small abattoir 
in Leeds. In effect, the Yorkshire Outdoor brand is an attempt to improve the motivational 
interest of the buyers.  The brand is in line with government policy and consumer interests. It 
is a local product made from outdoor reared pig, but there were a number of factors that 
have inhibited its success. In the first instance, though the brand has been quite well 
established within the region and farmers receive a higher farm gate price, it has failed to 
improve the leverage position of the cooperative. 
                                                                
75 The amount paid to the cooperative for each pig sold is an amalgam of both these fees and the total figure is around 80p per pig. 
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The brand holds but a very limited percentage of the total sales of either sausages or bacon 
of any of the retailers, where 82.6% at the time of the launch were retail own label.clxvii  It is 
important to note that the specialist niche market of local, free range pork produce only 
represented around 2% of the total market. Sales of local food were predicted to grow, but 
the 2008 banking crisis, which occurred at the time of the product launch, curtailed this 
eventually. Although the brand was launched at three of the top retail companies, these 
actual sales only amounted to 20-30 pigs per week. This figure represented less than 1% of 
regional sales, both in terms of volume and value, compared to national sales of over £3.9 
billion, of which 30% are sold by Tesco and 20% by Asda. This suggests that the 
contribution of the product to the retailer revenue and core competences is less than 
negligible, particularly given the ready availability of close substitutes. 
The inability of YFLM to sufficiently improve leverage from added value products persists 
even where pressure has been placed on retailers by the farmer funded BPEX (British Pig 
executive). There is some evidence that retailers have demanded more UK pig, most 
particularly since the farmer led “pork is worth it” campaign of March 2011, a promotion of 
the importance of self-sufficiency. Companies such as Tesco and Morrison’s have published 
changes to the sources of pig meat. Tesco reduce the proportion of pork sourced from the EU 
and Morrison’s switched to 100% British pork.clxviii 
However, there is no evidence of any impact on farm price; indeed, it is notable that Tulip, 
the principal supplier to Tesco, which represents 30% of YFLM sales, have dropped their 
price by 2 pence per kilo. Any marginal increase in returns to farmers is a consequence of 
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the 2-4 pence increase in price per kilo received by farmers who switch to outdoor reared 
pigs. Lower conversion rates from feed to meat mean that there is around an 8% increase in 
costs, but this may result in a 29% increase in revenue, deriving both from higher farm gate 
prices and  a  lower infant mortality rate.clxix   
So there are gains in price per kilo, but these are small, as indeed was the level of output. 
Yorkshire Outdoor Products may not have improved the cooperative leverage position either 
from relative scarcity, or operational / strategic importance. What is more, production costs 
were greater than the factory gate price of £1.69 per pack.clxx   Investment in the plant in 
2008 came to a total of  £87, 000. This resulted in high labour costs and because of the small 
production volumes a high unit cost. The investment was part funded by Yorkshire Forward 
and had five years of funds retained from fee surplus, but by late 2009 they were forced to 
subcontract the production of these sausages to a rival, Sykes House, who had a greater 
automation and thus could reduce unit costs to ensure a margin.  
9.2.3. Longevity and cohesion-the costs of coalition  
Despite consistently low prices, in the main, members perceive that the costs of coalition are 
low. Indeed it is apparent that the personal service offered by the cooperative coupled with 
the provision of additional services have supported the increase of productivity of farmers 
and reduced the high risk of financial loss that is a characteristic of this sector. This support 
appears to be valued by cooperative members.clxxi  When the costs experienced by the 
members are examined it is evident that the costs and risk of cost are significantly lower than 
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supplying direct to processors/abattoirs.  More explicitly, if one looks at asset specific costs: 
physical, dedicated, human, temporal and brand, these are minimal; despite considerable 
investment in  the Yorkshire Outdoor brand, bio digesters and the share of the farming  
scheme operated by YFLM, these are perceived to have had little influence on net returns. 
While physical asset costs are present, in particular costs associated with adapting farm 
practices and facilities to adhere to the new rules on pig welfare, these are not idiosyncratic 
either to the cooperative or to any specific contract negotiated by the cooperative agents. The 
implementation of directive 91/630/ec by UK farmers has resulted in a 34% increase in total 
costs, with investment costs representing around 34% of the total costs sustained by farmers.  
Other physical asset costs may be attributable to the costs of meeting the contractual terms, 
although these vary according to the contract. A comparison between two contracts, one with 
Tulip and the other with Cranswick, may be used to illustrate this point. In one contract the 
abattoir/processor Cranswick offers members a DAPP plus 4p, with a base price offered of 
between 55-95 kilos and up to 14 probes, with no deductions to the base price on weights 
less than 100 kg, but with 20p deductions on base price for every kilo over 100.  Tulip, in 
one of the contracts offered to YFLM members, heavily penalises overweight pigs. Pigs of 
100 kg dead weight will give maximum total revenue of £30.clxxii   
The distinctions in contractual terms are of particular significance where farmers are 
required to “rollover” stock from one buyer to another. In this instance, if they were to have 
stock rolled over by Cranswick to supply Tulip, this could lower the benefits they receive, 
but would rarely be accounted as a physical asset cost, predominantly because this is not 
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idiosyncratic to YFLM but a function of the sector. This does not refute the position that 
each contract imposes particular constraints on the method of producing pork.  Nor, despite 
the lack of dividend and heavy investment by the cooperative in added value activities, is 
there any apparent sense that these are perceived as dedicated costs attributable to 
membership of YFLM. 
  
 One key cost incurred by the members is that of transport. Previously pigs had been 
transported by rail and despite the 150 mile restriction on the transport of livestock, the cost 
to farmers may be as much as £3.00, with an extra 9p per carcass attributable to the 
sanitation of lorries between loads. clxxiii However, one of the key objectives of the marketing 
agents has been to minimise the asset specific costs to members by selecting the type of 
contract that best matches the farmer’s system of feeding, and management of the farm. A 
close relationship between the farmer and marketer within the cooperative ensures an exact 
knowledge of the costs of production along with an understanding of standard yields, 
growth, and mortality rates.  Furthermore, problems associated with temporal specificity 
associated with “rollovers” and the risk of overweight pigs are attenuated through the use of 
back up buyers of pig meat. 
9.2.4 The distribution of costs between members and the non-excludability of benefits 
Similarly, few farmers portrayed any fears about the costs of coalition, whilst others 
benefited. Certain larger farmers have perceived that the cooperatives are placing their own 
pigs in advance to the disadvantage of their members, but this fear was not widespread.  The 
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interesting phenomenon within the pig industry is that, particularly given the small size of 
the sector as a whole, there emerge clear friendship networks between specific marketing 
agents and the farmers. This inhibits much of the perceived costs of agency, in that single 
farmers would appear to remain loyal to one marketing agent, where ever they might be.  
When a marketing agent moves from one marketing company to another, there is a tendency 
that their “customers” 76, i.e. the farmers, would follow.  
Claims were made that the reason for continuing the relationship with the cooperative was a 
function of their continued involvement with the marketer, i.e. that “Robert” or “Chris” 
“were” the reason for not switching companies.  Comments such as   “I have only ever sold 
pigs to x  and when he has moved I have moved with him” are representative of  thisclxxiv.  
For small holders with a regular turnover of pigs, where precise numbers to be generated per 
week are not entirely predictable, this level of confidence in the ability of marketer to place 
pigs underlies the member loyalty. Member loyalty in this case  is not a function of the 
coalition, but of their personal relationship with the marketer. 
There is a strong recognition by the members of the reality of the claims made by marketing 
staff that their primary focus is to facilitate and delight their customers. With hands on 
knowledge of pig breeding, pig management and the market, the YFLM marketers / agents 
are well positioned to best match the pigs to specific contracts and offer aid and support for 
herd improvements (known as clean outs77). As members of staff they are in receipt of a 
                                                                
76 This is the only sector I have talked to that describes their members as customers. 
77 Clean out is where the whole herd is sold or slaughtered and the facilities are given an in-depth clean, a “clean” herd is then bought 
through one of the breeding companies and the facilities are then repopulated. This enables the farmer to reduce the inherent disease which 
affects both weight gain and premature mortality rates 
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salary, but this is not linked to input, which more often than not is in excess of their paid 
hours. There are certain larger farmers who perceive that the number of people deployed by 
the cooperative to deliver 5000 pigs78 per week is excessive, particularly those supplying 
directly to the abattoir sector: “we market from our kitchen table” farmers; however, this is 
not representative of the whole. 
The problem of transaction costs is also mitigated by the attitude of these agents. In acting in 
the interests of a declining pig industry, the marketers ensure that much of the transaction 
costs of coalition are absorbed in the marketing fee and fees paid for placement paid by the 
abattoirs. Despite the diversity of the membership group, the marketers’ personal 
understanding of each of their “customers”, and the efforts they make to place each batch of 
pigs with the view to maximise returns, eliminates any need for internal lobbying and 
metering. Nor are there any perceived shirking costs, because each “customer” receives a 
personalised service, as epitomised by this comment from a YFLM member:  
“You knew  that your money was safe and for speaking to someone on a weekly basis who 
you knew they were going to try their best or advise, knew the market, knew what was 
happening on spot price, contract price, across all abattoirs, uhr could advise you on 
contracts when they came for renewal, kept you up to speed with what was happening and at 
the same time in Yorkshire Farmers ’cos they are always buying feed because they are 
involved in their own pigs, so they know that if you want a bit of advice on what soya price is 
doing at the moment they offer. I often talk to Chris about that or on feed price.” 
In part, this is possible because there are 87 members of which 40 are regular suppliers.clxxv  
The openness of the cooperative enables members to seek their own solutions to excess 
                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
78 Some  changes could be changed as a result of their collaboration with the other cooperatives – need to dig out details associated with 
this 
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volume where possible but also allows the agents to bring in additional supplies where 
needed to fulfil contracts. Indeed the concept of service is seen by the agents to be critical to 
the survival of their jobs, as indeed the openness of the cooperative is essential to managing 
highly fluctuant volumes of pig supply.   
9.2.4.1 Summary of  findings associated with costs and cohesiveness 
This suggests that the cohesiveness of the cooperative does not entirely stem from the small 
size of the cooperative or the homogeneity of membership interests. It suggests that it is the 
service of individual needs rather than by YFLM agents that both ensures the longevity of 
the cooperative and is of service to the sector as a whole.  
Cooperative members do not support the cooperative because they will attain higher 
marginal benefits, or lower marginal costs than with alternative marketing agents, but 
because they know that they will experience lower on farm transaction costs than in direct 
supply. Where prices and demand are fluid, farmers are saved the expense of constantly 
surveying the market. Furthermore, they experience lower risk for the price79 of dead on 
arrival insurance (about 12p per pig), credit insurance and early payment (11-18p per pig), 
which ensures that they receive the full worth against risk. Furthermore, for the price of 
1.09p per pig per day, they receive payment within 10-12 days, which gives them a 20p per 
pig saving on farm costs.clxxvi  This suggests that farmers remain in the cooperative as an 
                                                                
79 Pigs are quite sensitive and may quite frequently die on the way to the abattoir, which means that they are not fit for purpose. Also the 
cooperative operates an indemnity insurance scheme which can ensure payment within 7 days or 11 days. Normal payment periods for the 
abattoirs may be as much as 60 days, and with the level of consolidation of the sector there has been and is a high risk of non-payment to 
farmers.   
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insurance against risk as they know they will receive one of the better prices for pigs at one 
of the lowest costs. The support by agents of the individual interests of farmers rather than 
corporate gain facilitates the retention of farmers within the sector and thus, to some extent, 
inhibits the decline of the sector as a whole. Nevertheless, this suggests that the farmers’ 
rationale for remaining within the cooperative is entirely calculative.clxxvii.  
9.3 Lessons learnt 
The examination of cooperative action within the pig sector also indicates that the 
cooperative under investigation has failed completely to deliver, although there is some 
evidence to suggest that the cooperative is able to improve the price paid to members over 
the short term. This was apparent both for spot market transactions and DAPP contracts. 
Over the longer term, the higher prices paid to members led abattoirs to switch to the lower 
priced pork produced in mainland Europe. Although the recent shift in Sterling against the 
Euro and the harmonisation of welfare legislation may alter the balance of UK versus 
European pork within the UK market, there is no evidence to suggest that this will be to the 
financial advantage of members or indeed UK farmers in general.  The investment in 
processing has not served to redress the balance of power. Nonetheless, the cooperative has 
survived, despite a considerable reduction in the number of farmers in the sector and a 
failure to increase scarcity, relative scarcity and motivational interest.  This is because the 
cooperative has continued actively to deliver perceived net benefits to its “customers”. The 
value of the cooperative is in the additional security it offers to farmers in an industry where 
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there is a risk of non-payment   because of buyer bankruptcy or other factors which lead to 
payment delays or reduced payments.  
9.3.1 Creation of leverage through absolute/relative scarcity and/or motivational interest 
The exploratory framework suggests that where benefits are not created through increasing 
either scarcity or utility, members will exit the cooperative. YFLM is able to influence price, 
but in this case there is little impact on the long term share of surplus retained in the farming 
sector, and returns may not be sufficient to maintain a UK pig industry.  This is because of 
changes to the marketing channel and the emergence of a highly concentrated buyer’s 
market which stemmed from the consolidation of the retail sector, coupled with changes to 
pig welfare legislation in the UK and the strength of Sterling against the Euro.  
These factors did not stem the fluctuations of price, which are a function of short term 
changes in supply and demand.  This is because under the current pricing system, where the 
contractual prices are linked to weekly changes in market price, when the spot price rises 
above the contract prices, farmers may switch from contracts in order to benefit from the 
higher price. Whilst in the short term this raises the price for all UK farmers, over the longer 
term, higher prices incentivise processors to find pigs from the EU, to whom the UK is 
particularly attractive when the Euro is low against Sterling. As a consequence prices fall 
and many UK pig farmers leave the sector.  
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When supply falls, the price has not recovered sufficiently to act as an incentive for farmers 
to reinvest in pigs.  YFLM, like many of the agents, are able marginally to increase the price 
received by farmers by collating supply, and they play a valuable role in managing excess 
and shortage in the short term to the advantage of members. Nevertheless, any attempt to 
create relative scarcity has failed.   Coalitions with other cooperatives have simply resulted 
in less bargaining power on spot prices, and the ability to bargain on the futures (contract) 
markets depends on the prices received at spot.  
Even attempts to add value and increase the utility of the products have failed due to 
insufficient consumer interest. Turnover has increased but the revenue generated is not 
sufficient to justify the expenditure. While this position might change if a large number of 
European farmers exit the market on the complete adoption of the new welfare regulations 
by 2013, at present, contrary to the proposition, the cooperative is sustained despite the fact 
that benefits are not attained. Furthermore, where prices paid to farmers are highly sensitive 
to the level of demand and supply it is highly improbable that given current downstream 
structures benefits could be attained, particularly given the dominance of retailers within the 
supply chain. 
9.3.2 The longevity of the coalition in relation to perceived costs of coalition 
Once more this case study appears to show that the survival of the cooperative is a result of 
rationally economic decisions by members.  In situations where costs exceed benefits, 
farmers have been shown to leave the cooperative.  This was also true in this case, but in this 
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case most farmers are staying within the cooperative, the reason being individual net benefits 
that are a function of the value they gain from the personalised service.  
 
The findings suggest that the perceived costs of the coalition are lower than the benefits. 
Within YFLM there are few marginal costs of coalition perceived by members, a factor 
which stems from personalised service received by members from marketing agents. It is 
suggested that cooperative members support the cooperative not because they will attain 
higher marginal benefits or lower marginal costs than with alternative marketing agents but 
because they know that they will experience lower on farm transaction costs than in direct 
supply. Where prices and demand are fluid, farmers are saved the expense of constantly 
surveying the market. Furthermore, they experience lower risk for the price80 of dead on 
arrival insurance (about 12p per pig), credit insurance and early payment (11-18p per pig), 
which ensures that they receive the full worth against risk. Furthermore, for the price of 
1.09p per pig per day, they receive payment within 10-12 days, which gives them a 20p per 
pig saving on farm costs.clxxviii Such forms of insurance are not restricted to this cooperative, 
but can be found in others.   
 
In addition, while members are required to contribute to dedicated investments such as the 
YFLM pigs and Yorkshire Outdoor Pork brand, these are not perceived to be idiosyncratic or 
                                                                
80 Pigs are quite sensitive and may quite frequently die on the way to the abattoir, which means that they are not fit for purpose. Also 
cooperative operates an indemnity insurance scheme which can ensure payment within 7 days or 11 days. Normal payment periods for the 
abattoirs may be as much as 60 days, and with the level of consolidation of the sector there has been and is a high risk of non-payment to 
farmers.   
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of any prolonged magnitude. The lack of awareness of the specifics and the tradition of not 
paying income surplus to the farmers has meant that these investments are generally not 
recognised as costs. The strategy of consistently retaining any surplus in value and investing 
in initiatives designed to either reduce costs or increase the price received has not aided the 
cooperative to improve their share of economic surplus, or even greatly reduced the marginal 
costs over marginal benefits for members, but what it has done is enabled the cooperative to 
improve the service in a sector that is characterised by individualistic calculatively rational 
individuals. 
 
9.3.3 Problems of non-excludability 
 The findings are even more interesting with the issues of non-excludability. As a small 
cooperative one might have expected to find a strong level of cohesiveness based on 
common interest. This is all too evidently not the case. Whilst the industry itself is small 
and littered with working groups under the remit of the British Pig Executive, each 
looking to improve the practices in and efficiency of the industry, pig farmers place 
self-interest far above that of the collective because of the high risk of moral hazard and 
non-placement of pigs.  
This is managed by marketing staff, which believe that the value of the cooperative is 
determined by the quality of the personal service offered. In consequence, farmers, 
whilst cognisant of the value of the cooperative as a means of reducing effort and risk at 
an individual level, are transient parties, and are more loyal to individual marketers than 
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the collective as a whole. As indicated earlier, the marketers expect to take a percentage 
of their “customers” with them when they move employer.  The case study also throws 
light on the issue of external free-riding. In the pig industry, unlike, for instance, the 
grain futures or milk markets, contract prices vary according to average prices received 
from all pig sales from the previous week. While there has been an increase in cost plus 
and combination pricing structures, it would appear that the predominant measure of the 
price on a week to week basis under contract is that of the DAPP. This means that any 
price received is dependent on the number of pigs which were up to the agreed weight 
and probe levels on all contracts, and the extent to which price penalties are served on 
farmers by the abattoirs.  The ability of the cooperative to exclude the impact both 
positive and negative on the sector because of the pricing mechanism is negligible. It is 
questionable whether such a mechanism, which was part of the mechanism deployed by 
the 1932 government to encourage pig farmers, reduce price oscillations and increase 
the self sufficiency of the sector, is to the benefit of the industry, given the original 
remit of the cooperative. 
9.4 Conclusion 
In the context of this thesis, it is argued that cooperative actions are able to deliver 
improvements in profitability in agriculture when they are able to increase benefits, and 
where benefits to members outweigh costs. It is held that where cooperatives can increase 
gross benefits and where those who bear the costs reap the benefits, collective action will be 
sustained.  
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In the previous two case studies, findings suggest that the sustainability of the cooperative is 
not necessarily a function of their ability to generate benefits in situations where benefit 
refers to increased leverage against their buyers. Findings indicate that certain products have 
distinct qualities which increase their price and demand sensitivity.   In this case the speed at 
which pigs increase weight and probe levels means that there is a short timeframe in which 
pigs can be placed, which means that the farmer is prone to moral hazard, a position which is 
made worse as a result of downstream industry structure and the pricing strategies deployed 
by the abattoirs. In highly contested markets, though retailers are able encourage abattoirs to 
switch suppliers, even where farmers are under contract, the cooperative has become unable 
to lever greater value for its members. 
This study was selected in order to examine the potential of YFLM to act as an effective 
mechanism through creating relative scarcity, and more latterly to increase motivational 
interest through the production of the Yorkshire Outdoor Pork brand. However, the 
cooperative has failed to achieve either of these objectives.  It was further anticipated that as 
a smaller cooperative there would be limited risk associated with the lack of internal 
cohesion, and again the case would seem to question this proposition. In addition, in the 
context of proposition 3, the boundaries between the internal and external market place 
appear to be infinitely and reciprocally permeable and hence the issue of external free-riders 
is to some degree inappropriate, because when there is a continual cycle of pig volumes and 
prices, the presence of a pig cooperative can in shortage markets have a positive impact as 
well as a negative one.  Even on a weekly basis it can have both a negative and a positive 
yardstick effect. Once again it raises the question as to why the cooperative has not failed, 
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and it becomes apparent that as long as there remain sufficient numbers of smaller farmers 
within the sector, members are interested in maintaining a relationship with an individual 
who can be relied upon to market their pigs to their best advantage and provide a service that 
relieves the farmer of the perpetual task of searching for the best deal for all or some of their 
pigs. The farmer reduces on-farm costs significantly by passing on the job of both placing 
pigs and locating alternative buyers when numbers of pigs exceed contractual terms. Such 
service is a key element in the choice of the agent and the cooperative. 
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CHAPTER 10 – DISCUSSION 
10.0 Introduction 
In the context of the decline in global farm prices and international pressure for trade 
liberalisation (Drummond et al., 2000; Ward, et al., 1998; Oglethorpe, 2005), the aim of this 
research is to gain a greater understanding of the extent to which agricultural marketing 
cooperatives can address the crisis in agriculture. 
In the aftermath of deregulation, policy makers hoped to improve the financial position and 
sustainability of the farming sector by seeking alternative market opportunities and 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the food supply chain. These events were to be 
promoted through the government promotion of both vertical and in the context of this 
research horizontal collaboration within the food chain (DEFRA, 2000; Curry, 2002; 
DEFRA, 2006). This research thesis questions the effectiveness of farmer coalitions in 
current market structures. In the exploratory framework, as seen in chapter 4, it has been 
suggested that in order to serve the interests of farmers, cooperatives need to be able to 
achieve leverage and cohesion.  
As discussed earlier, cooperatives are being touted as a solution to the problems facing 
agricultural producers through offering farmers the potential to a) generate added value 
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products to differentiate them within the market, b) provide a countervailing power  when 
faced with downstream market concentration.  This thesis draws upon two key bodies of 
literature drawn from in the first instance Power Dependency Theory and in the second 
common property and free riding problems within collectives (Olson, 1965). This literature 
exploratory research framework suggests that   cooperation of this kind will only be an 
effective counterweight when the cooperative is able to achieve either scarcity relative to 
that of the exchange partner or improve the motivational interest of the exchange partner. 
Even where benefits are attained, cooperatives can be undermined as a consequence of the 
lack of cohesion and the free rider problem (Olson, 1965). 
This leads to the position expressed in the exploratory framework, that where there is a lack 
of organisational cohesion, the cooperative may be unable to act as a counterweight and 
deliver benefits, and conversely the failure of the cooperative to act as a counterweight may 
lead to a loss of organisational cohesion.  The exploratory framework has further suggested 
that the presence of external free riding may similarly impact on the ability of the 
cooperative to deliver leverage. 
Following the examination of three case studies, the findings of this research are that all the 
three cooperatives have largely failed to deliver improved leverage. This failure can be 
attributed to the imbalance in the distribution of power within all three food supply chains. 
This position is analogous to the problems experienced by non-cooperative firms (Cox et al., 
2005; Hingley, 2005). Furthermore, findings were not inconsistent with the suggestion that 
even where leverage is improved, cooperatives are unable to exclude free riding problem. 
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The loss of cohesion can result in member defection, increasing the burden of costs to 
members and further encouraging members to defect, thereby undermining the longevity of 
the cooperative; an event that has been witnessed in both commodity and added value 
marketing cooperatives. However, the research findings did point to the idea that 
cohesiveness of cooperatives in general may not be a consequence of the achievement of 
greater leverage and improved farm gate prices. The findings, suggest that in the three cases 
examined, cooperatives continued to operate because they either a. delivered other benefits, 
b. were a better solution to marketing than other options or c. members had sunk costs in the 
cooperative and the cost of leaving the cooperative was greater than remaining.  
These findings and their implications for the development of an explanatory model will be 
examined in more detail throughout this chapter. 
10.1. Summary of findings 
The UK Government policy implies that the formation of cooperatives reduces the ability of 
the dominant party to seek gratification elsewhere, thereby creating a climate for the delivery 
of a fundamental transformation and enabling farmers to become price makers. This position 
is in line with many EU and Non EU countries (Hendrikse, 2004). 
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Figure10.1 the exploratory framework 
As is represented in figure 10.1, the exploratory framework was devised from the two 
existing strands of literature on cooperatives (Emerson, 1962; Olson, 1965). This was then 
used as a heuristic device in this research. As discussed in chapter 5, this stage of the 
analysis involved an analysis of the data through content and thematic analysis and cross 
comparisons of the findings within each of the case studies, through comparative analysis.  
In the first part of this section, the author examines the evidence from the case studies and 
explores the effectiveness of these three cooperatives as a means of redressing power 
imbalances.  
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10.1.1 Redressing power imbalances 
All cases suggested that the ability of the cooperative to improve margins and farm gate 
prices was severely restricted when supplying into a highly concentrated and indeed 
contested market. Cooperatives faced severe competition not only from their horizontal 
competitors, but also from buyers, and this blunted any impact from collective action. SGT 
and First Milk have not increased leverage through attempts at increased scarcity and where, 
as in the case of First Milk or YFLM, investments have been made in added value products 
such as cheese and sausages, there is no evidence of improved leverage either. The attempts 
of YFLM to increase relative scarcity have proven to be of some benefit to farmers, but their 
success over the longer term would appear doubtful. In all three cases, whilst the 
cooperatives are continuing to trade, the industry is shrinking as a whole. 
Figure 10.2 Summary of findings – the ability of the cooperative to improve leverage 
Is there evidence that the 
cooperative/s have been able to 
improve leverage through 
scarcity or motivational 
investment 
SGT  First Milk  YFLM 
Evidence of  the impact of  
absolute/relative scarcity  on 
farm gate prices/ margins 
Unable to increase 
scarcity 
Unable to increase 
scarcity  
Able to 
increase 
relative 
scarcity  
The cooperative was able to 
increase the motivational 
investment of the grocery 
multiples;  
 
Unable to increase 
motivational 
interest 
Unable to  
increase 
motivational 
interest 
Unable to 
increase 
motivational 
interest  
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10.1.1.1 Absolute/relative scarcity  
The ability of the cooperative to generate increased leverage through engineering an increase 
in absolute/relative scarcity, as explored in chapters 2 and 4, is contingent on the balance of 
specific power attributes, such as  causal ambiguity, inimitability, reputational effects, 
 switching costs, concentration and access to distribution channels. 
 As shown in figure 10.2., the findings of this research suggest that whilst in the case studies 
selected the cooperatives have been unable to achieve a position of scarcity to any extent, 
these findings are not inconsistent with the ideas that cooperative could increase leverage in 
order to generate improved farm gate prices. This will be examined in more detail within this 
section. 
The position held within the exploratory framework was that if the cooperatives were able to 
achieve a position of absolute scarcity, it would be anticipated that they would be easily able 
to find alternative buyers and offer products that are difficult to substitute in a market with 
low levels of competition and contestation (Porter, 1985; Barney, 1991). Were the 
cooperative to be less dependent on their buyers, there would be limited or no constraints or 
costs associated with switching distribution channels.  This would be of particular 
significance if they were either cost leaders or offering a differentiated product and if the 
market was significantly concentrated to inhibit the switch of buyers to alternative channels 
(Porter, 1985: Barney, 1991). In the event, the cooperatives studied failed to achieve 
absolute scarcity, but more importantly the findings suggest that even where absolute 
scarcity is not achieved,  farm income would be lower were the cooperative not present. 
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Such findings suggest greater complexity to cooperative success than is apparent in the 
exploratory framework. 
Each of the three cooperatives examined are/were highly dependent upon their buyers, 
despite the presence of few alternative suppliers. In the cases of SGT and YFLM, whilst 
there were any number of substitute growers and farmers, a function of the GATT 
agreements, there were a limited number of direct competitors to the cooperative. Yet they 
are unable to either increase their leverage position in respect of their buyers or close the 
market. This is because they were disproportionately small in contrast to their buyers. The 
members of SGT represented fewer than 10% of the total number of UK growers, whilst the 
proportion of members of YFLM out of the total holdings represented less than 2%, with a 
year on year decline in numbers of potential members. Furthermore, despite being promoted 
as British through lobby groups and governmental promotional executives, both 
commodities were easily substituted by retailers who were able to draw from a surfeit of 
overseas supplies. The ease of substitutability was in the main a consequence of the relative 
indifference of consumers and the limited operational and commercial importance of British 
produce. 
Equally noteworthy is that in both these two sectors, the proportion of home group produce 
to total supply continues to decline. Whilst average figures for self-sufficiency are 60% 
across other indigenous products, the top fruit and pig sectors provide 25% and about 40% 
respectively of total supply. This is because in both cases the reduction of possible exports to 
third countries by the major agricultural producers in Europe has resulted in the erosion of 
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the position of UK producers, because the UK has persistently failed to improve efficiency 
of production in line with its European competitors. Strong agricultural countries such as 
Denmark and the Netherlands are producing at a more competitive cost than their UK 
counter parts, and, as suggested by the exploratory model, offer a ready substitute to UK 
pork.  
Even in the milk sector, where there are barriers to entry for imports, a consequence of  the 
UK consumers’ preference for “fresh” milk, UK cooperatives have failed to compete against 
their EU competitors. In the past, coalitions such as the MMB and Milk Marque were able 
successfully to create absolute scarcity and fix prices (Empson, 1998). This was because 
they were able to control both the supply and the market, essential in a product characterised 
by a short shelf life and vulnerable to moral hazard. More recently, milk cooperatives have 
failed to maintain their hold over both supply and demand, a consequence of the dual impact 
of the acquisition by EU cooperatives of UK Dairy interests and the astringent UK 
competition policy (Frank, 2001).  The failure of the UK government to allow Milk Marque 
to move into milk processing has increased the vulnerability of the emerging smaller UK 
cooperatives, offspring81 of Milk Marque. These three cooperatives have not only failed to 
gain a significant share of the processed milk market but have collectively lost control over 
milk supply. 
                                                                
81 These were known as First milk , Milk Link and Dairy Farmers of Britain at the beginning of the research but initially Axis became First 
Milk and Zenith became Dairy Farmers of Britain 
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Competitors, through poaching the most accessible farmers, are able to undermine the ability 
of the cooperative to create scarcity and place pressure on farm gate prices. Yet, the inability 
of First Milk, and its predecessor Milk Marque, to assume control over demand was not 
solely a function of horizontal competition, but also a consequence of the introduction of two 
additional tiers of intermediaries. In the first instance, retailers became an intermediary 
between the dairies and consumers as they emerged as main purveyors of milk to the 
consumer market. In the second, in an attempt to ensure their power position, retailers 
introduced an additional tier, that of Category Managers. Retailers took over the consumer 
market by introducing milk as a loss leader, and when faced with the increasing 
consolidation and contestation of their supply base ensured their power position through the 
locking in of key dairies through offering them the role of category leaders. This strategy 
was not isolated to the Milk sector and is evident in both the other two cases.  
In the case of SGT, the large numbers of acceptable substitutes have meant that retailers 
have switched to an increasing number of overseas suppliers. This is despite the presence of 
lobby groups for British fruit. The result has been a failure by SGT to safeguard farm gate 
prices at a level greater than the costs of production, a position aggravated by a consolidated 
buyer’s market and a decision made by SGT and Chingford to reduce their customer base.  
Both SGT and the category manager Chingfords have tied up the lion’s share of their 
business in their key customer Sainsbury’s. In line with research undertaken by Cox et al., 
this would appear to suggest that this action has not enhanced their operational importance to 
either the retailer or Chingfords (Cox, et al., 2002). 
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Conversely, the retailer, because of dedicated supply conditions and high switching costs for 
suppliers and the ease by which they  can switch suppliers, has effectively increased their 
operational importance to the category leaders, Chingfords, and consequently the topfruit 
cooperative SGT (Cox, et al., 2002). 
Yorkshire Farmers Livestock Market Ltd has also been unable in any real way to improve 
leverage through scarcity, in the face of vertical competition from multiple retailers. As with 
the other two sectors, traditional distribution channels have been eroded, to be replaced by 
dedicated supply chains, now managed by category leaders, to the multiple retailers. 
Deterred from sourcing to alterative buyers and in the presence of a contested supply market, 
category leaders are put under pressure to cut costs and attempt to constrain the prices paid 
to the cooperative members.  
What has been particularly notable within the pig sector, though, is that the cooperative is 
able to improve average prices for members during weeks of shortage.  YFLM have been 
able to improve farm gate prices for members through management of supply and demand at 
a weekly level for the processors. This has proved to be counter intuitively a function of their 
restricted size and the small numbers of excess pigs they have to place.  
However, while the ability to play this role in the short term is of value to YLFM members, 
the ease of switching between suppliers over the long term, particularly to those located in 
Europe, infers a longer term deflation of prices paid to producers located in the UK and the 
exit of a large number of pig farmers from the sector. This position could change on the full 
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adoption of the new welfare constraints by European producers, but even were European 
farmers to exit the sector as a consequence of the increases to on-farm costs; there is no 
certainty that the possible ensuing price increases would stimulate the resurgence of the UK 
pig industry.  
In conclusion, the suggestion that the cooperatives are unable to redress power imbalances 
through coalition formation is not contrary to the ideas extracted from the work of Emerson, 
but findings suggest that the cooperative is not a sufficient counterweight to redress power 
imbalances when faced with current downstream market structures. Nonetheless it is 
apparent that without cooperatives, the UK farming sector would be suffering an even 
greater crisis than currently. 
To some extent findings are in line with research undertaken by Hendrikse et al. (2001), 
where the suggestion is that cooperatives were under threat because of the disappearance of 
shortage markets. Interestingly these ideas are consistent with research conducted in the 
context of the non-cooperative firm, where similarly it was found that the power distribution 
within UK retail supply chains inhibited leverage (Cox et al., 2005; Hingley, 2005b).  
10.1.1.2. Motivational interest -status giving  
Two of the three cooperatives have also made the attempt to improve leverage through the 
introduction of branded products. However, as with the issue relating to scarcity, neither 
cooperative has really improved the position of farmers, although it is important to note that 
some benefits have been accrued. The ability of the cooperative to improve status and 
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leverage, as explored in chapters 2 and 4, is contingent on the balance of specific power 
attributes, these findings are summarised in figure 10.2 and will be discussed in more detail 
in this section. 
As is noted in chapters 2 and 4, the exploratory framework suggests that cooperatives would 
be able to deliver leverage if it were to become more indispensable to the buyer in terms of 
its contribution to the buyer than the buyer was to them (Cox et al., 2002). This is seen in 
terms of operational importance, relating to proportion of spend and tacit knowledge and 
strategic importance of supplier to the buyer, as seen in terms of the impact of revenue and 
image. As expressed in earlier chapters, the ability of cooperative to increase motivational 
interest is not purely dependent upon their power attributes, but the relative balance of power 
attributes held by both parties (Emerson, 1962). 
What is clearly evident in the case of First Milk is that investment in Cheese production, a 
strategy that was to serve the dual purpose of reducing the costs of collection from more 
peripheral farms and of increasing motivational interest of retailers, has failed to deliver 
significant returns. Whilst First Milk has, in effect, materialised as a category leader, its 
strategy of developing provenance brands and "adding value” has generated little leverage in 
a market where manufacturers and retail own branded products are prolific. Indeed, the 
requisite levels of investment have proved problematic for the cooperative as a whole. 
Furthermore, cheese, and in particular the ubiquitous cheddar cheese, is a widespread 
solution to the problems of milk perishability in anglophile exporting countries. This means 
that the cooperative has faced considerable competition and pressure on prices.  
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This position is similar to the experience of the pig cooperative, YFLM. Many pig farmers 
have diversified into the butchery and processing sector for the production of locally 
identifiable organic products like sausages and bacon. These have been sold both through 
mainstream retailers as well as through more niche venues such as farm shops and farmers’ 
markets. Whilst direct sales to the consumer generate higher margins, these represent 
significantly less than 5% of sales, and in order to benefit greater numbers of members larger 
volumes need to be sold, and these can only be sold through multiple retailers.  
 
The opportunity to augment retailer motivational interest has been found to be negligible and 
as the volume produced by the cooperatives increases there is a considerable risk of 
increasing both their operational and commercial reliance upon the retailer; an effect that can 
in fact reduce margins to a level that generates lower value than sales of pork. Despite media 
interest, local organic produce is of limited importance to multiple retailers in a market 
where private retail labels account for 80.6% of sales. Even in the case of Bramley apples, a 
product exclusive to the UK, consumers largely fail to differentiate on the basis of 
provenance. 
In conclusion, with reference to the exploratory model, whilst there is some variability 
within these results, they do suggest that cooperatives endure despite their inability to 
improve leverage, although it is still contended that successful cooperatives need to improve 
leverage. Yet these findings place a question mark over the continued presence of the 
cooperatives within the market. It is evident that the continued presence of a cooperative in 
the markets is not necessarily a consequence of leverage.  This means that there are strong 
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suggestions that not only are these findings not adequately explained by any previous 
research on cooperatives, but are inconsistent with current theory on determination of 
governance structures (Emerson, 1962; Williamson, 1985: Cook, 1995; Van Bekkum, 2001).   
10.1.2 Findings on cohesion, and member costs  
In parallel, the exploratory framework suggests that there is an iterative relationship between 
the cohesiveness of the cooperative and its ability to improve the leverage position of 
members and thus farm gate prices and margins. The framework suggests that the longevity 
of the cooperative and thus the delivery of increased farm gate prices and margins may be 
threatened where costs of cohesion to members exceed the gains.  Members incur costs of 
cohesion as a consequence of direct costs of the management of the cooperative, the so 
called asset specific costs, of indirect costs of free riding, and of measures designed to inhibit 
free riding as in monitoring, sanction, lobbying mechanisms. These are noted in more detail 
in figure 10.3.  
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Figure 10.3 from figure 3.1 from Chapter 3 showing the costs of coalition  
Figure 3. 1: Costs of tensions between individual and collective interests  
Costs of the cooperative to members – tension between individual and collective good 
Source  Costs  
Direct costs    
 
Asset specific 
investment  
 Site specific – extent to which the site can be relocated post contract  
 Physical – assets to meet specific stipulations by the cooperative  
 Human- specific skills or knowledge held by cooperative and 
cooperative members 
 Dedicated – investment on and off farm in processes dedicated to key 
customers 
 Brand – investment specific to a product or brand 
 Temporal – assets which depreciate over time if not maintained 
 
Indirect costs   
the common 
property and free 
rider  problem 
 
Internal – 
 over production –costs caused by a decrease in price as a result of 
excess production levels by some or all members 
 Non-alignment additional–costs experienced by compliant members  
caused by compliant members who are not compliant 
 Non-investment off farm – failure or resistance to investment in 
processing, marketing and delivery systems, often due to problems 
such as horizon 
 
 External free riding – members bearing the costs of cohesion where 
the benefits are non- excludable to external parties  
 
Transaction costs   Metering/ monitoring costs –costs incurred in monitoring compliance 
 Lobbying –costs of negotiation, influencing opinions 
 Sanction and allocation- costs incurred in assuring compliance  and 
loss of inefficiencies, where compliance measures fail 
 Shirking cost –cost of compliance for compliant members not 
incurred by non- compliant members. 
Agency costs   Costs of monitoring and costs of failure to monitor managers  
However, as discussed in chapter 4, where these costs exceed alternatives or, as professed by 
Olson, where  the marginal cost to the individual farmer were to exceed their marginal 
return, farmers would no longer perceive a value in membership and would exit the 
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cooperative, thereby undermining its cohesion ( Olson, 1965). A comparison of the case 
studies shows findings are both congruent and incongruent to those suggested by the 
exploratory framework and the literature.  This is as summarised in figure 10.4 below and 
will be explained in more depth within this section. 
The cohesiveness of the 
cooperative declines where 
direct and  indirect costs rise 
SGT  First Milk  YFLM 
The costs of organising and 
sustaining the cooperative 
were greater than the 
commercial gains obtained 
from leverage. 
Perceived costs on 
membership are not 
greater/ equal to gains 
Perceived costs greater than 
gains 
Perceived costs are 
not equal or greater 
than gains 
Cohesion of cooperative Congruent -presence 
of cohesion  higher 
direct costs on leaving 
the cooperative 
Cooperative was losing 
membership through 
poaching – a position 
exacerbated by high costs of 
investment  
Congruent - 
cooperative  
survived , lack of 
awareness of direct 
costs/ asset specific 
costs 
Reason for cohesion  Sunk costs by 
members  
Other benefits  
Least worst  option for 
members Yardstick effect 
Other benefits 
delivered to 
members 
Figure 10.4 Costs and cohesion and longevity of cooperative 
 
In the case of First Milk, operating in a highly contested dairy sector where the continual 
search  for increased efficiency in processing is driven by the multiple retails, members 
experience high costs of asset  investment, particularly in physical and dedicated 
investments.  These have included cheese factories, shares in liquid dairy companies, milk 
swapping schemes and educational programmes run by First Milk Academy. 
High direct costs have resulted in the disaffection of certain farmers, particularly those who 
believed that they were in receipt of little direct gain from the investment programme of the 
cooperative, described by the literature as the portfolio problem (Cook, 1995;.Sykuta, et al., 
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2001; Chaddad, et al., 2004).  Problems of this nature have been identified in the discussions 
leading up to the development of the exploratory framework in chapters 3 and 4 in which it 
has been suggested that larger cooperatives were at greater risk of higher direct costs of 
cohesion as a function of the heterogeneity of interests of members (Sandler, 1992; 
Hariyoga, 2004). In the case of First Milk, for whom the bulk of their pool of farmers are 
increasingly those who are geographically disadvantaged and of little interest to the non-
cooperative dairies, heterogeneity of interests of members has been further increased as a 
result of the acquisition of creameries as a means of reducing transportation costs. 
Disaffection by more advantaged farmers is not simply a function of the cost of asset 
investment but their increased awareness of the destination of their milk as a consequence of 
contractual distinctions made between compositional and liquid milk.  The ensuing member 
defection not only exacerbates the problem of how to attain financial equity, (Bijman and 
Ruben, 2005), but undermines even further the cohesion of the cooperative.  These findings 
are largely in line with existing literature in which it is argued that larger cooperatives are 
more prone to the loss of cohesion as a function of the free rider problem (Olson, 1965; 
Hardin, 1968).  
 
The cooperative and indeed the sector as a whole has attempted to deal with the free rider 
issue through the introduction of differentiated farm gate prices awarded according to the 
farmers’ involvement in cost cutting exercises such as every other day collections and the 
even allocation of total costs of distribution amongst members.82 Yet these have largely 
                                                                
82 Although it is worth recalling that incentives are given where farmers accept flexible collection times and every other day collection 
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served to exacerbate the problem still further, stimulating younger and often less peripheral 
farmers to question the costing system delivered given the location of their farm; an 
interesting take on the Horizon problem.  
 
It could be argued that the cooperatives have shouldered the on-farm allocative inefficiencies 
of less well located farmers and a higher burden of infrastructure costs than non-cooperative 
dairy companies83.  
 
In contrast, both SGT and YFLM members experience limited loss as a result of asset 
specific investment.  In the case of SGT, this is simply because off farm investment is 
negligible, whilst in the case of YFLM, the nature of how the farmer is paid and how fees are 
charged means that the member’s attention is not drawn to their loss. Findings within the 
two case studies also support the idea that small cooperatives such as YFLM and SGT tend 
not towards high indirect costs of cohesion. It has been argued both in the literature and 
exploratory model that cohesiveness in smaller cooperatives is a consequence of the 
observability of members leading to lower costs of cohesion (Olson 1965; Riesman, 1990). 
The theory suggests that smaller cooperatives are more likely to be sustained than larger 
ones. There may be occasions when this is true, but this research offers an alternative 
explanation. Findings within YFLM and SGT suggest that there is limited internal free 
riding, but that this is not, as noted earlier, a function of ease of visibility of member actions.  
                                                                
83 Both cooperatives First Milk and Milk Link have taken this role 
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The area of interest within these two case studies is that low transaction and agency costs are 
more a function of,  in the one case, the individuality of sanctions experienced by members 
(SGT members experience sunk costs as a consequence of PO status), and in the other the 
individuality and tailored alternative rewards or benefits (YFLM).  
In particular, in the case of SGT, limited free riding is a result of the PO framework, where, 
if products fail to meet the retailer quality specification, the culprit individually bears the 
penalty costs. Members of SGT experience individual penalties for non-conformance, 
including costs of packhouse grading and additional transport costs. When they fail to meet 
retailer specification they also receive, as well as the additional costs associated with product 
returns, a lower farm gate price from subsequent buyers. This in effect is the process of 
individualising the costs of free riding, a mechanism which if does not remove the potential, 
at least removes the indirect cost to those members who conform to cooperative objectives.  
There are similarities to be found in the case of YFLM, but here the limited indirect costs of 
cohesion are associated with a lack of coalition identity, which is a function of the 
personalised individualised service delivered to members by the cooperative. Because there 
is no overt common interest, and thus few monitoring and sanction costs, members remain 
loyal to the marketing acumen of the marketers that serve them. In both these two case 
studies size is an issue, in that the limited numbers allow for the individualism of rewards 
and retributions, rather than inhibiting their need as stated in the exploratory framework.  
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10.1.3 The iterative relationship between leverage and cohesion 
 
In the context of both the literature and indeed the exploratory framework, the iterative 
relationship between benefits and cohesiveness has not been found to be evidenced in full, 
nor has it proved to be the only explanation. It is evident that there are other factors that have 
emerged as a consequence of cooperative action, as is explicit in figure 10.4. 
 
As suggested by the exploratory framework, the ability to manage the free rider problem 
allows for the retention of members and cooperative cohesion. However, in both the smaller 
cooperatives it was evident that, while the management of the free rider problem has meant 
that there are low costs of cohesion, it is the recognition of the individual member’s 
rationality rather than the delivery of benefits that has engineered the sustained presence of 
the cooperatives. The results show that it is the individualisation of the costs of cohesion in 
the case of SGT and the individualisation of the benefits received by members as in the case 
of YFLM that has maintained member loyalty. These results show clear evidence of 
calculative rational behaviour.   
 
While the decisions made by members of both SGT and YFLM are calculative, the factors 
which have led to these decisions are different. In the instance of SGT, members have sunk 
costs or exit barriers, which increases their loyalty and thus cooperative cohesion.  These 
sunk costs relate to any investment on their farms part funded by the Producer Organisation, 
which would revert to the cooperative were the member to leave. Such sunk costs ensure the 
survival of the cooperative despite the lack of benefits.  Yet, contrary to the framework and 
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literature, the presence of exit barriers does not lead to greater benefits. In fact as will be 
discussed later, this case study suggests quite otherwise. 
 
In the case of YFLM, the lower costs of cohesion are attained through meeting individual 
needs, but in meeting these, the cooperative could be said to offer benefits other than 
financial to its members. These benefits include support in the development of husbandry 
techniques, insurance against non-payment by abattoirs and early payment schemes. It is 
these schemes plus a high degree of trust in their marketing agent that result in member 
loyalty and the continued presence of the cooperative in the market. In other words it is the 
additional benefits supplied by the cooperative not the relationship between low cohesion 
costs and farm gate prices that has ensured the longevity of this cooperative. 
 
Finally, in an examination of the position of First Milk, findings would also appear to 
diverge from those expected from the mainstream cooperative literature and exploratory 
framework. Whilst it might have been expected that the issues of free riding and member 
defection might have led to the collapse of the cooperative, this has not been so.  The 
members’ fear of free riding at First Milk has led to increasing inefficiencies associated with 
costly distribution structures and farm location. This is of interest as inefficiencies in 
cooperatives are normally associated with non-investment in physical assets both on and off 
the farm, poor management and over production (Olson, 1965).  Olson expressed the 
problem as the risk that any increase in product prices would stimulate firms to increase the 
level of production, thereby leading to over production for the collective as a whole and, in 
consequence, a subsequent deflation of price. Here the deflation of price is a consequence 
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both of the asset specific costs associated with transportation and asset specific costs 
stemming from the strategies to reduce transportation costs.  
 
However, more importantly in this context, counter to the exploratory framework, despite 
the high asset investment and indirect cohesion costs, the cooperative continues to serve its 
members. This is unexpected as it might have been anticipated that a cooperative that has 
failed to improve farm gate prices and suffers from a lack of cohesion would fail. It is 
apparent that this could happen, in that Dairy Farmers of Britain went into receivership in 
2009.  
In this instance, it would appear that First Milk does provide additional benefits in the same 
manner as YFLM, but that the principal reason for survival is that, given the remoteness of 
many of the milk fields and the rising costs of transportation, there are few alternative 
options. First Milk is, for many farmers, the best option in a problematic situation. High 
costs of cohesion should mean that the cooperative should not survive, but whilst many 
farmers have left the cooperative, the cooperative still serves a significant proportion of the 
Dairy farming community.  
 
10.1.4 Further issues of non-excludability and its impact on the sector as a whole  
Finally, it has been proposed that the cyclical relationship between cohesion and benefits 
means that the presence of a cooperative within the market can result in an external free rider 
problem. This is contrary to existing literature, which holds that the mere presence of a 
cooperative within a market has a positive impact on the price paid to all farmers within the 
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sector, an effect most commonly known as the Yardstick Effect (Sexton, 1990; Sexton, 1990; 
Gunnerson, 1999) 
In this current study, the external freeriding can be seen as an issue in a number of ways, 
with both negative and positive implications for the members and farming sector as a whole. 
One of the critical findings relates back to the point made that where the cooperative is 
unable to deliver farm gate prices to members then this may undermine integrity/cohesion, 
and where a cooperative fails to maintain cohesion then this may inhibit the delivery of 
benefits. 
 
In an examination of the factors affecting the success of First Milk, it is apparent that the 
opportunistic strategies of rivals, who are actively poaching more attractive members from 
cooperatives, increase the burden of costs for members and thereby deflate farm gate prices. 
As previously discussed, the act of poaching in the dairy sector has meant that the key non-
cooperative dairies are able to reduce their own costs of collection, but at a cost to First Milk 
members, who proportionally incur higher costs of collection and transportation per unit of 
milk.  
Furthermore, while non-cooperative liquid dairy firms may offer for all year round 
production, the greater proportion of the cost of balancing the seasonality of milk supply 
would appear to be carried by the Dairy cooperatives, including First Milk. This has the net 
effect of increasing marginal costs and thus reducing net benefits for members, resulting, 
eventually, in a decline in price for the sector as a whole (Olson, 1965).   
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Much research has extolled the value of the yardstick effect (Sexton, 1986; Sexton et al., 
1987; Hoffman et al., 1997). It has been generally held that the yardstick effect is a 
mechanism that generates higher returns to farmers without passing on the cost to the 
consumer (Sexton and Sexton, 1987; Hanson, 1996; Peterson, et al., 1996). Such work, 
however, fails to recognise the potential negative impact of the yardstick effect that can 
emerge where producers supply highly contested markets, as purported in this research. 
Findings imply that this is the particular event which emerges from the presence of SGT 
within the topfruit sector. Being the smallest cooperative and their inability to negotiate 
against the category leaders for Sainsbury’s has the net impact of undermining the 
negotiating position of other top fruit suppliers within the sector. 
Additionally, findings also suggest counter intuitively that small cooperatives may influence 
the price for the sector as a whole. In the case of YFLM, this is a function of its ability to act 
as a market balancing mechanism and balance volume. However, over the longer term, their 
presence within the sector can be seen to reduce the burden of cost for competitors, thereby 
driving prices down over time in a highly contested sector supplying a concentrated retail 
sector.  
The ability of buyers to place pressure on farm gate prices is enhanced by the freely 
published and often misleading data on costs of production. The devolution of the costs of 
defective infrastructures by which non-cooperative firms are included in the costs of 
servicing remote areas or areas with few surviving farms is an interesting area of the free 
rider problem, which is in effect damaging to the sector as a whole. These examples are 
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clearly illustrations of calculative behaviour and are particularly evident in the dairy sector, 
but reiterate the perspective that the calculative rational decisions is one where benefits may 
be attained without the costs. 
 
The failure of the existing literature to consider negative impacts on prices may be attributed 
to a lack of consideration of the impact of imbalances of power within the supply chain. 
Where there are highly contested interfaces between consumers and purveyors of food, a 
highly consolidated and contested retail sector/purveying food to consumers, there is an 
impact not solely on first tier suppliers but also on second tier suppliers. In conflating the 
continued existence of the cooperative with its ability to operate at a competitive advantage 
with head to head competition, there is a failure to recognise that the presence of a 
cooperative in the market might be for some quite other reasons (Cook, 1995; Hanson, 1996; 
Hind, 1997; Hardesty et al., 2004).  
The case studies show that the survival of the cooperatives is a function of rational economic 
decisions by members, but also show that the cooperative needs to deliver benefits over and 
above farm gate prices, particularly in contested markets. In a situation where the sector is in 
considerable decline, the cooperative appears to be ballast, and stays the erosion of the 
farming community, at least in the short term. It can also be said that the cooperatives’ 
survival could in financial terms have a negative impact on prices received. This is because 
the rational solution for non-cooperative firms is that they should seek to undermine the 
cooperative.  
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10.2 Implications of discussion for the theoretical framework 
Whilst much of the exploratory theoretical framework has proved useful in the examination 
of the case study, there are complexities that have emerged from the research as set out in 
figures 10.2 and 10.3. While the findings from this research show little inconsistency with 
much of the exploratory framework, in that while the cooperatives in question were not able 
to improve leverage and the relationship between lack of cohesion and leverage did not 
present itself in the manner articulated, nonetheless there has been nothing within these 
findings to suggest that there is no relationship between improved leverage and the 
attainment of financial benefits for farmers. Furthermore, observations were not inconsistent 
with the idea that the success of a cooperative was contingent upon the ability to ensure 
cohesion. Nor was there anything observed that suggests that there was an iterative 
relationship between cohesion and leverage. However, the research did find that there were 
other reasons as to why a cooperative may continue to trade. It was found in the examination 
of the three case studies presented within this thesis that either sunk costs or the belief that 
the cooperatives were better than alternatives meant that members remained loyal despite the 
failure to deliver financial benefits. 
10.2.1 Leverage 
On one level, the findings demonstrate that for the most part the three cooperatives have 
failed to deliver real price improvements to farmers, with the possible marginal exception of 
YFLM. The cooperatives appear unable to increase scarcity for or motivational investment 
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of buyers, because of the persistence of power imbalances, despite coalition formation and 
the development of added value products. Yet these findings do not fundamentally refute the 
position that cooperatives who are able to effectively close the market through coalition 
formation or motivational interest can become an effective counterweight against more 
concentrated downstream markets; it simply suggests that in the market examined the 
traditional cooperatives examined have failed to do so. The research does not claim, 
therefore, that there are no circumstances that would allow cooperatives to attain leverage, 
but it does suggest that a proposition for future research could be: 
 Where cooperatives are able to improve leverage higher financial benefits can be delivered. 
 
10.2.2 Cohesion  
Furthermore, it is apparent that cooperatives can be seen to avoid problems of free riders. 
Current literature has particularly focused upon suggesting ways in which cooperatives can 
adapt their governance structure in order to promote cohesion and avoid free riding 
problems, particularly those associated with decision making, ownership and coherence of 
objectives84  (Porter et al., 1987; Cook, 1995; Bijman and Ruben, 2005). Indeed, it is evident 
that producer organisations were developed in order to redress the impact of free rider 
problems on the coherence of objectives, through the provision of a measure to ensure cost 
effective investment. 
                                                                
84 influence, control, horizon and portfolio problems 
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This research does suggest that whilst cohesion is a necessity in cooperative action, cohesion 
can be better attained where the focus is on the individual interests. This is more feasible in 
smaller cooperatives.  Cohesion is less attainable in larger cooperatives, and it does appear 
that there is causal relationship between free riding, cohesion, and longevity. In First Milk, 
where there is greater potential for heterogeneity in members' interests, internal free riding 
and thus cohesion may have an impact on the cooperative longevity.  This reflects the key 
literature, where Olson suggests that cooperatives exist to further the common interests of 
their members and will “perish” if they fail to do so (Olson. 1965 p. 6-7). This suggests the 
following proposition: 
 the effectiveness of cooperatives is linked to the ability of cooperatives to sustain  
cohesiveness 
 
10.2.3  The interrelationship between leverage and cohesion 
 
Finally, the exploratory framework suggested that there was an interrelationship between the 
cooperative cohesion and the ability of the cooperative to attain leverage against multiples: a 
process that was seen to be iterative. In earlier chapters it was suggested that a lack of 
financial benefits would drive the decline in cohesiveness of the cooperative with the 
increased risk of the disintegration of the cooperative and furthermore, that a lack of 
cooperative cohesion would lead to the inability of the cooperative to generate financial 
benefits.  Again, in this instance  the research did not find anything to refute this position, 
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indeed  the evidence found within the First Milk case study supported such a relationship; 
however, all three of the  three case studies suggested  other reasons as to why the 
cooperative was sustained. In the light of these findings the following propositions are 
proposed: 
1. Cohesive cooperatives may deliver increased benefits 
2. Cooperative able to deliver leverage through coalition formation and/or motivational 
investment may become more cohesive 
3. The loss of benefits does not automatically lead to a reduction in cooperative 
cohesion 
4. Cohesion  can be maintained as a consequence of: 
 The delivery of other benefits 
 Scarcity of buyers 
 Exit or Sunk costs 
10.2.4 Cooperatives and the external and internal freeriding – the Yardstick effect 
It is also of importance that this research shows a level of interconnectivity and permeability 
between the cooperative and its environment, in a manner which extends beyond traditional 
precepts of the cooperative as a “pacemaker” or “yardstick”. This research indicates that 
because of the levels of contestation within the market, cooperatives can have a negative as 
well as positive impact on prices. The proactive initiatives in two of the cooperatives, YFLM 
and First Milk, have the effect of increasing prices in the short term that improves prices for 
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the whole sector. As a consequence, if buyers then seek to find either alternative, cheaper 
suppliers, as in the case of YFLM, or to redistribute costs and reduce benefits to members, as 
in First Milk, price rises are swiftly followed by a price decline. In such circumstances it is 
problematic as to whether there would have been an even more marked deflationary impact 
on industry prices if the cooperatives were not in existence. This leads to the following 
proposition: 
 The failure to exclude rivals from receiving benefits without bearing the costs undermines 
the ability of the cooperative to maintain both benefits and cohesion. 
10.2.5 Summary of the previous sections 
The discussion in the last three sections postulates that the relationship specified between 
dependent and independent as expressed within the original exploratory framework is 
incomplete. Whilst it is apparent that cooperatives are not necessarily able to deliver improve 
farm gate prices, or indeed maintain cohesiveness, this has not led to their demise in the 
three case studies examined. This is of particular interest in the context of existing literature 
that suggests that traditional cooperatives are particularly vulnerable, due  both to the 
constraints placed on their access to external capital for investment, a particular hindrance in 
increasingly contested markets and their higher risk of free riding.  These findings however 
suggest that cooperatives are able to survive over the long term even where they are unable 
to increase leverage, and even where they are not cohesive. This does not refute the position 
that success in cooperatives is a consequence of their ability to deliver leverage and operate 
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cohesively. Furthermore, it fails to find evidence to suggest that there is not a causal 
relationship between cohesion and any attempt to improve leverage. 
10.3 Developing propositions and hypotheses 
The findings of this research suggest that farmers make calculative rational decisions on the 
value of cooperative action, based on the extent to which benefits are in excess of asset 
specific, agency and transaction costs and of the risks of free riding from parties inside and 
outside the cooperative. As a consequence, the ability of the cooperative to perform depends 
on complex causal relationships between the generation of improved farm gate prices, non-
price benefits, actions of competitors, head-on-head competition and cooperative cohesion. 
The cooperatives in this study continue to trade and maintain membership despite a 
persistent failure to improve farm gate prices, a situation that in one case seemed to be 
caused, ironically, by the benefits obtained from individual services provided by the co-op 
managers. Suffice to say, the study has made it clear that there are other benefits, aside from 
the government’s hoped for improved profits from increased leverage, that allows 
cooperatives to continue to trade.  In this respect, the Government policy seems to be a 
failure, but the cooperatives in this study have survived the failure.  
This means that the earlier causal diagram found in figures 4.2 and 10.1, as also seen in the 
leverage/free rider matrix figure 4.1, needs some revision. Figure 10.5 show these revisions 
and that there are additional relationships to consider. First, as highlighted above, leverage is 
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not essential for the survival of the cooperative. Second, it is apparent that free rider 
problems do threaten co-ops, but can be eliminated or reduced in smaller cooperatives where 
service is personalised. Third, two clearly new dimensions to the framework are that both 
leverage and cohesion can be undermined by the intervention of competitors. 
 
 
Figure 10.5 revisions of original framework  
 
What is notable is that cooperatives can lack cohesion and leverage and not disintegrate, as 
suggested in chapter 4. Nor is there any real indication that where there is cohesion and no 
leverage, or leverage and no cohesion, this will cause co-ops to fail over the longer term.  
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 However, it does seem to be the case that when cooperatives are larger, where there is 
greater heterogeneity and highly contested buyers’ and competitors’ markets, requiring the 
development of added value products, there is a greater risk of loss of cohesion and failure.  
 
The research, therefore, leads to the following propositions: 
Proposition 1 
 Where cooperatives are able to improve leverage higher financial benefits can 
be delivered. 
Proposition 2 
 The effectiveness of cooperatives is linked to the ability of cooperatives 
sustain  cohesiveness 
Proposition 3 
 Cohesive cooperatives may deliver increased benefits 
 Cooperative able to deliver leverage through coalition formation and/or 
motivational investment may become more cohesive 
 The loss of benefits does not automatically lead to a reduction in cooperative 
cohesion and  can be maintained as a consequence of: 
 the delivery of other benefits 
 best of possible options 
 sunk costs  
Proposition 4  
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 The failure to exclude rivals from receiving benefits without bearing the costs 
undermines the ability of the cooperative to maintain both benefits and 
cohesion. 
 
10.4 Conclusion 
Policy makers have emphasised the value of cooperatives as an alternative to direct 
intervention, but the failure to address the apparent limitations of this policy will result in the 
continued erosion of the farming sector, with the consequent implications for food security 
in the UK.  There is a clear need for the inability of cooperatives to act as an effective 
balancing mechanism to be fully understood and for more effective instruments for the 
promotion of the UK agricultural sector to be developed. 
This research has put forward an explanatory model for further investigation as derived from 
the exploratory framework, which has provided an interesting basis for initial research.  In 
addition to the contribution the research makes to both the theory of cooperatives and 
theories of power relations in contested environments, it provides the basis for further 
research, which may lead to insight into a more effective way of managing the development 
of the increased market orientation of the farming sector. Under the rural development 
programmes the government has emphasised the cooperative form as an instrument through 
which additional value is gained: either through greater efficiencies in existing relationships 
with buyers and/or in the development of new markets.  
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The government is inferring that coalitions, accompanied by a strategy of improving 
productivity through education and benchmarking, may result in a shift in power/dependency 
dynamics and will enable the withdrawal of residual direct support instruments such as 
Single Farm Payments. However, the delivery of benefits to farmers is contingent upon the 
ability of the cooperative to increase leverage, either through increasing scarcity or through 
the development of added value products that prove to be of operational and commercial 
importance to the buyers. This research has questioned the idea that either of these two 
expectations is realistic. Indeed, the persistence of cooperatives in the longer term would 
appear to be a function of their delivery of alternative benefits which cannot realistically 
over time sustain the farming sector. The policy, therefore, is at best an irrelevance, at worst 
a distraction from the need to consider more realistic policy options. Such policy options 
could include measures that focus on the development of a more effective transportation 
system. However, a measure which would be of benefit to farmers would be effective action 
by the Competition Commission in order to break up the working monopolies present 
downstream within the UK food supply chain.  
In terms of the exploratory framework that states that cooperatives will collapse if benefits 
are not attained, this research finds that, while farmers do make calculative rational decisions 
in order to maximise their own utility, there is an over simplistic assumption that all benefits  
may be measured in financial terms as above normal profits. Findings demonstrate that for 
the most part the three cooperatives have failed to deliver financial benefits to farmers, but 
they continue to survive as a result of additional services delivered that have an impact on 
net margins.  
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The next chapter will examine the limitations of this research and provide more in-depth 
recommendations as to the nature of future research in this area. 
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CHAPTER 11- 
 LIMITATIONS, CONTRIBUTION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
 
11.0 Introduction 
This chapter is to examine the limitations and recommendations for further research. In the 
first instance, this research has examined three cooperatives that are largely characterised by 
their similarity to traditional cooperatives. Since the execution of this research there have 
been a greater number of start- ups of cooperatives within the UK, as supported by the EFFP, 
that are operated under more relaxed rules of ownership, and democracy. This chapter first 
explores this as a key limitation and the implications of this and other limitations in terms of 
the contribution to knowledge of this research. The chapter concludes with insights into the 
main areas of contribution and the recommendations to extend this line of enquiry. 
 
11.1 The limitations  
 
 There are a number of limitations of this research, the identification of which will form the 
basis for the proposals for further research.  
In the first instance, this is exploratory work and whilst there are some important insights 
delivered here, this offers no potential for generalisation across either the UK or other 
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market contexts. Further research should be conducted to examine and test the propositions 
put forward in the discussion chapter of this thesis, and it suggested that this could be 
expanded to look at other commodities in the UK as well as cooperatives operating in other 
national contexts. In this research, despite the care in the selection of case studies, in all 
cases, cooperatives failed to deliver benefits, but survived. It would have been of interest to 
find cooperatives which were successful on both counts or to the contrary that had failed on 
both counts and disintegrated. Attempts were made to conduct research with Dairy Farmer of 
Britain stakeholders but there was considerable reluctance by parties to contribute to the 
research.  
This suggests another key limitation of this research. The research focus is on three 
cooperatives that have much in common with traditional cooperatives. At the start of the 
research in 2006, the development of Entrepreneurial cooperatives as seen and researched in 
mainland Europe, and US cooperatives, was underdeveloped in the UK.  Much of the 
research into Traditional cooperatives pointed to the difficulties experienced by cooperatives 
in two aspects - their ability to raise sufficient funds for mergers and acquisitions, and their 
speed of decision making where members retained or indeed were able to take advantage of 
their democratic rights.  
Key authors in the US and in mainland Europe, have argued that cooperatives will be able to 
generate more efficient sources of funds if they adopt one of a number of forms of 
Entrepreneurial cooperatives that have emerged over recent times ( Cook, 1995; Van Dijk, 
1996; Cook and Tong, 1997; Nilsson, 1998; Nilsson, 1999; Van Bekkum, 2001). It is held 
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that there are at least 4 types of cooperatives, namely PLC cooperatives and cooperatives 
with proportional tradable shares, both of which offer tradable shares to members, and 
participation shares cooperatives and subsidiary cooperatives, both of which offer shares to 
non-members 85(Van, Bekkum, 2001).  Van Bekkum extended the ideas to suggest that the 
choice of form of entrepreneurial cooperatives could be contingent upon market structures 
in which they were located.  
 In the light of the findings here it would be of value to examine the nature of the different 
forms of cooperative and their ability to deliver benefits to members (Nilsson, 1998: Van 
Bekkum, 2001). This thesis, because of the available cases, may not have examined whether 
new forms of cooperatives are able to generate leverage. Existing literature argues, in the 
context of Entrepreneurial cooperatives, that the presence of tradable shares offers 
cooperatives much more scope for economies of scale and scope. This, it is argued, is a 
consequence of their greater freedom to raise investment funds. In the case of PLC 
cooperatives and cooperatives with proportional shares, where they are able to raise 
additional funds through offering supplementary, tradable and appreciable shares to 
members, the so called “B” shares, this is seen to inhibit both the Portfolio and Horizon 
problem and members of these cooperatives experience no sense of loss of benefit. 
Similarly, participant share cooperatives and subsidiary cooperatives are able to trade 
shares on the open market, and thus the division between users, beneficiaries and control are 
seen to eliminate the free rider problem (Nilsson, 1998; Van Bekkum, 2001). In both 
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instances they represent a separation between on-farm and off-farm asset specific investment 
which reduces the impact of the common property problem. While Entrepreneurial 
cooperatives are relatively new to the UK and not evident at the time of this research in the 
UK, the lack of consideration is a limitation and a study of them would provide greater 
insights into the leverage problem. It is of interest to note that existing research on non-
cooperative firms holding equivalent shares of the market have failed to redress power 
imbalances (Cox, et al., 2005; Hingley et al., 2005).  
 
A further claim within the literature is that cooperatives are more able to perform where they 
offer closed membership. This is because they address the issue of the free entry of non- 
members into the cooperative who exploit the high farm gate prices generated by the 
countervailing weight of the cooperative and in so doing, reduce the impact of excess 
volume available for supply on the overall price. This again is a Horizon problem. Closed 
members is a further feature of certain types of Entrepreneurial cooperatives, however, 
current findings although not generalisable, have suggested to the contrary, specifically in 
the case of SGT, a closed member cooperative. Nonetheless, there is further more 
explanatory research that could be undertaken. This thesis, does nonetheless offer the basic 
framework through which further research could be undertaken for the purpose of expanding 
this area of inquiry. 
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11.2 Recommendations for future research 
In the first instance, as suggested in the previous section, there is a need to extend this 
research into other countries, commodities and markets.  This is particularly pertinent as 
there is an apparent initial interest in the financial performance of Entrepreneurial 
cooperatives (Lerman and Parliament, 1990; Kalogeras et al., 2005; Nilsson et al., 2012; 
Kalogeras et al., 2013), with much of the relevant work published following the first 
submission of this thesis for examination. 
Further to the main findings of this research, there are other key aspects which might prove 
to be of interest to researchers. This research suggests that simply promoting cooperatives 
may not effectively support farmers. A change in tack may be particularly necessary if 
further research supports the preliminary findings of this thesis, namely: 
1. that cooperatives may not necessarily be able to improve farm gate prices  
2. cooperatives serve other purposes than improving farm gate prices and gross margins 
3. cooperatives can serve to deflate industry price and can have a negative impact on food 
security and the sustainability of the sector as a whole 
It could be suggested that there is room for research into the nature of farm business support 
and national infrastructure. It is critical that the distribution of costs to farmers that are 
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incurred from the current infrastructure be re-evaluated in the light of the competitiveness of 
the farming industry. This is apparent particularly in the case of transportation systems, 
where farms are located away from the major centres of population and there has been little 
investment in more cost effective forms of transportation since the 1960s’ decision to shift 
from rail transport to road, following the Beeching Report. This line of research is in keeping 
with the ethos of the interdisciplinary strategy launched by the UK government in 2010 (UK 
Cross-Government Food Research and Innovation Strategy, 2010) 
11.3 Conclusion  
The chapter has highlighted the limitations of the research, in that at present it is an 
exploratory piece of work from which further research can be conducted. It suggests that 
following the submission of this work, a programme of study should be undertaken that tests 
the theory derived from the exploratory framework over a large number of cooperatives. It is 
felt the scope of the research should be extended, not only to consider traditional 
cooperatives but also the emergent entrepreneurial cooperatives. This chapter also suggests 
that there are signs that this research could have broader implications for government 
regional development policy beyond agriculture alone. The next chapter, chapter 12, 
concludes this thesis. 
  
299 
 
CHAPTER 12- CONCLUSION 
12.0 Introduction 
In this thesis, research has been undertaken in order to examine whether cooperative actions 
may deliver improved profitability in agriculture. The research has examined cooperative 
literature and determined two key strands that attempt to examine the nature of cooperative 
success. On the one hand the research draws upon a Power Dependency Theories which does 
not, hitherto, appear to been applied to the problem of the effectiveness of agricultural 
marketing cooperatives as mechanisms to redress power imbalances ( Emerson, 1962). On 
the second, the research draws upon common property literature (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 1968: 
Cook, 1995), which constitutes a more significant body of literature and examines the 
implications of cooperative governance structures on longevity and cohesion. These bodies 
of literature are drawn together from which it is recognised that there are few considerations 
of the relationship between cooperative cohesion and its ability to deliver literature in current 
research.  
On the basis of the evidence drawn from the literature review, this research has developed an 
A priori exploratory framework in order to examine the factors affecting the success of the 
cooperative governance form. The research attempts to reveal the “real” event, and combines 
content, thematic and comparative analysis to examine the findings from interviews, 
published and unpublished data. On the basis of this research, a theoretical framework has 
been developed for future testing.  
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However, prior to that testing, this research suggests in a preliminary way that there are 
further lessons to be learned. Inherent to the explanatory framework is the idea that even 
where farmers collaborate they attain insufficient power attributes to counter power 
imbalances when faced with the highly concentrated and contested buyers’ markets. These 
findings were consistent across the three cases examined. While the research at this stage is 
merely exploratory, there may be greater implications of this research but this would require 
a wider study of cooperatives across diverse market structures, commodities and countries.  
Interestingly, these findings are comparable to those of earlier studies in power and 
dependency that examined the balance of power in the retail sector, but where cooperatives 
were not the focus of attention, which lends further credence to these results. The research 
corroborates the point made in that earlier research that it is the distribution of power 
attributes between exchange parties that determines the balance of power.  
It further suggests, though, that the endurance or longevity of cooperatives is not simply a 
function of the delivery of financial benefits in the form of farm gate prices, but the delivery 
of individual needs for members. There are non-leverage benefits of co-op membership and 
in some cases these are supplemented by the fact that members’ other options outside the co-
op are less than attractive. So members demonstrate clear calculative behaviour, but the 
calculation is regarding non-leverage benefits. 
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12.1 The exploratory model and the research method 
The exploratory model suggests attainment of leverage through motivational investment or 
coalition formation and cooperative cohesion as demonstrated by member loyalty and 
cooperative longevity are critical to cooperative success. The model also suggests that this is 
an iterative problem that stems from the interrelation between leverage and cooperative 
cohesion. The issue is to what extent the model aids understanding of the factors affecting 
cooperative success. This research was conducted through a case study methodology, which 
is seen to be of particular value in the examination of what questions in exploratory research 
(Yin, 1994). Case studies have the further advantage of enabling multi-perspectival analyses 
and holistic in-depth investigation of a phenomenon, using multiple sources of data (Feagin 
et al., 1991; Yin, 1994 p. 23; Stake, 1995).  
The three cooperatives selected  might best be described as Traditional agricultural 
marketing cooperatives, in that members technically held the rights of ownership, decision 
making and,  with the exception of YFLM,  the earnings or surplus generated by the 
cooperative (Barton, 1989).  Furthermore, investment income was not attained through 
offering members B shares or attaining funds from external investors. Nonetheless, some of 
the cooperatives’ principles had been relaxed in each of the cooperatives selected.  This is 
particularly so for SGT which operated under a closed membership policy. 
The choice of cooperatives as case studies in this exploratory study was primarily in the 
interest of research validity and availability at the time of the research (Eisenhart, 1989; Yin, 
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1994: Merriam, 1998: Gerring, 2007). Availability was a particular issue in the selection of 
Traditional cooperatives as cases rather than the Entrepreneurial cooperatives which were 
rare in the UK at the start of this research. Further constraints were that the researcher failed 
to elicit responses from cooperatives located in the  “sudden death” quadrant of the 
leverage/cohesion matrix, illustrated in figures 4.1 and 12.1 ( see below), and failed to find 
any cooperatives delivering leverage and cohesion, as illustrated in the “successful” 
quadrant, which would have enabled further triangulation of findings.  
 
Figure 12.1 the potential outcomes:  the  leverage/free rider matrix 
Nevertheless, the researcher has given much consideration to issues such as the number of 
case studies, the unit of analysis, methods of data collection and data triangulation, each of 
which have been identified as critical factors in case design (Eisenhart, 1989; Yin, 1994). 
This research has chosen to undertake three case studies, with the view, despite the 
constaints, that multiple case studies are often considered more compelling and more robust 
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and are also based on two units of analysis, in line with the interpretation that the 
cooperative is both a collective of individual firms as well as a firm in its own right (Herriot 
and Firestone, 1983; Yin, 2009). 
12.2 The results and potential impact 
The results tend to suggest that there are distinct characteristics specific to the products, to 
their price and demand sensitivity, which is magnified by both the downstream industry 
structure and the pricing strategies, deployed by the abattoirs, dairies, and top fruit category 
managers. In highly contested markets, where retailers are able to place pressure on 
intermediaries and even though farmers were under contract, the cooperative was unable to 
lever greater value for its members.  
The research was interested primarily in the development of a theoretical framework that 
could be used in future research to examine the ability of cooperative action to redress the 
problems in the UK farming industry and to what extent it could realistically replace 
traditional sector support mechanisms. The findings of this research have placed a serious 
question over the ability of cooperatives to deliver in the context of a highly competitive 
market place. This is an issue of particular significance to self-sufficiency in the UK, whilst 
food security at a global level is apparently an increasing issue in a world with a population 
of over 7bn (Real world statistics, 2013). Improved market orientation through cooperative 
actions is seen to be critical in maintaining an effective and efficient farming sector and 
thereby ensuring self-sufficiency and food security.  
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Many have alluded to the success story of New Zealand. In 1984 New Zealand introduced 
policy reforms in agricultural policy that reduced support from 30% of the value of 
production to currently circa 1% and facilitated a growth in production of circa 2.5% per 
annum (Gilmour et al., 2007).  This, it is suggested, is proof that agricultural markets do 
adjust themselves where subsidies are removed. Research findings suggested that whilst 
farmer incomes declined after the reforms over a six year period, these readjusted (Le Heron 
et al., 1999). This is, in part, a consequence of the proximity of New Zealand to the major 
growth economic growth areas of Asia and China in particular. 
Since the GATT agreement, the UK government has sought to increase market orientation, 
and gradually to erode direct support. Unlike farm gate prices in New Zealand, prices in the 
UK have failed to readjust and, at best, have remained static.  The distinction between the 
two countries can be attributed to the  population size, marketing channels, more extensive  
access  into international markets,  and  the improved leverage position experienced by New 
Zealand due to a less contested  and consolidated customer base (Bijman, 2010; Cavicchi, 
2010).  Yet perhaps there are further questions to be raised.  Where benefits are defined in 
terms of farm gate prices and farmers gross margins, it may be appropriate to ask, on the one 
hand, whether these results are generalisable across all product sectors, cooperative forms 
and countries.  
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12.3 Contribution to Knowledge  
Nonetheless, this research offers some contribution to knowledge in a number of literature 
strands, including those of Cooperatives and Power and Dependency  
In the first strand, that of literature on cooperatives, the research contributes to two areas of 
the issue of cooperative success; on the one hand, the value of the cooperative as a counter 
lever to downstream power. 
In the context of leverage and power, some of the findings in this thesis would appear to be 
in line with the limited research into the issue of leverage and the ability of cooperatives to 
improve farm gate prices, particularly in the context of contested and competitive markets 
(Guillouzo, 2003; Cook, 1995; Hanson, 1996; Hind, 1997; Hardesty et al., 2004). One key 
issue raised by this study’s findings, which has been discussed in earlier research, is that the 
ability of the cooperatives to improve leverage is jeopardised when they are faced with the 
opportunistic behaviour of competitors; this is particularly so where there are sanctions 
imposed on the exit of members, as in open membership cooperatives (Cook, 1995; 
Hansmann, 1996). 
In line with previous research, this work produces some evidence to support the idea that 
even where the cooperative is able, over the short term, to have control over the volume 
delivered by members, their position is open to exploitation by external parties. Literature on 
cooperatives has pointed to the relative benefit of open and closed cooperatives, their 
implications and the impact on monopsonistic rents and market power (Youde and 
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Helmberger, 1966; Van Bekkum, 2001; Russo et al., 2011). This research corroborates their 
work in that it suggests that the success of cooperatives can be attributed to their ability to 
control aggregate supply when faced with horizontal competition (Cook, 1995).  
However, a real contribution to knowledge of this research is in the application of PDT  in a 
more rigorous evaluation of the market power and the success of cooperatives to improve 
leverage. Power Dependency Theory argues that coalitions are a key mechanism to adjust 
power imbalances. However, the concept has not until now been used to examine the 
cooperative problem. PDT suggests that cooperatives can potentially improve the financial 
position of farmers by increasing motivational interest and/or reducing the number of 
alternative sources of supply. Theoretical constructs based on PDT have been used to 
examine the distribution of power in B2B exchange relationships, but not explicitly in the 
context of agricultural marketing cooperatives and the ability of “coalitions”, as proposed by 
Emerson, to redress power imbalances (Emerson, 1976).  
Researchers have expressed concerns as to the ability of the cooperative form to improve the 
leverage position of cooperatives, whether through consolidation or the development of 
added value products in current markets (Staatz, 1987; Fitter, 2001; Goodhue et al., 2011), 
but research has tended to be limited, particularly in the context of improvements to margins 
through added value products. The present project has attempted to address this research gap 
and offers an explanatory framework through which further research could be delivered. 
In addition, the research has contributed to a second strand of literature, that of the 
expanding literature on governance and power in exchange relationships and literature on 
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power in B2B relationships ( Cox et al., 2005; Cox et al., 2007; Hingley, 2005; Hanf, 2011). 
There is further, more extensive research to undertake, but this work offers as an outcome of 
the research an explanatory model for future investigations. A further contribution to 
knowledge, which again needs further investigation but is nonetheless interesting, relates to 
the issue of free riding and in particular the issue of the Yardstick effect. The Yardstick 
effect is normally considered to stem from the presence of the cooperative in the market 
place and is seen to increase competition for supply in marketing agricultural cooperatives 
and thereby have a positive impact on farm gate price (Sexton, 1990; Gunnersson,1999). 
Whilst the results tend to support this position, they also suggest that in highly contested 
markets, Yardstick effects can also have a negative impact on prices as competing parties 
seek to undermine their rivals’ market position.  
These results can be also seen to contribute to the body of literature on cooperative cohesion 
and longevity, in that they suggest that a cohesive cooperative does not necessarily lead to 
improved leverage, but that the lack of cohesion and the fulfilment of individual goals can in 
fact lead to the collective good. This finding appears to be a ramification of the Yardstick 
effect, and would seem more in line with the principles found in classical and neoclassical 
economics than with the “logic of the commons”.  The consequence of the relationship 
between cohesion and delivery of the common good is that a lack of cohesiveness does not 
necessarily lead to the death of a cooperative.  
This is apparent even where they fail to deliver consistent improvement to farm gate prices. 
Where members are not hostage to the cooperative, the longevity of a cooperative appears to 
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be influenced where the firm offers additional benefits and support. This is of interest in that 
many have questioned the value of cooperatives as a governance structure and have 
emphasised the importance of increasing internal cohesion for the delivery of differentiation 
strategies and other initiatives (Cook, 1995; Van Bekkum, 2001).  
However, it is also important in relation to the import attributed to the development of 
mechanisms to increase the cohesiveness of effort by examining the implications of member 
trust and loyalty and coherence of objectives   (Staatz, 1989; James et al., 2005). Indeed the 
research also contributes to a further body of literature that has suggested that there is a need 
for a severance between ownership of cooperative assets and of individual farm assets ( 
Nilsson, 1999; Van Bekkum, 2001). This is because in each of these bodies of literature 
there is a suggestion that the barrier to implementing a strategy to increase the competitive 
advantage is the conflict between individual and collective goals; this would suggest that 
where it is evident that there is a divergence between the collective and the individual, as 
evident in research that proposes Entrepreneurial cooperatives (Nilsson, 1999; Van Bekkum, 
2001), there is room for a looser association. Again there is room for further, wider 
investigation into this issue.  
Finally, it is perceived that the findings of this research tend to suggest that at a policy level 
there is a need for reconsideration of the support infrastructure for farmers. The 
consideration of the infrastructure should include not simply the role of the support bodies 
but also the nature of transport infrastructure and its implications for a viable farming sector. 
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The rationalisation of the railway structure, following the Beeching report, has resulted in 
the loss of a competitively priced transportation system.  If UK rural areas are to continue to 
play an important part in the provision of the nation’s food supply, then the cooperatives 
may be able to play an important role. However, in this role, it is not possible that they 
should continue to absorb structural x-inefficiencies arising from the location of a farm and 
continue to support the farming sector.  
If the UK farming industry is to become competitive, there not only needs to be a more cost 
effective transport infrastructure, but also greater ease of access to distribution systems other 
than those dedicated to the major retail chains. However, it is perhaps also important to 
recognise (Clark, 1952) that whilst governments believe that cooperatives have the capacity 
to be competitive within the market, they fail to acknowledge that cooperatives are not able 
to achieve sufficient allocative efficiency where the objectives of maximising farmer welfare 
and maximising consumer welfare are in conflict.  
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Appendix A 1 – Measures of data  
Figure A1.1. Showing measures for Utility demonstrating degrees of intensity 
Measures of Utility  
Attribute measured  Basis for measurement Intensity Sources of data  
Operational 
importance 
( buyer) 
Proportion of overall spend of the buyer to 
supplier 
 Proportion of overall spend on the category 
Technical and Human skills 
Networks 
 
Consideration of proportion of spend – over 50% 
high 
Below 20% low  
Number of  suppliers 
1-3 ( high op importance) 
4-9 ( medium ) 
Below 10 – low   
Switching costs - 
Interviews with cooperatives , 
Journal articles, other published 
data 
Commercial 
importance 
( buyer) 
Proportion of overall revenue generated through 
product 
Perceived importance by the buyer of product 
portfolio 
 
Tacitness, specificity and Complexity  ( where high 
– these are products which are unique and 
bespoke, and contribute much to revenue 
generation 
Operational 
importance 
(supplier) 
Value of the buyers business – over the long and 
short terms 
 
Consideration of proportion of spend – over 50% 
high 
Below 20% low  
Number of  suppliers 
1-3 ( high op importance) 
4-9 ( medium ) 
Below 10 – low   
Switching costs 
Interviews with cooperatives , 
Journal articles, other published 
data 
Commercial 
importance 
(supplier) 
Implications for business growth  
 
Potential growth in buyers’ market  
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Figure A1.2 showing measures for Scarcity 
Measures of scarcity   
Attribute measured  Basis for measurement  Intensity  Sources of 
data 
Market 
competition  
Industry growth Increases in share of 
Gross domestic product 
 
 
 
Comparative increase with other businesses. High = a proportional 
increase of greater than 25% more than the average increase 
Published data for 
historical and current 
triangulation with 
cooper competitors 
farmers and industry 
bodies  
 
Interviews with all 
stake holders 
Trade journals, 
industry bodies  
 
Exit barriers  
 
Presence of government 
legislation,  
Investment costs etc.  
High – severe losses incurred or exit inhibited,  representing 
above 5-10% of annual operating budget 
 
Diversity of competitors 
 
Levels of specialisation 
of competitors 
High = many specialists  ,  more than 10 in the field  
Concentration and balance A HHI index  High above 25 – low below 10% 
 
Switching costs 
 
Levels of specific 
investment, 
Proportion of business tied up  
Brand identity 
 
Perceived strength of 
brand 
High value placed on brand – low not recognised 
Product differences 
 
Level of standardisation Interchangeability of product,  specificity of product,  high only made for, 
low = standard 
Intermittent capacity Evidence of periodic 
supply 
Presence of evidence of any bottleneck problem 
Storage costs 
 
Costs  of holding stock 
– based on premises, 
use of energy 
technology, length of 
time needed to be 
stored 
High – presence of all three, low  
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Market 
contestation  
Economies of scale 
 
Share of output over time  
Expert knowledge of technology 
Evidence of fall in share of output over time 
Data on investment of  best practice technology 
 
Proprietary product differences Standard or customised  Bespoke or standard  
Brand identity  
 
brand identity Significant presence within the market, - key association with 
product identity in mind of consumers 
Switching cots 
 
Levels of specific investment, Proportion of business tied up  
Capital requirements 
 
Costs of investment for expansion or 
differentiation 
Return on investment  
 
High – above average return on investment  
Access to customers/ 
distribution channels 
Dedicated supply channels  Evidence of dedicated supply channels in which there are apparent 
switching costs  
Availability of 
buyers 
Product differences Standardisation – levels of 
interchangeability  
High products are easily interchangeable – choice entirely based 
on cost a 
Distribution channels Dedicated supply channels  Evidence of dedicated supply channels in which there are apparent 
switching costs  
Switching costs Levels of specific investment, Proportion of business tied up  
Concentration and balance A HHI index  High above 25 – low below 10% 
 
Corporate stakes Potential for loss or gain of market 
share 
Extent to which there is shifts in market share  
Prices performance of 
substitutes 
 
Comparison of prices of substitutes High above the average prices  
Low lower than average 
Switching costs Levels of specific investment, Proportion of business tied up  
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Appendix A 3 Lists and schedules of interviews (highlighted to protect the interests of farmers and confidentiality agreement ( see acknowledgements) 
Top Fruit cooperative   
 Date  Company Location  Tape record number  
Adrian Barlow 
1st Interview  
1st Feb 2006 English Apples and Pears  Telephone interview Interview notes / not recorded 
James Crowden  Feb 2006 Fruit specialist Telephone interview Notes – not recorded 
Paul Hillman  Feb 2006 Industry specialist rural business advisor  Telephone interview Not recorded 
John Thatcher March 2006 Thatcher’s brewery  At the Brewery Interview notes 
Dan Keech  March 2006 Sustain  Telephone interview Interview notes 
Nigel Jenny  April 2006 Fresh produce  
Journal 
Telephone interview Interview notes 
Ian Mitchell May  2006 
July 2006 
August 2006 
3 meetings plus continuous 
email contact up to July 2007. 
Robert Mitchell partnership, chair of 
SGT and Chair of the Bramley campaign 
At the university of 
Birmingham, and on his 
farm 
Interview notes / not recorded 
Andrew Tinsley  May 2006 Horticultural development council Telephone interview  Not recorded key details on the 
structure of industry and appropriate 
contacts 
Des Mckeever  August 2006 Marketing agent for class two fruit Hotel foyer  Interview with notes 
Derek Whitnall SGT 
manager  
July 2006 SGT  Head office  Interview notes  
Robert Mitchell July  2006 RMB  On Fruit Farm Interview notes / not recorded 
Andy Sandler August 2006 Norman Collett Head office Interview notes / not recorded 
Graham Jenner  November 2006 Bayer crop Science Head office Interview notes 
James Simpson November 2006 Adrian Scripts 
These are growers  packhouse supplier 
to Tesco 
Head office Interview notes 
John Morgan August 2006 International produce  Wakefield Interview notes 
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John Breach  August 2006 Chair of British independent fruit 
growers association 
Telephone interview  Interview notes  
Stuart Carter August 2006 Interlink – buys sliced and processed 
apples from Fourayes 
Warrington  Interview notes 
Chris Browning   
August 2006 
Non-grower member of SGT - Cottage 
farms ltd  ( packhouse) 
At the pack house  Interview notes 
Rob Browning  August 2006 Member of SGT Telephone interview Interview notes 
Richard Greenwood 
- Manager 
September 2006 Hazel street ~Farm Horsmonden 
Tonbridge, TN1 8EF 
 At Hazel street farm Interview notes 
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HOPs  October 2006 One of the two employment agencies for the sector National fruit 
Show 
Interview notes 
Mike Jobbin 1st 
Interview 
October 2006 Orchard World  Colchester  Interview notes 
Mike Jobbin 2nd 
Interview 
6th November 
2006 
Orchard World  Telephone 
interview 
Interview notes – confirms certain details  
Phil Acock  January 2007 Fourayes  
Slicer and dicer 
At Factory Interview notes  
Martin De la Fuente   Tesco – Top fruit buyer Tesco head office Interview notes / not recorded 
Steven Packer  January 2007  A and P hill This agent works closely with WWF and removes 
class 2 or not spec fruit 
At head office  Interview notes  
Huang  fruits  January 2002 This took place in Shaanxi Provence 
In Xian at the Huang fruit packhouse and office 
At head office Written notes from interview- working 
with translator  
 
Dairy Interviews  
 Date of 
interview 
Company Location  Tape record number 
Mansell Raymond 1st 
interview 
22nd April 2008  Farmer and Farmer director for First Milk Jordanston Cassette tape interview 
Mr Lewis 17th July  Cilau farm  Interview by phone No recording  
Richard Hollingsdale   1st 
Interview  
22nd July 2008 Marketing Director First Milk Welsh Show 1st interview  
Interviews with the board 
of directors First Milk  
22nd July 2008 Richard Davis – supplies 
Tom Cambell 
Robert Shearlaw – Deputy chair 
Alan Taylor 
The Welsh show July 2008 Not able to take a recording, held 
within members tent 
Richard Hollingsdale 2nd 
interview 
23rd July  Ibid  Over the phone  DS400034 
Nigel Evans  24th July 2008 Farmer Nr Fishguard DS400016 and V0r 04 
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Ian Jaimeson  25th July 2008 Hendre Eynon Farm supplies First Milk and 
part of grass Hooper group. 
St David’s. Refused to be recorded 
Thomas G     Ds400018 plus tape recordings 
Eric Evans 29th  July 2008 Conlwyn farm Llanchaer Fishguard Request that should not be 
recorded – interview notes 
R Lewis  29th July 2008  Organic farmer Trefasser Strumble head  DS400019 
E Evans 31st July 2008 Farmer supplying  Milk Link  Request refused  
Matt Sheenan 12th august  Dairy Farmers of Britain Head office  Ds400020 
R J Morgan,  17th August  Cilwn Fach  Upper Scolton Brief interview notes 
W O Reed  17th August 
2008 
Farmers supplying Dairy Farmers of Britain Upper Scolton , Spittal  DS400022 
Alan Pritchard  18th August 
2008 
Panty Philip Dwrbach DS400023 
Phil Leigh  19th August 
2008 
2010 
Glanbia  Interview took place at 
Pembrokeshire show 
Interview notes  
Tom Davis  August 2008 Highmead dairy Lynbudder  
 
Telephone interview Interview notes 
Farmer at Little Newcastle  August 2008 Farm little Newcastle  Little Newcastle on Farm DS400029 
Simon Davis 17th September Organic farmer Brynhfydd, Penaear, Whitland 
–supplies Dairy farmers of Britain at the time.- 
On farm DS400031 
 
Robert Somerfield  19/09/08 Farmer in Argyle Telephone interview  Vor 7 and DS40024 
 
Hywel James  18th September   Organic farmer who supplies Rachels through 
the cooperative Calon Wen 
Plasybellan V0rc009  
David Fisher  25th September 
2008 
Farmer in Chorley First milk David.fisher@btopen.com Email and telephone  
DS400033 
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Graham James  13th October  
2008 
Bottling Plant, also works with ~Willie 
Pritchard to make diversified milk drinks etc. 
Mark Hunter Ltd DS400043 
Sean  Beer  October 2008 Academic – advise on feed and implications of 
feed in terms on yield and costs  
Bournemouth University 
background agriculture 
VO8 
Cambell Appleton  
 
October 2008 Saputo  Cambell.Appleton@ 
saputo.co.uk 
Brief interview  
Longer interview was to follow but 
cancelled at last minute twice 
Robert Gibby  October 2008  Bethseda  Dairy small scale DS400030 
Mr Ridge September  
2008 
Farmer , director of Omsco  The Granary Behesesada DS400027 
Peter Gash  September  
2008 
Farmer near Whitland  Whitland DS400028 
V010 and v011 
Ian Potter August 2008 Runs an advisory website Independent advisor  Brief interview at Pembrokeshire 
show 
Mr Evans  15th October 
2008 
Little Hooks Dairies Ambleston  At the dairy  Ds400047 
Gareth Rowlands  October 2008  Ex Director of Rachel dairies Nr Aberystwyth DS400045 and DS400046 
Edward Perkins August 2010 Independent advisor The Pembrokeshire show Interview notes 
Ed Andrews  October 2010, 
and 2011  
dairy farmer and produces ice cream   notes from interview 
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Pig interviews  
 Date of 
interview  
Company Location  Form of recording and recording 
number   
Chris Barlow 1st 
interview 
26th August  Yorkshire Farmers Livestock marketing Ltd  Malton  Tape -cassette 
Ian Paragreen  28th August  Scotlean Telephone interview Interview notes 
Thompson 
Norton  
 
10th August 
2008 
Farm producing pigs supplied to Beadle Price – independent  
marketing agent 
Norton Sheffield DS00013 
Philip Hardy  7th August 2008  Marr grange farmer, wholesaler and retailer Marr Grange farm DS400004 
Mr Perkins  9th August 2008  Small scale farmer – takes his pigs to Selby market  Hollin Hill Farm  
Worral  
Refused to be recorded  
Mr Parks August 2008 Member of  Scotlean Farm near Rotherham  Refused to be interviewed 
Angela Cliffe August 2008 Bpex North Derbyshire  
knowledge transfer group  
Interview notes ( short interview, 
plus email) 
Chris Barlow 2nd 
interview 
September  marketer for YFLM  Malton  DS40025 
Ian Paragreen -  15th September  Scotlean Woodhall service station  Interview notes  
Tim Leigh  18th September  
 
AQM Short telephone interview Interview notes 
Mike Bell   Farmer member of YFLM Phone call  DS40032 
4 
Don Sanderson  21st September 
2008  
Farmer / exdirector of YFLM  Phone call DS400034 and DS400035 
Phil Sanderson  30th September 
2008 
Farmer member of YFLM  DS400038 
Simon Newby  Farmer member of YFLM  DS40039 
Dan Day  20th October  Grampian foods  Short telephone interview  Interview note 
Richard 
Longthorpe  
11th November 
2008 
Farmer member of Thames Valley , also member of BPEX board, 
chair the Pig industry training strategy implementation group, 
At his farm DS40048 
Chris Barlow 3rd 11/02/2009 discussion on the power dynamics in food  telephone interview DS40052 
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interview Makes point that farmers 
wouldn’t want to invest in 
abattoir 
Richard Smith 
interview 1 
29th July 2009 Bedfordia supplies Meadow quality   Telephone interview interview notes  
Katherine Rhodes  31st July 2009 Farmer member of YFLM  Holme farm DS40063 
Richard Smith 2  4th August 2009 Bedfordia supplies Meadow quality   Nr Bedford  DS40064 
Guy Kiddy  4th August 2009 Shuttleworth College / lecturer and farmer  Shuttleworth college  DS40064 
Angela Cliffe August 2008 Bpex North Derbyshire  
knowledge transfer group  
Interview notes ( short interview, 
plus email) 
John Walker  20th September 
2010 
David Burtin Farms Sausages  DS40067 
Peter Batty 23rd September  
2010 
Director of Yorkshire farmers previously a member of Scotlean On Farm DS40069 
Mr Templeton  20/11/2009 Supplies Scotlean  Spittalmoor farm DS40065 
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Appendix 3 Summary of qualitative data analysis methods 
 Description  Strengths 
Content 
analysis 
Intense examination and classification of the text into an efficient number of 
categories  that represent similar meanings Content can be analysed in terms of the 
descriptive and its meaning 
Allows for use of predetermined themes  and offers a 
basis for a preliminary analysis of themes derived 
from  theoretical framework but is also flexible in 
that it allows for emergent themes 
Conversation 
analysis  
Based on ethnomethodology, it looks at language as a means of understanding how 
people make sense of their world 
Valuable in social constructivists’ work on society 
and understanding how context influences 
participants’ production of social reality  
Comparative 
analysis  
This is a technique used to make causal inferences on the basis of a small number 
of cases. It is based on the intensive analysis of a few cases, which allows for the 
researcher to look for rival explanations. 
 An effective method for Theory development  
Narrative 
analysis  
Focuses upon the narrative as a unit of analysis Allows for the re-formulation of people in different 
context 
Discourse 
analysis 
Method of analysing naturally occurring speech, it looks at words, sentences, 
linguistic features and focuses upon the way language is used  and where and when 
it is used   
It is valuable in the examination of talk as indicators 
of social practice and gives answers to social 
questions and how people relate to their social 
environment 
Thematic 
analysis  
Thematic analysis is a method for identifying, analysing, and reporting patterns 
(themes) within Data, and indeed has been known to refer to content analysis and 
discourse analysis. Its distinguishing feature is that it allows the themes to emerge 
from the data  
It allows works in conditions where there is an 
assumption of an intransitive or subjective truth 
Grounded 
theory 
It starts with an examination of a single case study and develops a theoretical 
understanding of that data. The theoretical construct is then used to examine 
another case study and if there is a fit with the statement then another case is 
selected and so on. Where there is no fit there is an adjustment to the statement. 
To gain an understanding of the abstract categories 
grounded in the data and is designed to come to a 
generalisation of a population 
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Appendix 4 Comparative analysis of the three case studies 
 SGT  First Milk /Milk Marque/MMB YFLM 
Pre-retail 
consolidation 
Post retail 
consolidation 
Pre-retail 
consolidation 
Post retail 
consolidation 
Pre-retail 
consolidation 
Post retail 
consolidation 
Emerson 
framework  
Increase in 
prices and 
margins  
+ scarcity  Yes  No Yes  No Yes Yes 
+  motivational interest No No No No No No 
Other factors 
affecting 
leverage  
Pressure on prices by 
category leaders  
No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Proactive  
Action of competitors 
No Yes  Yes –( after est. 
Milk Marque) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Consolidation of customer 
base  
No Yes Yes Yes  No Yes  
High asset specific 
investment (coop) 
No Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
UK competition policy  No No No until Milk 
Marque 
Yes No No 
Small Size relative to 
buyers  
No  Yes No  No (complexity) No Yes 
High risk of moral hazard 
– product perishability 
Yes  No  Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Olson,  
Longevity/ 
cohesion 
Monitoring . lobbying ; 
negotiation , search and 
control costs Inc agency  
N/a No No Yes  No No 
Shirking costs/ sanction 
costs 
N/A No Yes  Yes No No 
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xlvi  Interviews 
1. Chair of cooperative  
2. Manager of cooperative  
3. Hayward D. J. and Le Heron (2002) Horticultural reform in the European Union and New Zealand: 
further development towards a global fresh fruit and vegetable complex, Australian Geographer, Vol. 
33, no. 1 pp. 9-27. 
Supporting evidence 
1. Ellis P.G. (1968?) Marketing boards and the fruit import trade of the United Kingdom, Wye College, nr 
Ashford, UK 
xlvii  Figures derived from 
1. Orchard Surveys and MAFF publications on the horticultural sector from the period Basic Horticultural 
statistics. MAFF data from the period 
2.  Interview with James Crowden, Feb 2006 
3. Interview with Liz Copas, Feb 2006 
4. Interview with Phil Hillman, Feb 2006 
xlviii 
1. Interview with manager of SGT, additional information sought from the Financial Services Agency, 
and provided on company accounts that can in effect only trace financial records back to the 1980s. 
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Section A.5. 3 Endnotes for Pig case study 
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cxxviii  
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cxxxi  
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cxxxvi 
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2. Also supported with evidence from EuroPA (1999) The way forward for the British Pig Industry, a 
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1. Rasmussen J. (2006) Costs of international pig production 2002 Danish pig production, Danish Bacon 
and Meat Council Report 29 2006. (Data talks about English costs being 30% higher than EU ) 
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2. Palmer C. (2008) The future for abattoirs, AHDH consulting April 2008 
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cxxxix Agra CEAS consulting(2003) Economic evaluation of the pig industry restructuring scheme, Final report 
for DEFRA submitted by Agra CEAS consulting in association with the Department of Agricultural Services, 
Imperial College, University of London.  
cxl 
1. Knowles, A. (2002)  European cost of production project in selected countries, Bpex/ MLC, 
2.  ETTP (2009) Improving the competitiveness of the UK pig meat industry EFFP, September 2009. 
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cxli Agribusiness2008,   Welfare fails to win market share, agriculture autumn 2008  
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cxliii  
1. Bpex  (2008)  The British Pig Industry , Bpex , UK.  
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cxlv  
1. Anon (2007) Danes take a slice of the UK Pig market, 10/2/2007, Farmers Weekly 
ww.fwi.co.uk/articles/2007/10/02/107194/Danes 
2. Tulip company reports between 2004 – 2011 
3. Vion company reports over the same period 
1. Corroboratory evidence on decline in numbers of abattoirs, Palmer, C. W. 2008 The future for 
abattoirs, note by Agricultural and Horticultural Development Board meat services, ADHB consulting, 
April 2008 www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/board/fsa080504a2.pdf 
 
cxlvi  
1. there is a requirement under UK policy that all abattoirs should have a registered vet attached  
2. Interviews Marketeer YFLM and procurer for key customers 
3. Additional resources included EC (2004) case no comp/m.3461 Danish Crown and Flagship foods, 
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cxlvii 
1. This figure is based on a calculation based on data extracted from a range of sources including 
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line presentation. 
 
cxlviii   
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pigs they produce. This information stems from a discussion with two Vion members attending   
2. EFFP (2009) Improving the competiveness of the UK pig meat industry, September 2009. 
cxlix  
1. Cranswick plc. report 2010, http://www.cranswick.plc.uk/downloads/Cranswick_R_A_2010.pdf 
2. Anon, (2012) Cranswick Restructure at Preston Site, Published 1st June 2012 
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cl  
1. Interviews former director YFLM, member of rival cooperative, member of BPEX board and  chair of the 
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cli Attempts to explore the situation with both Danish Crown and Vion met with an evasive response. 
clii   
 
1. Interviews former director YFLM, member of rival cooperative, member of BPEX board, chair of the 
Pig Industry Training Strategy Implementation Group, former employees of Cranswick and marketeer 
YFLM 
 
cliii  Interviews with Marketeer YFLM- additional information based on interviews with former employees of 
Cranswick 
cliv 
1. Interviews, Marketeer YFLM, Director Scotlean, independent farmers and farmer directors YFLM  
clv   
This is derived from 
1. comparisons of data on prices from a data base supplied by Chris Barlow at YFLM, 
2.  Bpex data  and  
3. data  generated from interviews from members of YFLM,   
 
clvi   
1. Marketeers YFLM 
clvii   
1. Interviews - Members and Farmer directors 
 
clviii  Interviews: Members of YFLM , members of other cooperatives and independent farmers 
 
clix  
ETTP (2009) Improving the competitiveness of the UK pig meat industry EFFP, September 2009. 
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5. DEFRA (2007) Agriculture in the UK, 2007 DEFRA, HMSO, London. 
6. DEFRA (2006) Agriculture in the UK, 2006 DEFRA, HMSO, London.  
18 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
clxii Interviews with Pig farmers across the sector members, non members and independents. 
 
clxiii Competition commission report of 2006. www.competition-commission.org.uk/rep_pub/.../085c03.pdf 
 
clxiv  
1. Tulip,  Vion, Cranswick  company reports 2008- 2010 
2. Bowman, A. Froud, J. Johal, S. Law, J. Leaver, A. and Williams, K. (2012) Bringing home the bacon, 
CRESC Public interest report, June 2012. 
clxv  
1. Marketeers YFLM 
 
clxv UK: Vion plans more UK job cuts By: just-food.com | 24 February 2010 htttp://www.just-
food.com/news/vion-plans-more-uk-job-cuts_id109962.aspx   ACESSED 14TH Feb 2011. 
2. Anon, (2009) Tulip cuts its headcount by up to 375, 17th Jan 2009 , The grocer 
http://www.thegrocer.co.uk/fmcg/tulip-cuts-its-headcount-by-up-to-375/196740.article accessed , 2oth Jan 
2011. 
 
 
clxvi  
  Interviews with marketeers, members and directors of YFLM  
 
clxvii   
1. Interview with procurement manager Grampian food  
2. Bpex labelling report, (2006) bpex.org.uk/articles/dodownload.asp?a...bpex.org 
3. Bpex labelling report up dated , (2009) bpex.org.uk/articles/dodownload.asp?a...bpex.org... 
4. Bedington, E. (2010) Pork report maintaining momentum, Meat info 23rd July 2010  
clxviii  
1. Interview with procurement manager Grampian food 
2. Bpex labelling report (2006) – revisit 
3. (  something going wrong here ) 
clxix  
1. Interviews with Marketeers, Members and members of other cooperatives 
 
clxx   
1. Interviews with Marketeers and member involved in production of sausages YFLM 
 
 
clxxi  
1. Interviews with members and director of YFLM 
clxxii  
1. Interview with marketeers, members and director of YFLM   
 
clxxiii   
1. Interviews with Organic pig producer – member of other cooperatives, non-members Marketeer and 
Managing director, and members 
 
clxxiv  
2. Interviews with members  
clxxv  Interview with Marketeer 
clxxvi ibid 
a. Corroborated by interviews with members and former member/directors and non-members  
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clxxvii This appears to be a sensitive issue – a brief conversation with a Vion procurement manager – elicited the 
point that at 100,000 kills per week there were more than sufficient volumes of UK pigs, despite only a 46% 
self-sufficiency level ( his figures) The figures are substantiated by BPEX figures 
clxxviii ibid 
b. Corroborated by interviews with members and former member/directors and non-members  
